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Letter dated 5 December 2016 from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2262 (2016) addressed to the President of the Security Council

The members of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to resolution 2262 (2016) have the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 23 (c) of resolution 2262 (2016), the final report on their work.

The attached report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic on 4 November 2016 and was considered by the Committee on 2 December 2016.

The Panel of Experts would appreciate it if the present letter and its annex were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Ruben **de Koning**
Coordinator
Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended
pursuant to Security Council resolution 2262 (2016)

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Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2262 (2016)

Summary

Despite important post-transition achievements, such as the launching of efforts towards the national disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration of armed groups and revitalized regional cooperation, the newly-elected Central African Government has not been able to come to grips with a deteriorating security situation, observed since June 2016. While violence among ex-Séléka factions and between anti-balaka and ex-Séléka first appeared to be localized and largely driven by internal power struggles and competition over territory, incidents have grown more severe and widespread during the months of September and October 2016.

Moreover, violent incidents in Bangui and the hinterland are increasingly interconnected, with political agendas entwined in the fighting. A violent exodus on 12 August 2016 of ex-Séléka militia from the PK5 neighbourhood in Bangui, including Abdoulaye Hissène and sanctioned individual Haroun Gaye, created a manhunt that was led by anti-balaka, but with the tacit support of some Bangui politicians. In mid-September, anti-balaka fighters from Bangui travelled to confront ex-Séléka, committing violence south of Kaga-Bandoro, where violence further escalated mid-October when ex-Séléka fighters assaulted the town's camp of internally displaced persons.

Such recent acts of violence by ex-Séléka factions and their endeavours to reunify in Bria have reactivated anti-balaka groups in Bangui, some of them galvanized by the return of Jean-Francis Bozizé, former Defence Minister and son of sanctioned individual and former President Francois Bozizé. Some civil society leaders and politicians have used popular resentment to criticize the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) for its alleged inability to contain ex-Séléka factions, calling for the lifting of the arms embargo and the rearmament of the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) under the guise of protecting civilians.

Following the killing of a FACA officer in the PK5 neighbourhood on 5 October 2016 and the ensuing deadly clashes and retaliations, civil society leader Gervais Lakosso organized a mass violent protest against MINUSCA in Bangui on 24 October. The protests left several people dead and paralysed the capital for days. Five peacekeepers were injured.

Sanctioned individual Nourredine Adam has — to date — failed to reunify ex-Séléka factions. During the long-awaited General Assembly held in Bria in late October 2016, only the Rassemblement patriotique pour le renouveau de la Centrafrique (RPRC) joined Adam's Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC). The Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC) of Mahamat Al-Khatim and the Union pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC) of Ali Darrassa stuck to their independent posture.

In the centre of the country, UPC, in particular, has further extended its area of control, moving to the south and east from its headquarters in Bambari in order to control important diamond mining areas around Nzako and arms trafficking routes spreading from the Democratic Republic of the Congo into the country. In the north, arms trafficking, for the benefit of FPRC, runs through Am Dafok and Tissi, a town that straddles the borders between the Central African Republic and Chad.

In the east, the Lord's Resistance Army has been on a spree, carrying out a number of civilian abductions. The group's trading activities in Kafia Kingi suffered a blow in January 2016 when a number of fighters were expelled after a fallout with local traders. The group continues to loot gold and diamonds and to poach wildlife, as do competing groups of Sudanese poachers.

Most of the southwest of the country is free from violent conflict. However, for a brief period following the violent events in Bangui in June 2016 there was an increase in the number of incidents of harassment of Muslim returnees and internally displaced persons. While periodically under pressure, freedom of movement of Muslim diamond collectors is improving. The Panel does not therefore place in doubt the recent decisions by a Kimberley Process monitoring team to readmit the sub-prefectures of Berberati, Nola, Carnot and Boda to the international diamond trade.

While having an important signalling effect, targeted sanctions against individuals and entities listed by the Committee have been poorly implemented. After being listed, Eugène Ngaïkosset and Alfred Yékatom have received their salaries as army officers. Yékatom's salary payments have stopped, not as a result of sanctions, but rather because he had to resign from the army to run for legislative elections. The Panel has received only verbal assurances that he is not paid as a parliamentarian.

Furthermore, judiciary procedures against listed individuals and other spoilers identified in the Panel's previous reports have been delayed. Arrest warrants against sanctioned individuals Nourredine Adam, Haroun Gaye and Eugène Ngaïkosset have not been carried out. Jean-Francis Bozizé was arrested by MINUSCA but soon released under judicial supervision by the Central African authorities. Hamit Tidjani, a member of Abdoulaye Hissène's network, who was also arrested by MINUSCA and transferred to Central African authorities, has remained in custody.

The judiciary of the Central African Republic has failed to issue arrest warrants for two known perpetrators of violence in Bangui: the former director of Central African Office for the Suppression of Banditry, Robert Yékoua-Ketté, and the army officer Legrand Yamanza, who killed a Senegalese peacekeeper in June 2016. Investigations are formally ongoing but in reality little effort has been made to apprehend them.

Contents

Page

I. Background 6

II. Armed groups, the arms embargo, listed individuals and other spoilers in the international, regional and national context 7

- A. International engagement and regional challenges 7
- B. Government engagement with armed groups 9
- C. Judiciary follow-up of listed individuals and other spoilers 12
- D. Implementation of United Nations sanctions 14
- E. Calls to lift the arms embargo 17

III. Bangui region 18

- A. Ongoing violence in the PK5 neighbourhood and surroundings 18
- B. Anti-balaka in Bangui and the return of Jean-Francis Bozizé 24
- C. Deployment of Central African Armed Forces in Bangui and their weapons management 25
- D. Anti-MINUSCA protests and calls for lifting the arms embargo 27
- E. Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique: business dealings in Bangui 28

IV. Central region and border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo 29

- A. Union pour la paix en Centrafrique, anti-balaka and Mouvement de résistance pour la défense de la patrie activities in Ouaka prefecture 29
- B. Union pour la paix en Centrafrique and cross-border arms trafficking in Mbomou prefecture 35
- C. Illegal taxation by anti-balaka on the Oubangui River between Bangui and Kouango 36

V. Eastern region and border with the Sudan and South Sudan 37

- A. General Assembly of ex-Séléka in Bria 37
- B. Diamonds and security in Bria and the surrounding area 40
- C. Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique: arms trafficking and recruitment in Vakaga prefecture 42
- D. Lord's Resistance Army 43
- E. Sudanese poachers and anti-poaching efforts in Chinko National Park 44

VI. Northern region and border with Chad 45

- A. Anti-balaka challenge to ex-Séléka domination in the prefecture of Nana-Grébizi 45
- B. Area of influence of the Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique and cooperation with Révolution et Justice 47
- C. Oil exploration 49

VII. Western region and border with Cameroon 50
  A. Tensions between anti-balaka and Retour, réclamation et réhabilitation (3R) 50
  B. Front démocratique du peuple centrafricain of Abdoulaye Miskine 50
  C. Diamonds and security 51
VIII. Recommendations 54
Annexes* 56

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* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

I. Background

1. On 27 January 2016, the Security Council adopted resolution 2262 (2016), by which the Panel of Experts was mandated, inter alia, to provide to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) a final report no later than 31 December 2016.

2. During the reporting period (July to October 2016), the Panel maintained an almost permanent presence in the country. Panel members travelled to 12 out of the 16 prefectures (provinces). As was the case in its 2016 midterm (S/2016/694) and 2015 final (S/2015/936) reports, the present report is structured by non-administrative regions, reflecting distinct security dynamics on the ground (see map in annex 1.1). However, in the present report, an introductory chapter has been added in order to provide a regional and national perspective on armed groups, the arms embargo, listed individuals and other spoilers previously identified by the Panel.

Cooperation

3. At the regional level, the Panel conducted official visits to the Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda. For the second time during the current mandate, and despite a letter dated 3 October 2016 from the Committee expressing support for the Panel's visit, the Republic of the Congo did not accommodate the proposed visit.

4. During its mandate, the Panel addressed 58 official communications to Member States, international organizations and private entities, receiving various levels of response to its requests (see annex 1.2).

5. The Panel notes with appreciation the support and collaboration of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), in particular its Joint Mission Analysis Cell, for its logistical support and exchange of information.

Methodology

6. The Panel endeavours to ensure compliance with the standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions in its report of 22 December 2006 (see S/2006/997, annex). While it intends to be as transparent as possible, in situations where identifying sources would expose them or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel intends to withhold identifying information.

7. The Panel is equally committed to the highest degree of fairness and will endeavour to make available to parties, where appropriate and possible, any information in the report for which those parties may be cited, for their review, comment and response within a specified deadline.

8. The Panel safeguards the independence of its work against any effort to undermine its impartiality or create a perception of bias. The Panel approved the text, conclusions and recommendations in the present report on the basis of consensus prior to its transmission by the Panel's Coordinator to the President of the Security Council.

II. Armed groups, the arms embargo, listed individuals and other spoilers in the international, regional and national context

A. International engagement and regional challenges

9. The installation in April 2016 of the newly elected Government, under President Faustin-Archange Touadéra, put an end to the international mediation architecture that had been in place since 2013. The creation of an International Support Group in lieu of the International Contact Group on the Central African Republic symbolizes the new framework for international engagement.[1] The end of the transition also terminated the international mediation role played by consecutive Presidents of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), initially Chad and subsequently the Republic of the Congo.

10. On 31 October 2016, in Bangui, the Minister of Defence of France, Jean-Yves Le Drian, confirmed the end of Operation Sangaris and his country's continuing support for stabilization efforts through contributions to MINUSCA and the European Union Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic.

11. Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) and the African Union also played a significant role in contributing troops to peacekeeping operations and financing the transition. Whereas the African Union is currently reviewing its mandate and its role in the country,[2] CEMAC has offered to financially support the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration programme and to train elements of the Central African Armed Forces (FACA).[3]

12. Regional cross-border challenges such as the migratory herding of cattle, arms and ammunition trafficking and the movement of foreign fighters must be seen in the context of multiple crises in the region. Darfur, in the Sudan, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cameroon, the Republic of the Congo and Chad all face varying degrees of instability that have negatively impacted the security situation of the Central African Republic.

13. Along these lines, the inability of Central African authorities to exert State authority over the entire territory has also contributed to instability in neighbouring countries. The Panel has previously reported on the Front démocratique du peuple centrafricain (FDPC) taking people hostage in Cameroon (see S/2016/694, para. 105). In the same vein, the Government of Chad recently informed the authorities of the Central African Republic about regular incursions of armed men from the Central African Republic into Chadian territory (see annex 2.1).

14. As he did during the electoral period, President Touadéra continued to visit neighbouring countries and relevant partners in the region with a view to mobilizing

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[1] China's planned membership in the International Support Group confirms its economic and political engagement in the Central African Republic. Meeting with a member of the Group of Eight International Contact Group on the Central African Republic in Bangui, 30 May 2016.

[2] Meeting with the African Union Post Conflict Needs Assessment Mission to the Central African Republic in Bangui, 14 August 2016.

[3] Final communique, CEMAC meeting of Heads of State in Malabo, 30 July 2016, available from www.journalducameroun.com/files/communiques/775.pdf.

support for the country's reconstruction needs. The end of the international mediation role played by the Republic of the Congo coincides with a gradual diplomatic re-engagement with the Central African Republic by Chad[4] and a warming of relations between the Central African Republic and the Sudan.[5]

15. Chad and the Sudan are particularly significant because of the long and porous borders they share with the Central African Republic, as well as the alleged presence of nationals of those countries in various ex-Séléka factions. Paradoxically, the Sudan has been absent from existing conflict resolution forums until now.[6] In addition, the Sudanese authorities deny that Oumar Younous, listed by the Sanctions Committee on 20 August 2015, and Moussa Assimeh, one of the most important Séléka generals in 2013, are Sudanese nationals.[7]

16. Despite numerous problems (see para. 178 below), the renewed commitment of the Central African Republic, Chad and the Sudan to implement the tripartite arrangement — that is, the tripartite force established by the Central African Republic, Chad and the Sudan in Khartoum on 23 May 2011 — is an indication of the acknowledgement by these Governments of transborder vulnerabilities. However, the arrangement's objectives of countering arms trafficking and cross-border movements of armed groups still need to be demonstrated by the tripartite force.

17. While the issue of foreign fighters in the Central African Republic is the one that usually relates to Chadian and Sudanese nationals, the Panel obtained information concerning opposition figures of the Democratic Republic of the Congo having arrived in Bangui. Among them is Freddy Libeba Baongoli, a former rebel in the Mouvement de libération du Congo of Jean Pierre Bemba.[8] Baongoli supposedly arrived in Bangui on 5 July 2016 (see annex 2.2). On 24 October 2016, he posted a video online, showing himself in military attire, announcing an ultimatum for Congolese President Joseph Kabila to step down (see annex 2.3).

18. Uncertainty related to Uganda's planned withdrawal from the African Union Regional Task Force against the Lord's Resistance Army is a source of concern for both the Government of the Central African Republic and the subregion as a whole.[9] At the moment of writing, the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) had already

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[4] Although Chad's border with the Central African Republic is still closed, diplomatic relations have improved in recent months. Chad is the country that President Touadéra has visited the most since his election. Meeting and telephone interview with security actors in Bangui and N'Djamena, May and September 2016.

[5] President Touadéra travelled to the Sudan again on 7 September 2016 for the second time since his election to attend the closing ceremony of the Darfur Regional Authority as part of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur.

[6] Despite having an embassy in Bangui, the Sudan is neither a member of the Group of Eight International Contact Group on the Central African Republic nor is it invited as an observer when States members of ECCAS or CEMAC discuss the crisis in the Central African Republic.

[7] Meeting with National Intelligence and Security Services in Khartoum, 13 October 2016. According to the Panel's information, the former passed away, and the latter was part of the Sudanese military and paramilitary structures and sent back to the Sudan by former President Michel Djotodia in October 2013.

[8] E-mail communication from a European intelligence source, 13 August 2016; E-mail communication from a United Nations source in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 23 July 2016.

[9] Meetings with Ugandan officials, Kampala, 18 October 2016. The AU-RTF mandate was extended until 22 May 2017.

withdrawn from certain positions in the country, but continues to maintain an operational base in Obo.[10] It is still unclear how the vacuum would be filled. Although FACA has a presence of 30 elements in the city of Obo, the force is neither trained nor equipped to fight the Lord's Resistance Army. The African Union has made an appeal for other members to support its Regional Task Force, the mandate of which has been extended until May 2017.[11]

19. An additional regional challenge for the African Union Regional Task Force is the spillover of conflict from South Sudan to the Central African Republic with the arrival of approximately 5,000 South Sudanese refugees.[12] Armed South Sudanese "Arrow Boys" have been seen in the vicinity of refugees, who are moving in greater numbers towards Obo.[13]

B. Government engagement with armed groups

Armed groups' involvement in the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration process

20. Following the dialogue initiated during the early months of his mandate (see S/2016/694, paras. 11-15), President Touadéra has continued interacting with armed groups. He met with several armed group leaders during his visits to Bouar on 6 June, Kaga-Bandoro on 6 August and 17 October, and to Bria on 5 September 2016.

21. On 12 October 2016, the President participated in the first meeting of the Advisory and Monitoring Committee for the national disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration programme. Participants included representatives of 11 armed groups out of the 14 invited (annex 2.4). Maxim Mokom's anti-balaka group, Nourredine Adam's Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC) and "General" Sidiki's armed group, Retour, réclamation et rehabilitation (3R),[14] did not take part in the work of the Committee. On 3 November participants unanimously adopted the national strategy on disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration, well in advance of the 17 November Brussels Donors Conference, at which resources in support of the plan should be mobilized.

22. The holding of this long awaited first meeting of the Advisory and Monitoring Committee is a positive achievement, although several challenges remain. The question of whether the leaders of the armed group participating in the Committee genuinely represent their combatants is the first issue of concern. Anti-balaka leaders have difficulties in effectively commanding and controlling their groups, which easily shift allegiances, depending on the financial means put at their

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[10] In early August 2016, the UPDF 11th Battalion based in Nzako and the 43rd Battalion in Sam-Ouandja, left those locations.

[11] Peace and Security Council of the African Union, see document: Assembly/AU/Dec.605-620(XXVII).

[12] Confidential report, 30 September 2016.

[13] Confidential report, 11 May 2016.

[14] The Panel was informed that 3R leader, "General" Sidiki, has approached the President and considered joining the work of the Committee; meeting with Jean Willybiro-Sako, Bangui, 21 October 2016.

disposal.[15] Among ex-Séléka groups, participants appointed for the Mouvement Patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC) and Mouvement des libérateurs centrafricains pour la justice (MLCJ) have seen their legitimacy challenged by certain factions on the ground.[16]

23. Second, the actual readiness of armed groups to disarm is very uncertain. Leaders of ex-Séléka groups have little incentive to disarm, considering the unchallenged control they exercise over large parts of territory. They formally argue that their political concerns must be addressed before actual disarmament can commence (see annex 2.5; see also S/2016/694, para. 11).

24. Similarly Maxime Mokom, who refused to allow his anti-balaka group to participate on the grounds that the Committee is merely consultative (annex 2.6) expressed the view to the Panel that disarmament should not be conducted as long as ex-Séléka continue to threaten civilians.[17] Adopting a similar view, many members of Ngaïssona's anti-balaka branch have threatened to withdraw from the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration process.[18]

Integration and reintegration of armed groups into the national security and armed forces

Profile of the ex-Séléka combatants requesting integration

25. The integration and reintegration of ex-Séléka combatants into the national security and armed forces has been a constant request of the leaders of the various ex-Séléka factions. Several told the Panel that the deployment of national security and armed forces in areas under their control could only be accepted if the deployed units included a significant number of Muslims (see S/2016/694, para. 19).

26. Among ex-Séléka requesting their integration and reintegration, the Panel has identified five different categories of individuals (for an integral analysis of MPC combatants, see annex 2.7):

(a) Registered FACA elements whose names appear on the FACA payroll, some of whom have gone through the simplified verification or vetting process of FACA in Bangui (see S/2016/694, para. 36): they demand that a proper rank/title be allocated to them, as is the case, for example, of Geoffroy Yakota Beroum, the leader of the ex-Séléka RDOT camp in Bangui;[19]

(b) FACA elements who were removed from the register under former President François Bozizé: this includes many so-called "liberators", mostly Muslim rebels who participated in Bozizé's coup in March 2003 and who were integrated in FACA when Bozizé took power, to be removed later by then-President Bozizé

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[15] Dieudonné Ndomaté, Coordinator in charge of operations within the Ngaïssona branch of anti-balaka, told the Panel that the Coordination needs a representative in the Government to alleviate its lack of funding. Interview with Dieudonné Ndomaté, Bangui, 15 October 2016.

[16] Confidential report, 1 September 2016.

[17] Meetings with Maxime Mokom, Bangui, 15 August and 21 October 2016.

[18] Press communiqué dated 28 September 2016 of the Ngaïssona branch of anti-balaka, available from https://www.facebook.com/berengerludovicigor.lamaka/posts/1146495552083881; meetings with participants in the anti-balaka assembly of 6 October 2016, Bangui, 12 and 15 October 2016.

[19] Meeting with Geoffroy Yakota Beroum, Bangui, 14 October 2016.

(see annex 2.8). Many of these elements joined the Séléka to take revenge against Bozizé;

(c) FACA elements dismissed by the Transitional Government of Catherine Samba Panza because they had abandoned their position in the national army to join the Séléka rebellion (see annex 2.9). The Chief of Staff of the national army Ludovic Ngaïfei informed the Panel on 4 October 2016 that he was about to dismiss another 200 and 300 FACA soldiers who did not respond to recent calls to present themselves at FACA gathering centres. These soldiers may include many ex-Séléka fighters who are unable to move to or within Bangui given the safety risks when passing through anti-balaka areas;[20]

(d) FACA elements integrated by President Michel Djotodia after the Séléka took power in 2013: this group includes 3,437 Séléka fighters integrated by the decree of 10 October 2013 (see S/2014/452, annex 6.1), who were sent to training camps in the Central African Republic and the Sudan (see annex 2.10 below) and a group of "liberators" readmitted to FACA. Subsequent Governments of the Central African Republic never recognized this integration of FACA by Djotodia;

(e) Ex-Séléka combatants who have had no previous role in national security and armed forces, but nevertheless claim the need to integrate into FACA.

The integration and reintegration policy of the Government of the Central African Republic and the reaction of ex-Séléka groups

27. The Government has expressed its commitment to integrate a number of ex-combatants in the internal security and armed forces. Jean Willybiro-Sako, Special Coordinator for disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration, security sector reform and national reconciliation, told the Panel that this will be done on an individual basis, as agreed upon at the Bangui Forum in May 2015. He also pointed out several issues to be taken into consideration, including "right-sizing" of forces and their financial sustainability, as well as inflated ranks and the criminal records of some ex-combatants.[21]

28. Ex-Séléka groups generally oppose the idea of integration on an individual basis, which they consider to have been imposed upon them at the Bangui Forum. On 12 October 2016, during the meeting of the Advisory and Monitoring Committee on disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration, representatives of UPC expressed the view that their members still expect to be integrated on a collective basis (by corps).[22] Both UPC and MPC call for their elements to be integrated as part of two collective corps, one corps to protect transhumance activities and another corps of border guards (see annex 2.11). The discrepancy between the expectations of the armed groups and the actual opportunities for integration and reintegration is likely to constitute a serious source of tension.

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[20] In this regard, the Panel reiterates its recommendation to ensure that FACA soldiers of all prefectures have equal access to the registration and simplified verification process (see S/2016/694, para. 113(d)).

[21] Meeting with Jean Willybiro-Sako, Bangui, 21 October 2016.

[22] Meetings with participants to the Advisory and Monitoring Committee meeting on disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration, Bangui, 12-19 October 2016.

29. The dissatisfaction of ex-Séléka factions regarding the Government's integration policy is aggravated by the fact that most anti-balaka fighters have never lost their position in the national security and armed forces, or that some have even been reintegrated in spite of a record of human rights abuses during the crisis, such as sanctioned individual Eugène Ngaïkosset (see paras. 46-50 below).

30. Along these lines, on 24 June 2016, the Minister of Interior, Jean-Serge Bokassa, issued a decree nominating Maxime Mokom as an officer in the national police (see S/2016/694, para. 13). Realizing his error, on 18 July Minister Bokassa cancelled the appointment on administrative grounds (annex 2.12).

C. Judiciary follow-up of listed individuals and other spoilers

Limited execution of arrest warrants

31. As the Panel highlighted in its midterm report (see S/2016/694, paras. 24-26) judges of the Central African Republic issued arrest warrants against a number of high profile individuals, including: Francois Bozizé's family members and entourage; ex-Séléka and anti-balaka leaders; and PK5 militia leaders. While the responsibility to arrest or detain an alleged culprit rests with the authorities of the Central African Republic, MINUSCA, at the formal request of the authorities, is mandated by resolution 2301 (2016) to arrest and detain under the urgent temporary measures.

32. MINUSCA has insisted that warrants should be properly drafted and formally transmitted by the competent legal authorities.[23] The Panel notes that many of the arrest warrants contain serious deficiencies, in that names are wrong or incomplete and charges are not clearly specified. After discussing with judges and prosecutors, it also appears that many evidence files are practically empty. Therefore, even if the arrest warrants are executed, the chances of an eventual conviction against many of the alleged criminals are not high.

33. Of those under arrest warrant, MINUSCA has been able to arrest Jean-Francis Bozizé, on 5 August 2016, and Hamit Tidjani, who fled from Bangui along with Abdoulaye Hissène, on 13 August 2016 (see paras. 65-67 below). Jean-Francis Bozizé was transferred to the authorities of the Central African Republic, which granted him provisional release under judicial supervision.

Acquittals of alleged anti-balaka culprits

34. A review of the 54 cases[24] that were considered during the first hearing session of the criminal court session of 2016, held in Bangui from 26 August to 23 September 2016, shows that 11 cases were acquitted, among which were those of anti-balaka leader Aubin Yaouné, also known as "Chocolat", and Jonathan Fabrice Tchokola, both on the grounds of insufficient evidence (see annex 2.13). In other instances, the Court decided to request more information from, or send them back

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[23] Confidential communication, 25 June 2016.

[24] The judicial criminal system of the Central African Republic holds sessions during which decisions are issued once or twice per year. The previous session, from 29 June to 21 July 2015, was the first since 2011. At that occasion, 127 cases were heard, resulting in 94 convictions and 15 acquittals.

to, the investigating judge. There is no explanation as to why the Court did not opt for this possibility in the two above-mentioned cases.

Crimes in Bangui committed by FACA officers pending prosecution

35. As the Panel indicated in its midterm report (see S/2016/694, paras. 38-41), there is considerable evidence of the commission of serious human rights violations by FACA officer and former head of the Central African Office for the Suppression of Banditry, Robert Yékoua-Ketté. However, at the time of writing of the present report, no arrest warrant had yet been issued against him.

36. On 2 August 2016, a judicial investigation was opened into the killing of a Senegalese peacekeeper on 24 June in Bangui, cited by the Panel in its midterm report (see S/2016/694, para. 33).[25] Investigations carried out by MINUSCA police and the national police have resulted in a detailed account of the circumstances of the murder and identity of the alleged perpetrator, Legrand Yamanza, alias Yamandjia Legrand. Yamanza is a FACA Corporal, active in the 5th district of Bangui, and his name is on the FACA payroll. Even though the public prosecutor of Bangui is of the opinion that the eyewitness reports in themselves justify an arrest warrant against Yamanza, none had yet been issued at the time of writing of the present report.

37. The FACA Chief of Staff and the Director of Cabinet of the Minister of Defence claim not to have been informed about the case and that, as such, no disciplinary procedure had been brought against the alleged perpetrator.[26] However, the Panel was informed that MINUSCA did communicate the alleged perpetrator's name and rank to the President and Minister of Defence in August 2016.[27]

Uninvestigated attacks against peacekeepers and humanitarian personnel

38. In the course of 2016, there have been several other serious incidents, including killings, against peacekeepers and humanitarian personnel in different parts of the country. Annex 2.14 contains a list of incidents against humanitarian personnel. Annex 2.15 contains a list of incidents against peacekeepers. At the time of the writing of the present report, the Panel was not aware of any substantial judiciary investigations.

Judiciary shortcomings and the Special Criminal Court

39. While the Panel acknowledges the many challenges in terms of material and human resources of the judiciary, as well as those of the police authorities, the above-mentioned pending prosecutions, limited arrests, acquittals and provisional release raise questions about the impartiality of the judicial system and its willingness to investigate serious crimes, underlining the need for the Special Criminal Court to start its work.

40. The Special Criminal Court was formally created on 3 June 2015 by the Central African Transitional Government. It is a court within the national judicial

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[25] Meeting with the Chief Judge, Mr. Abdel Daouda, 17 October 2016.

[26] Meeting with Cabinet Director of the Ministry of Defence, Bangui, 6 October 2016; Meeting with the FACA Chief of Staff, Bangui, 5 August 2016.

[27] Meeting with MINUSCA, 12 August 2016.

system that will have national and international judges and an international prosecutor. It has competence over the gravest crimes committed in the national territory since 2003, including war crimes and crimes against humanity, committed in the territory of the Central African Republic since 2003. On 26 August 2016, the Central African Republic and United Nations partners agreed on an initial budget of $7 million for starting the Court's operations.

D. Implementation of United Nations sanctions

Nourredine Adam

41. On 24 August 2016, the Panel received a response to a request for information sent on 26 April 2016 to Deenar Travel in Dubai, the company through which Nourredine Adam's airline tickets for flights between N'djamena and Nairobi in 2015 were booked (see S/2016/694, annex 36). The response specified that Nourredine Adam purchased the tickets himself, paying in cash, but the response failed to specify the location where the payment was made. Tickets were paid for on 13 July 2016, a day prior to Adam's travel from N'djamena to Nairobi. To ascertain whether Nourredine Adam was in fact in the United Arab Emirates on 14 July 2016, the Panel, on 30 August, requested further information from the authorities. No response had yet been received at the time of the writing of the present report.

42. For their part, the Kenyan authorities did not reply to any of the Panel's requests for information regarding Adam's travels, neither during this mandate nor during its previous ones. The Panel appreciates the fact that representatives of the President of the Security Council (New Zealand) and the Chair of the Committee met with the Deputy Permanent Representative of Kenya on 28 September 2016 with a view to seeking a reply to the Committee's letter of 30 October 2015 to the Permanent Representative of Kenya. However, to date no response has been forthcoming from the Kenyan authorities regarding reports of Adam's travels to Kenya between May and September 2015.

43. On 29 October 2016, Nourredine Adam allegedly travelled overland from Ndélé to Sido, just across the border in southern Chad, in the company of a number of other FPRC leaders, including Abdoulaye Hissène.[28] They supposedly returned to Ndélé on 1 November 2016.[29]

François Bozizé

44. After multiple requests for information by the Panel, South African authorities, on 3 October 2016, responded to an official correspondence from the Chair of the Committee, dated 21 June 2016, regarding the entry of François Bozizé into South Africa on 14 October 2015, as previously reported by the Panel (see S/2015/936, annex 6). South African authorities confirmed that Bozizé had travelled to South Africa on 14 October 2015, which, according to the note verbale, was aimed at fostering national reconciliation and stability prior to the elections; the note verbale also contained a post facto request for an exemption to the travel ban.

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[28] Telephone interview with confidential source, 3 November 2016; confidential report, 2 November 2016.

[29] Confidential report, 3 November 2016.

45. In his reply to South Africa, the Chair of the Committee requested further travel details, as well as clarification with regard to a reference to "each visit" in the South African note verbale, which suggests more than a single visit by Bozizé to South Africa. In fact, the Panel has received reports that Bozizé may have entered South Africa on or around 13 September 2014 (see S/2015/936, annex 6), and has also received information about his possible travel to South Africa in June 2016.[30]

Eugène Barret Ngaïkosset

46. On 17 December 2015, the Committee listed Eugène Barret Ngaïkosset as one of the main perpetrators of the violence that erupted in Bangui in late September 2015.[31] In its 2016 midterm report (see S/2016/694, para. 31) the Panel cited Ngaïkosset's role in leading irregular FACA deployments in Bangui that were ordered by former Minister of Defence, Joseph Bindoumi. Ngaïkosset himself told the Panel that he had been reinstated by Minister Bindoumi.[32] An official in the cabinet of the current Defence Minister verbally confirmed this claim.[33]

47. On 24 March 2016, Ngaïkosset began receiving his monthly salary of 380,158 Central African francs (FCFA) ($760) as a FACA captain in his personal account at Ecobank in Bangui (see annex 2.16). On 5 April 2016, Ecobank also provided Ngaïkosset with a personal loan of FCFA 1,456,608 ($2,913). In its correspondence to Ecobank dated 22 March 2016, the Panel included an updated sanctions list, including the name of Ngaïkosset.

48. A representative of Ecobank in Bangui informed the Panel, in a meeting on 5 October 2016, that implementation of the asset freeze rests with the government of the Central African Republic and that the bank does not block payments on accounts unless requested to do so by the Ministry of Finance and Budget.[34]

49. On 6 October 2016, the Defence minister's cabinet told the Panel that the Ministry would only suspend salary payments if Ngaïkosset was condemned in court. The cabinet also argued that salary suspension would be inacceptable on humanitarian grounds.[35]

50. On 11 October 2016, the Panel requested clarification regarding the lack of implementation of the freezing of the assets of Ngaïkosset by the authorities of the Central African Republic, copying all relevant ministries, as well as Ecobank. At the time of the writing of the present report, no answer had been received.

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[30] Meeting with a diplomatic source from a member of the Security Council, 25 June 2016.

[31] Ngaïkosset, subject to an international arrest warrant issued against him on 2 April 2014 for his role in abuses committed in the northeast of the country under François Bozizé's rule, was apprehended in Bangui upon his extradition from Brazzaville on 12 May 2015. On 20 May 2015, he managed to escape from the Section Recherche et Investigation of the national gendarmerie in Bangui.

[32] Meeting with Eugène Barret Ngaïkosset, Bangui, 4 October 2016.

[33] Meeting with an official in the cabinet of the Ministry of Defence, Bangui, 6 October 2016.

[34] Meeting with Clement Mazou, Chief of Legal Department at Ecobank in Bangui, 5 October 2016.

[35] Meeting with an official in the cabinet of the Ministry of Defence, Bangui, 6 October.

Alfred Yékatom

51. Sanctioned individual Alfred Yékatom received his first salary as parliamentarian in April 2016, along with other new members of parliament. After the Panel notified the office of the Speaker of Parliament that salary payments to Yékatom represented a violation of the asset freeze, the Minister allegedly suspended all his allowances in May 2016. However, the Panel could not obtain documentary evidence of such a suspension.

52. On 29 February 2016, the Minister of Defence accepted Yékatom's resignation, which was necessary in the light of the latter's campaign to run for legislative elections. After having been paid his salary until June (see S/2016/694, annex 36), FACA payroll details of July 2016 show that he is no longer being paid. However, rather than being removed from the list, Yékatom is listed as being on leave of absence.

53. According to the FACA payroll, payments were made to Yékatom through his account at Banque Sahélo-Saharienne pour l'Investissement et le Commerce. On 15 October 2015, following his sanctions designation on 20 August 2015, the bank informed the Panel that Yékatom was not listed among its clients. On 29 August 2016, the Panel again requested information about Yékatom's banking information and provided his account number, but at the time of the writing of the present report, no answer had been provided.

Kardiam/Badica

54. In the course of 2016, the Belgian authorities made five exemption requests to the Committee for basic expenses and one notification for reimbursement of a loan on behalf of Kardiam, the Antwerp-based diamond-trading entity that was sanctioned on 20 August 2015 together with the Bangui-based diamond-trading firm Badica. Four exemption requests were granted and one is still pending.

55. On 20 June 2016, the authorities of the Central African Republic transmitted a notification to the Committee, inter alia, announcing the addition of rental payments of three entities to the Badica account at a commercial bank in Bangui. The concerned rental contracts predated the listing of Badica on 20 August 2015. Admission of funds and debt repayments were therefore in line with paragraphs 10 and 11 of Security Council resolution 2262 (2016), respectively.

56. One of the leasing entities is MINUSCA. Its land-lease contract with Badica, which was included in the notification, expired on 31 October 2016.[36] On 27 September 2016, the Head of MINUSCA informed the Committee, in a letter shared by the Chair with the Panel, that the Mission saw no other possibility but to extend the lease for six months.

57. Because the initial one-year contract of 2013 foresees only two extensions, the final extension being to 31 October 2016, a new contract would have to be concluded between MINUSCA and Badica. Paragraph 10 of resolution 2262 (2016) allows Member States to permit addition to frozen accounts of payments due under contracts that arose prior to the listing, but not afterwards.

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[36] The land leased from Badica is used by the Bangui joint task force and is strategically located near the PK 5 neighbourhood. An estimated $700,000 has been invested to improve the premises.

58. Since payments under new contracts are not permitted, the Panel sees no other option than for the parties to agree that, upon the signing of any new contract, MINUSCA would withhold its payments until an eventual delisting of Badica, at which time MINUSCA would transfer arrears payments to the company, with interest.

59. Another leasing entity is related to the office of the special representative of the international mediator of the crisis in the Central African Republic, General Leonard Essongo of the Republic of the Congo. While the income from this lease is referenced in the loan contract between Badica and its bank, the bank in question has stated that it has never received any rental payments to Badica's account.[37] The Panel requested information about rental payments to the authorities in the Republic of the Congo, but has yet to receive a response.

E. Calls to lift the arms embargo

60. Over the last months, the Panel has noted increasing number of calls for the lifting of the arms embargo from various actors, including in the media, the legislative and executive branches of Government, opposition parties and civil society, who claim, inter alia, that the arms embargo is an injustice imposed on the Central African Republic.[38] While previously these calls were expressed mainly by actors perceived as hardliners, they are increasingly being articulated by a substantial majority of actors in different sociopolitical fields, including by the President himself.[39]

61. The Minister of Interior, Jean Serge Bokassa, is one of the most vocal members of the Government expressing discontent with the arms embargo and MINUSCA's management of violence in the country. After the last outbreak of intercommunal violence in Kaga-Bandoro, on 12 October 2016 (see paras. 195-199 below), Minister Bokassa openly criticized MINUSCA, and specifically the Pakistani contingent, for failing to protect civilians.

62. On several occasions, individual members of the Government and the army have expressed the view to the Panel that the arms embargo is the main reason for the continued insecurity in the country because, according to them, it prevents the army and security forces from dealing with armed groups and criminal actors. The Panel reiterated to the Chief of Staff and the members of the cabinet of the Minister of Defence the procedures regarding exemptions and notifications extended

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[37] Meeting with Eric Enede, head of commercial banking at Ecobank in Bangui, 3 June 2016.

[38] Meetings with a Member of Parliament, a local journalist and a member of the Government in Bangui between 29 August and 19 September 2016; see also the Parliament's declaration, issued on 1 July 2016, which, inter alia, calls for the total lifting of the arms embargo, available from http://www.centrafrique-presse.info/site/info-politique-9522.html.

[39] President Touadera has called for the lifting of the arms embargo in various speeches; see remarks of President Touadera at the 9th meeting of the International Contact Group on the Central African Republic, Bangui, 25 August 2016, available from http://presidence.govcf.org/allocution-president-touadera-a-loccasion-de-9eme-reunion-groupe-international-de-contact-republique-centrafricaine-gic-rca/. See also his speech at the seventy-first session of the General Assembly, 23 September 2016, available from http://presidence.govcf.org/allocution-president-touadera-a-lassemblee-generale-de-lonu/.

pursuant to Security Council resolution 2262 (2016), which they agreed to use and to comply with.[40]

63. While recognizing that the national army does not have sufficient weapons and ammunition at its disposal, the Panel stresses that, in addition to the training, reorganization and restoration of a single chain of military command, weapons management issues should be addressed when rearming or re-equipping FACA. These issues pertain to the storage and control of weapons in the custody of the central army command, and the need to bring weapons currently held privately by FACA soldiers under the custody of the central military command (see paras. 97-100 below).

64. It is the view of the Panel that intensified calls for the lifting of the arms embargo by some officials of the Central African Republic are part of their political strategy to mobilize nationalist sentiment and place the responsibility for intensified violence entirely on the United Nations in general, and on MINUSCA in particular.[41]

III. Bangui region

A. Ongoing violence in the PK5 neighbourhood and surroundings

Violent exodus of Abdoulaye Hissène, Haroun Gaye and Hamit Tidjani

65. In the late evening of 12 August 2016, a convoy of seven vehicles, with 35 heavily-armed men from the PK5 neighbourhood in Bangui's 3rd district and the BSS camp aboard, left Bangui. The convoy was led by Abdoulaye Hissène, Haroun Gaye (listed by the Committee on 17 December 2015) and Hamit Tidjani. These individuals had convinced some ex-Séléka fighters who had been living in the BSS camp for three years and were frustrated with the lengthy disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration process, to join them to the "General Assembly" in Bria.[42] Thereafter, it was envisaged that some armed fighters would return to their home towns, while others would join FPRC forces under Nourredine Adam in Ndélé.[43] Gendarmes and MINUSCA forces told the Panel that there were several women and children in the vehicles along with the fighters.[44] All vehicles in the convoy were painted white, in order to resemble MINUSCA vehicles (see annex 3.1). One vehicle had been stolen from the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).[45]

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[40] Meeting with the FACA Chief of Staff, Bangui, 5 August 2016. Meeting with Chief of Cabinet of the Ministry of Defence, Bangui, 6 October 2016.

[41] In discussions with political actors, the Panel has noted that the Government is divided over the arms embargo and its attitude with regard to MINUSCA.

[42] Meeting with Ahmad Issa and Ahmad Haroun, Bangui (MINUSCA hospital), 5 September 2016. Meeting with FPRC leadership, Kaga-Bandoro, 30 August 2016. Confidential report, 14 August 2016.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Meeting with gendarmes, Nguerengou, 29 August 2016.

[45] Letter of a non-governmental organization, 29 August 2016.

66. At the PK12 checkpoint, on the main road from Bangui to the north, gendarmes and FACA soldiers fired upon the convoy, killing at least one ex-Séléka fighter.[46] Nevertheless, the convoy forced its way through and continued along the Sibut-Dékoa road. At the Guerengou checkpoint, between Bangui and Damara, Hissène explained to the gendarmes that he was on a disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration awareness-raising mission and was granted free passage.

67. On the road into Damara, gendarmes who had been alerted by their colleagues from PK12 set up a barricade and called in FACA soldiers from Damara. Following an exchange of fire, the convoy forced its passage through the barricade. One ex-Séléka fighter who fell off a truck was killed by anti-balaka fighters (see annex 3.2).[47] Lacking ammunition and outnumbered, security forces could not pursue the convoy, which was then able to stop in Damara to change the tires of some vehicles.[48]

MINUSCA response

68. After the brigade commander of the gendarmerie had alerted MINUSCA in Damara, one MINUSCA vehicle left the military base, but arrived at the scene only after the confrontation had taken place. Upon arrival at the halted convoy, the MINUSCA commander saw that many ex-Séléka fighters were wounded, but judged that an intervention would be too risky. The convoy was able to repair all but one of the vehicles and resumed its journey. The national gendarmerie seized the abandoned vehicle belonging to Gaye but armed anti-balaka fighters forced the gendarmes to hand over the vehicle the following day.

69. In Sibut, MINUSCA received orders in time to block the convoy and disarm and arrest the ex-Séléka fighters.[49] At 5 a.m. on 13 August, MINUSCA stopped the convoy 40 km south of Sibut and initiated negotiations with Hissène. Among the 34 remaining men, two had died and several were wounded. The ex-Séléka fighters were willing to hand over heavy weapons but wanted to keep some of their light weapons to defend themselves against anti-balaka. MINUSCA rejected the proposal and insisted on full disarmament.

70. While negotiations were ongoing, the arrival of a MINUSCA helicopter spread panic among the ex-Séléka fighters who fled into the bush. MINUSCA was able to arrest 11 fighters and seize a significant amount of weapons and ammunition and all vehicles (see annex 3.3). Four fighters were evacuated to Bangui hospital for medical assistance, and six were brought to the MINUSCA base in Sibut before being handed over to the national authorities. Three Burundian blue helmets were wounded during this operation.

Security concerns on the Sibut-Dékoa-Kaga-Bandoro road

71. The escape of the other fighters, including Hissène, created insecurity on and around the Sibut-Dékoa-Kaga-Bandoro road until mid-September. Killings of

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[46] Meeting with gendarmes, Bangui (PK12), 29 August 2016. Confidential report, 14 August 2016.

[47] Meeting with national security forces, Damara, 29 August 2016.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Panel's mission to Sibut and meeting with MINUSCA, Sibut, 29 August 2016.

several civilians in the area have been attributed to the ex-Séléka fugitives in search of food and supplies.[50] Fugitives also took villagers hostage to carry looted goods and to show them the way. Released hostages recognized Hissène as the fugitives' leader and confirmed that many were carrying weapons.[51]

72. On 4 September 2016, a group of ex-Séléka elements, coming from Kaga-Bandoro on motorbikes to pick up the escapees, opened fire against MINUSCA near Dékoa. Firing back, one ex-Séléka fighter was killed, while two blue helmets and one civilian were wounded.[52]

73. Anti-balaka fighters allegedly attacked and killed a number of escapees.[53] Several sources told the Panel that officials in Bangui had alerted anti-balaka forces about the presence of ex-Séléka elements in the Sibut-Dékoa area.[54] Although the Panel did not find any evidence indicating that there were orders from the Government to pursue the fugitives, it remains concerned about the apparent influence of some Government officials over anti-balaka groups.[55]

The Government's contested awareness of the convoy's exodus

74. Several ex-Séléka fighters that were part of the convoy declared to the Panel that there had been a verbal agreement between Hissène and the Government of the Central African Republic regarding the fighters' exodus from Bangui.[56] The FPRC leadership in Kaga-Bandoro told the Panel that Hissène and Gaye had handed over an official letter to the Government and MINUSCA with regard to their departure. The authorities of the Central African Republic and MINUSCA firmly denied this. The Panel found no copy of the any such letter in the six vehicles in the convoy it searched.

The aftermath: judicial proceedings and General Assembly in Bria

75. The 11 men detained by MINUSCA between Damara and Sibut and the personnel captured thereafter in the bush and in Bangui were all handed over to the national gendarmerie — some after several weeks of extensive medical care at the MINUSCA hospital. The men were charged with criminal association, illegal possession of weapons, crimes against the State security and rebellion, and all but one were put under precautionary detention in the Ngaragba prison centre and Camp Deroux — this in spite of their expressed fear of falling victim to anti-balaka actions inside the prison.[57]

76. Accompanied by Gaye, whose position remained unclear for some time, Hissène arrived at Ndélé in early September. From Ndélé, the group supposedly travelled to Siki Kedi and N'Da (Vakaga prefecture), where they met with

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[50] Confidential report, 28 August 2016; confidential report, 5 September 2016.
[51] Meeting with gendarmes, Sibut, 4 September 2016.
[52] Panel's mission, Sibut, 4 September 2016.
[53] Meeting with FPRC leadership, Kaga-Bandoro, 30 August 2016.
[54] Ibid.
[55] Confidential report, 6 October 2016.
[56] Meeting with Ahmad Issa and Ahmad Haroun, Bangui (MINUSCA hospital), 5 September 2016; confidential report, 28 August 2016; confidential report, 9 September 2016.
[57] Confidential communications, 23 and 27 October 2016.

Nourredine Adam before going to Bria to attend the ex-Séléka General Assembly (see section V below).[58]

Evolving dynamics among self-defence groups

77. The departure of Hissène, Gaye and Tidjani changed the political and security landscape of Bangui's 3rd district. Since no one has thus far replaced them to represent ex-Séléka in the area, armed groups in the PK5 neighbourhood are now more disconnected from national politics.

78. Insecurity, however, persists with about 100 to 150 armed individuals associated with so-called self-defence groups remaining in the area.[59] After Abdoulaye Hissène's departure, there were still four such groups:

(a) Matar Anemeri, alias "Force", controls the south/southwestern area of PK5;

(b) Issa Kappy, alias "50/50" — formerly Anemeri's deputy — controls the north/northwestern area;[60]

(c) Abdoul Danda — the area around Pont Yakité in eastern PK5;

(d) Mohamed Appo — a small area in southwest PK5.

79. Fearing arrest — warrants against them were issued in June (see S/2016/694, para. 26) — Issa Kappy and Abdoul Danda have not demonstrated any willingness to lay down their weapons. Adopting a different approach, Anemeri, also under arrest warrant, told the Panel that he has made an offer to President Touadéra to leave the area if the Government recognizes the role his group played in securing the 3rd district and integrates some of his combatants in the national security and armed forces (see annex 3.4).[61]

80. The opinion of the population in PK5 neighbourhood about the self-defence groups is mixed. On the one hand, it is considered that the groups play a positive role in protecting Muslims from persecution.[62] On the other hand, it is also recognized that they contribute to the insecurity in the area by preying on the population, for example by competing for control of and associated revenues from taxing shops, vendors, buses and motor taxis. On 3 August, 29 September and 10 October 2016, fights and exchanges of fire between members of the different groups took place.[63]

81. The illegal activities carried out by these groups also include attacks on individuals, notably those refusing to pay taxes, and carjacking.[64] On 29 September, members of one of the groups attacked an ambulance of Médecins sans Frontières and attempted to kill the patient on board. As a result, Médecins sans Frontières

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[58] Meeting with confidential sources, Bria, 14 September 2016.

[59] Meeting with confidential sources, Bangui, 23 October 2016.

[60] A former deputy of "Force", Issa Kappy has gradually gained power to become the most influential militia leader in the neighbourhood.

[61] Meeting with Matar Anemeri, Bangui, 14 October 2016.

[62] Meeting with individuals and civil society representatives from the 3rd district, Bangui, 20 October.

[63] Confidential reports, 4 August, 30 September and 11 October 2016.

[64] Confidential report, 29 July 2016.

suspended its activities in the area for four days.[65] On 3 October, three members of one of the groups also attempted to rob a United Nations vehicle.[66]

Violence in the PK5 neighbourhood in October 2016: the killing of a member of FACA by a member of a self-defence group

82. At 8 a.m. on 4 October 2016, Marcel Mombeka, FACA Major and former bodyguard of Transitional President Catherine Samba-Panza, was shot and killed at the Koudoukou roundabout in the 3rd district of Bangui (see annex 3.5). Bashir Bouari, a member of Abdoul Danda's group, is indicated to have carried out the crime, but his motive remains unclear.[67]

83. In retaliation, two hours after the murder, a group of FACA soldiers killed a Muslim motorbike taxi driver at the Yakité bridge in the 3rd district. One hour later, a man wearing a FACA uniform, identified by the Fulani as being either a FACA soldier or an anti-balaka fighter, attacked a group of Fulani with an AK-type assault rifle near the Sega slaughterhouse in the 6th district.[68] Three Fulani were instantly killed. Members of the population living around the Kolongo villas violently robbed other Fulani fleeing the violence: some of those Fulani have gone missing. Later that day, on the border between the 3rd and 6th districts, close to the Fatima church, opposing groups clashed, leaving 11 people dead and 21 wounded.[69]

MINUSCA response

84. The reaction of MINUSCA to the sudden upsurge of violence on 4 October 2016 was robust, and it effectively prevented the further spread of violence. For several days MINUSCA cordoned off the PK5 neighbourhood and intensified patrols, maintaining a strong presence in all sensitive areas. The Mission also organized armed escorts to and from the PK5 neighbourhood, allowing Muslim residents to have some degree of mobility.

85. Nevertheless, even with all of the security measures in force, on 5 October 2016 the Panel observed anti-balaka elements 200 meters away from the MINUSCA headquarters on Boganda Avenue. On the same day, MINUSCA reported the presence of armed youths, some in FACA uniforms, in almost all areas surrounding the PK5 neighbourhood.[70] During the days following the violence, gunshots were heard in the 3rd and 5th districts and several attacks, reportedly perpetrated by men in FACA uniforms, took place against Muslims.[71]

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[65] Press communiqué on the suspension of the activities of Médecins sans Frontières, 3 October 2016, available from http://rjdh.org/centrafrique-msfsuspend-quatre-jours-activites-km5/.

[66] Confidential report, 3 October 2016.

[67] Confidential reports, 5 and 6 October 2016. Meeting with confidential sources, Bangui, 12 October 2016.

[68] Meeting with a group of 13 Fulani, Bangui (Territorial Brigade), 5 October 2016.

[69] Panel's observation through MINUSCA surveillance cameras, 4 October 2016. Confidential report, 12 October 2016.

[70] Confidential report, 6 October 2016.

[71] Panel of Experts database of incidents, July-October 2016. Confidential reports, 5-10 October 2016.

86. MINUSCA reported that between 4 and 7 October 2016, a total of 11 persons were killed and 21 injured as a result of gunshot wounds, stabbings and grenade shrapnel.[72] Several victims showed evidence of torture.[73]

87. The attacks against Fulani had a negative impact on the meat supply in the capital. Targeted violence compelled Fulani herders and traders to abandon their livestock and stop bringing cattle to the market and the Sega slaughterhouse.[74]

Response of the national authorities

88. On 4 October 2016, the Minister of Defence, Joseph Yakété, publically appealed for calm and urged FACA to refrain from further retaliatory actions. Likewise, the Minister of Interior, Jean Serge Bokassa, condemned the violence and all attempts to undermine the Government's efforts to stabilize the country.[75] The same day, the Coordination des Organisations Musulmanes de Centrafrique, in a public communiqué, condemned the killing of the FACA Major and the Fulani, stressing that isolated individuals were responsible for the violence, not the Muslim community as a whole (see annex 3.6).

Heightened tensions between PK5 self-defence groups: the killing of Abdoul Danda and Issa Kappy

89. The killing of Major Mombeka has contributed to divisions between the PK5 self-defence groups, creating two opposite blocks. After Mombeka's murder, members of the group of Matar Anemeri and Mohamed Appo collaborated with Muslim FACA soldiers, regularly deployed in the 3rd district, in an attempt to arrest Abdoul Danda. The latter took refuge in a house belonging to Issa Kapy, who has protected him since. Anemeri claims that the intervention of MINUSCA prevented his combatants from capturing Danda. On 14 October 2016, he also told the Panel that, should MINUSCA not arrest Danda, his militia would capture him, using force if necessary.[76]

90. On 30 October 2016, violent fighting took place between the two blocks described above, with use of heavy weapons and rockets, reportedly leaving about 10 self-defence group members killed, including militia leaders Abdoul Danda and Issa Kappy.[77]

91. More information on weaponry circulating in the PK5 neighbourhood is provided in annex 3.7 below.

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[72] Confidential report, 5, 6, 7 and 12 October 2016.

[73] Confidential report, 3-9 October 2016.

[74] Confidential report, 7-13 October 2016.

[75] Interview with Interior Minister Jean Serge Bokassa at the Network of Journalists for Human Rights on 4 October 2016, available from http://rjdh.org/centrafrique-ministre-de-securite-appelle-rassemblement-face-aux-fauteurs-de-trouble/.

[76] Meeting with Matar Anemeri, Bangui, 14 October 2016.

[77] Phone interview with confidential sources, 31 October 2016. Confidential report, 31 October 2016.

B. Anti-balaka in Bangui and the return of Jean-Francis Bozizé

92. About 250 anti-balaka elements remain armed in the capital, mainly in the neighbourhoods of Gobongo/Boy-Rabe, Combattants and Sica 2/Ben-Zwi (see annex 3.8). Anti-balaka zone commanders in Bangui told the Panel that their groups remain active to fight crime or counter the threat posed by ex-Séléka fighters, which include, in their view, ex-combatants in the BSS/Béal and RDOT camps, as well as militia in the PK5 neighbourhood.[78]

93. Moreover, many anti-balaka members remain active in order to put pressure on President Touadéra and to obtain some kind of reward for their support during elections. Some members hope to get a position in the administration, an amnesty for past crimes or otherwise to influence policy, for instance on the deployment of FACA soldiers.[79] In spite of the official support given by Bozizé's party Kwa Na Kwa to presidential contender Anicet Dologuélé, most of the party's members, as well as anti-balaka elements, actually supported Touadéra. Ultimately, however, many anti-balaka members — particularly from the Mokom branch — aim to facilitate the return of former President Bozizé and his relatives to the national political arena.

94. Jean-Francis Bozizé returned to Bangui on 3 August 2016 and told the Panel that he was responding to the FACA Chief of Staff's call to all soldiers to rejoin the army or else be considered deserters.[80] Several sources informed the Panel that his return might also be due to the financial difficulties the Bozizé family faces abroad following the freezing of their assets in France.[81]

95. Since his return, Jean-Francis Bozizé has maintained and developed his networks among anti-balaka groups and FACA officers in Bangui. When meeting with the son of former President Bozizé on 4 September 2016 at his home in Bangui, the Panel noted the presence of the anti-balaka commander Olivier Koudémon. The Panel was also informed that, after Bozizé's apprehension by MINUSCA, Eugène Ngaïkosset and Maxime Mokom gathered anti-balaka elements in the PK11 area of Bangui in order to prepare demonstrations, although they failed to mobilize anti-balaka members or to hold such protests.[82] The majority of the elements composing Jean-Francis Bozizé's security guard today are former members of Bozizé's Presidential Guard, mostly ethnic Gbaya.[83] The Bozizé family can also count on the support of many allies in the administration, including those already in service under the two consecutive presidencies of François Bozizé.

96. Jean-Francis Bozizé's return is a source of concern for President Touadéra and may explain the recent establishment of a presidential security guard.[84]

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[78] Meeting with "Aristide", anti-balaka zone commander in the 5th district, Bangui, 18 October 2016. Meeting with Thierry Serge Balemea, anti-balaka zone commander in the 5th district, Bangui, 18 August 2016.

[79] Meeting with Dieudonné Ndomaté, Bangui, 15 October 2016. Meeting with Maxime Mokom, Bangui, 21 October 2016.

[80] Meetings with Jean-Francis Bozizé, Bangui and Paris, 6 and 7 September 2016.

[81] Meeting with confidential sources, Bangui, 15 September 2016.

[82] Meeting with confidential sources, 13 and 14 August 2016.

[83] Confidential report, 4 October 2016.

[84] Meeting with confidential sources, Bangui, 13 August 2016.

C. Deployment of Central African Armed Forces in Bangui and their weapons management

97. While most FACA elements are deployed at regular static posts and come together at the official gathering centres in Bangui, irregular FACA units outside the central command and control of the army continue to operate in different neighbourhoods.[85] Irregular units are primarily concentrated in the 3rd and 5th districts, but international forces have also identified four such units at other strategic locations close to the airport, the Presidential palace, the Parliament and the road towards Bimbo (see annex 3.8). Thus far, the repeatedly declared intent of the Government to dismantle those FACA units and restore a single chain of command has been unsuccessful.[86]

98. For example, on 2 September 2016, the Director General of the presidential security guard, Lieutenant-Colonel Ngboya, signed a document allowing for the deployment of extra Muslim FACA soldiers in the 3rd district in order to stop the cycle of attacks against motorcycles in the 3rd and 5th districts (see annex 3.9). This deployment was coordinated with the regular Muslim FACA in the PK5 neighbourhood, self-defence groups, religious leaders and motorbike taxi drivers. However, the FACA Chief of Staff was not aware of the deployment.[87] On 5 September, the day that deployment was to take place, a group of Muslim FACA and those from an irregular FACA post clashed.

99. In addition, uncontrolled FACA soldiers continued to be involved in fraudulent activities and serious abuses, in particular following the killing of Major Marcel Mombeka on 4 October 2016. On this date, FACA killed a Muslim motorcycle driver near the Yakité bridge (see para. 83). On 7 October, a young Muslim man was killed by men in FACA uniform near the Ecole Yakité in the 3rd district.[88] On 14 October, a MINUSCA unit saw a member of FACA in uniform throwing a grenade towards the population at the Serpent roundabout in the 5th district.[89] There are also several reports of FACA members shooting at and harassing motorcycle drivers in the Miskine and Bimbo neighbourhoods and in the 3rd and 5th districts.[90]

100. In its midterm report, the Panel highlighted that many FACA soldiers keep in their homes weapons and ammunition previously assigned to them or acquired on the black market (see S/2016/694, para. 31).[91] The Panel obtained a list concerning the possession of several types of weapons by FACA officers (see S/2015/936, annex 1.12). The FACA Chief of Staff recently sent official letters to 15 officers asking them to return their weapons.[92] Other FACA officers are in possession of important amounts of arms and ammunition, although this was never declared in the

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[85] Panel's mission to the 3rd District, Bangui, 2 and 5 October 2016.

[86] Meeting with the FACA Chief of Staff, Bangui, 21 April, 5 August and 4 October 2016.

[87] Confidential report, 6 September 2016.

[88] Confidential report, 8 October 2016.

[89] Confidential report, 15 October 2016.

[90] Confidential reports, 31 August, 5 and 11 September 2016.

[91] There seems to be an increasing black market for military items, supposedly in view of the forthcoming DDR process. Meeting with international forces, 5 September 2016; meeting with confidential source, 14 October 2016.

[92] Meeting with FACA Chief of Staff, Bangui, 4 October 2016.

context of the 2015 voluntary disarmament operation. A notable example, in the light of targeted sanctions, is weapons in the custody of Alfred Yékatom (see box 1).

Box 1
Yékatom's weaponry

Documents archived at the office of the FACA Chief of Staff show that sanctioned individual Alfred Yékatom was in possession of 59 conventional weapons (see annex 3.10). On 21 July 2016, the FACA Chief of Staff sent an official letter to Yékatom requesting the return of weapons (see annex 3.11) and told the Panel that he would go to Court and ask for Yékatom's parliamentary immunity to be lifted if he refused.[93]

On 6 September 2016, a member of the National Collection Committee informed the FACA Chief of Staff that Yékatom had surrendered weapons and ammunition to the national collection committee in Pissa on 7 April 2015 (see annex 3.12, see also S/2015/936, annex 5.19). However, the number of weapons handed over in Pissa was well below the number of weapons considered to be in his official possession. A comparison of the two lists shows that Yékatom should still be in possession of 39 conventional weapons. In addition, some weapons and approximately 1,743 rounds of ammunition returned by Yékatom at the ceremony in Pissa did not figure on the original list, which means that he was in illegal possession of them.

In spite of the discrepancy between the original list and the weapons returned by Yékatom in Pissa, the FACA Chief of Staff, in an official correspondence to Yékatom, declared that he had adhered to the voluntary disarmament policy and returned weapons and ammunition of all calibres to the national collection committee and that by that patriotic act, the Joint Staff assured its respect and recognition of your role in stabilizing our country (see annex 3.13). The Panel notes that Yékatom still maintains a substantial level of influence over militiamen in the Lobaye prefecture.[94]

101. The FACA Chief of Staff informed the Panel of his intention to acquire non-lethal and lethal equipment for the national armed forces by mid-2017.[95] The Panel once again informed the Chief of Staff and the cabinet of the Minister of Defence about the exemption and notifications procedures extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2262 (2016), which they agreed to comply with.[96]

102. In the light of the limited and inadequate custody over existing FACA weapons held by the central FACA command, the Panel is concerned about storage and control of future deliveries of lethal and non-lethal military equipment received by the Government after the activation of the exemptions and notifications procedures (see S/2016/694, paras. 46-51). Already several non-lethal items received from

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[93] Meeting with FACA Chief of Staff, Bangui, 5 August 2016.

[94] Mission to Lobaye sub-prefecture, 18 August 2016.

[95] Meeting with FACA Chief of Staff, Bangui, 5 August 2016.

[96] Ibid. Meeting with Chief of Cabinet of the Ministry of Defence, Bangui, 6 October 2016.

China in March 2016 (see S/2016/694, para. 28), for example, were diverted when stored at a customs storage facility, despite the permanent presence of FACA guards.[97] FACA soldiers were also caught selling their newly received military sports outfits.[98]

D. Anti-MINUSCA protests and calls for lifting the arms embargo

103. Radical actors in Bangui have started to advance the call of Government officials for a lifting of the embargo as part of a discourse meant to incite hostility against international forces. A so-called "working group of civil society", led by a former member of the Transitional National Council, Gervais Lakosso, has gained prominence by accusing MINUSCA of passivity in the face of continued violence in the country.[99] In so doing, Lakosso often uses language aimed to galvanize public opinion against international forces. Lakosso was also one of the instigators of the escalation of violence in Bangui in September and October 2015 (see S/2015/936 paras. 39 and 40). On 24 August 2016, Lakosso was appointed to the Advisory and Monitoring Committee for the national disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration programme, but decided not to participate on 18 October (see annex 3.14).

104. On 18 October 2016, Lakosso launched his campaign, collecting citizens' signatures to demand the withdrawal of MINUSCA and the redeployment of FACA. In contrast with previous attempts in September (see annex 3.15),[100] the Government did not formally react to any demonstration during the days prior to operation "ville morte" that took place in Bangui on 24 October. A Government spokesperson merely called upon people not to participate. The demonstration saw a robust reaction by the MINUSCA force resulting in a paralysis of the capital. The United Nations reported 4 dead and 13 injured, including 5 peacekeepers.[101]

105. Lakosso's campaign was not exclusively organized by civil society groups, it also received support from political opposition actors and some armed groups. The leaders of the Mouvement démocratique pour la renaissance de Centrafrique, Joseph Bendounga,[102] and Séraphin Komeya of the newly-created Mouvement de résistance pour la défense de la patrie (MRDP) (see paras. 138-142 below), have supported Lakosso's campaign. Individuals linked to several members of the Government were also among the organizers of the campaign. This is the case, for instance, of Marcel Mokoapi, who is former presidential campaign manager for the Minister of Interior, Jean Serge Bokassa.

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[97] Panel visit to inspect containers with Chinese non-lethal military equipment, Bangui, 21 April 2016; meeting with the FACA Chief of Staff, Bangui, 3 October 2016; meeting with international forces, 5 September 2016.

[98] Meeting with the FACA Chief of Staff, Bangui, 3 October 2016.

[99] Interview of Gervais Lakosso with the Network of Journalists for Human Rights, 14 October 2016, available from http://rjdh.org/centrafrique-ministre-de-securite-appelle-rassemblement-face-aux-fauteurs-de-trouble/.

[100] Confidential reports 20, 22, 28 and 30 September 2016.

[101] Confidential report, 25 October 2016.

[102] Confidential report, 26 October 2016.

106. The fact that, despite their arrest warrants, the PK5 fugitives were not arrested during their exodus from Bangui on 24 August 2016, and again on their arrival in Bria, also fuels anti-MINUSCA sentiments.[103] In a press conference, the MINUSCA spokesperson informed the media that the Mission would double its vigilance in Bria in order to assure arrests of ex-Séléka members under warrant.[104]

107. The Panel also noted an increased mistrust on the part of the Government towards the United Nations, which is accused of being biased in favour of ex-Séléka members. While going on a mission from Bangui to Sibut on 4 September 2016, a United Nations vehicle carrying Panel members was stopped and searched at a checkpoint in Guerengou by the gendarmerie. A Rwandese peacekeeper in the vehicle was suspected of being a Séléka member. Overall, in the present climate, there are recurrent incidents of national security forces hindering the movements of MINUSCA staff and United Nations contractors.[105]

E. Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique: business dealings in Bangui

Michel Djotodia's land sale

108. The Panel has determined that FPRC leader and former President of the Central African Republic, Michel Djotodia, has business interests in Bangui. In its 2015 final report (see S/2015/936, para. 30) the Panel cited the role of Mahamat Nour Binyamine, reportedly in charge of collecting rent for buildings and houses owned by former President Djotodia, who was president of FPRC until the General Assembly in Bria (see paras. 153-155 below). Binyamine is a resident of the United States of America and a former chargé de mission of President Djotodia.

109. In July 2016, Binyamine reportedly brokered the sale of a plot of land in Bangui belonging to Djotodia to a private contractor. On 29 August, the contractor wired a total of FCFA 25 million ($50,000) to Binyamine's account, which he retrieved in the form of a check the same day.

110. Prior to the sale, the contractor in question had consulted the legal representatives of a former minister under Djotodia, Crépin Mboli-Goumba, to conduct title and transactional due diligence, as well as a second attorney to validate the findings of the cabinet's lawyer. Both found the title to be genuine, and that there were no liens or encumbrances on the property.[106]

111. Through his attorney, the contractor in question communicated in a letter to the Panel that he had asked the attorney of Mboli-Goumba's cabinet whether Djotodia's exile and role as former president would make the transfer of property unlawful or otherwise problematic, but the attorney told him there were no legal

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[103] See Prime Minister Sarandji's reaction, available from http://www.hirondelle.org/index.php/fr/nos-operations/programmes-actuels/republique-centrafricaine/a-la-une/1763-radio-ndeke-luka-rca-les-fugitifs-a-kaga-bandoro-liesse-de-joie-au-pk-5, accessed on 26 October 2016.

[104] The MINUSCA spokesperson is quoted by the Network of Journalists for Human Rights in an article published on 5 October 2016, available from http://rjdh.org/centrafrique-minusca-compte-arreter-ex-seleka-vises-mandats-darret-cas-dag-a-bria/?platform=hootsuite.

[105] Confidential reports, 15 August, 25 September and 16 October 2016.

[106] Due diligence reports are archived with the United Nations.

issues related to Djotodia's past and present activities.[107] The same letter stated that the contractor, arriving in the country seven months prior to the purchase, and not reading French, was not aware of the United Nations sanctions regime, or of Djotodia's involvement with any armed groups.

112. The Panel refrains from identifying the independent contractor in question in the present report because Djotodia has not been sanctioned to date by the Committee, and the contractor in question credibly argues that he was not aware, and, after diligent inquiries, was not made aware, of potential financing of armed groups through his transaction. Djotodia's assets in the United States have, however, been frozen since 13 May 2014, when he was sanctioned by the United States, and Binyamine, as an American resident, could be transacting or holding funds on behalf of Djotodia in the United States.

Abdoulaye Hissène's gold business

113. Abdoulaye Hissène, a former collector of diamonds and gold, resumed his business activities following the conclusion of his tenure as Minister Councillor on Youth and Sports under the Presidency of Catherine Samba Panza in August 2014.

114. On 2 September 2014, Hissène reportedly concluded a sale and purchase agreement with an Indian investor for a total of 300 kilograms of gold to be delivered at a to-be-specified refinery in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (see annex 3.16). It is unclear whether this deal materialized, but he may have travelled or intended to travel through Kenya on 5 September 2014 with a sample of one kilogramme of gold, on his way to Dubai for an estimate (see annex 3.17).[108] However, in 2014 Hissène had no mineral export licence, either as a cooperative or a buying house, and did not declare taking out the sample for assaying.

IV. Central region and border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo

A. Union pour la paix en Centrafrique, anti-balaka and Mouvement de résistance pour la défense de la patrie activities in Ouaka prefecture

Union pour la paix en Centrafrique and dissidents

115. The tensions between the Arab faction of UPC, under General Abdoulaye Ahamat Faya, and the Fulani faction, under General Ali Darassa, translated into actual clashes on 4 July 2016 between both groups in the centre of Bambari (see S/2016/694, para. 51).

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[107] Mboli-Goumba and Binyamine closely worked together under Djotodia's regime, travelling to the Middle East together on official business. Meeting with Mahamat Nour Binyamine, 1 October 2016.

[108] During his tenure as Minister Councillor, Hissène travelled to Dubai at the end of March and beginning of April 2014 on an official visit to look for material and funding to revive sporting activities. Mission order retrieved by the Panel on 18 October 2016 from Hissène's confiscated vehicle, archived at the United Nations.

116. Generals Faya, Achafi Daoud and Oumar Fadlala, three of the UPC dissidents, reported that the fighting between FPRC/MPC and UPC elements in Ouandago and Batangafo on 19 and 20 June 2016 (see S/2016/694, para. 95) had triggered their defection.[109] At that time, General Faya was the UPC Chief of Operations, but the UPC leader, Ali Darassa, decided to send armed reinforcements consisting only of Fulani soldiers to Batangafo in order to combat Al Khatim's Arab soldiers, without informing General Faya, himself an Arab.

117. Upon questioning from General Faya, Ali Darassa reportedly declared that his ultimate goal was to defend Fulani interests in the Central African Republic. This was perceived as a declaration of ethnic segregation within UPC, as a result of which the Arab faction decided to leave UPC. This decision was communicated to Ali Darassa in early July (see annex 4.1).

118. The policy of ethnic segregation within UPC started in early 2016 with the departure of many Arab soldiers from UPC bases and checkpoints. At that time, the Panel, along with MINUSCA and non-governmental organizations, had observed that several checkpoints in the Mbomou and Ouaka prefectures were exclusively manned by Fulani. However, in October 2016, in Béma and Ouango, the Panel continued to observe the presence of Arab soldiers at strategic points.[110]

119. On 3 July 2016, Islamic community leaders tried to settle the dispute between the two factions, but the tension escalated with the killing of an Arab merchant on that same day. On 4 July, there was heavy armed fighting between the two groups in Bambari. MINUSCA reported that between 10 and 15 ex-Séléka soldiers were killed.[111] According to defectors, the number of victims was much higher.[112]

120. In fear of being killed by Ali Darassa's fighters, 37 Arab defectors took refuge inside the MINUSCA camp in Bambari where they stayed for seven weeks (see annex 4.2). Despite the fact that they were disarmed and deprived of means of communication, the permanent presence and the protection of the rebels in the camp created a delicate security situation for MINUSCA.[113]

121. Following the deterioration of the security situation after the confrontation on 4 July 2016, the MINUSCA contingent in Bambari quickly tightened its policy on UPC armed movements in and outside the town, which then had to be approved by MINUSCA headquarters in Bangui.[114] These measures were soon eased, however, and UPC forces continued to move, fully equipped, in and around Bambari, as observed by the Panel (see also S/2016/694, para. 48).[115]

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[109] Meeting with Abdoulaye Ahamat Faya, Bambari, 3 August 2016. Meeting with Achafi Daoud, Bangui, 4 August 2016. Meeting with Oumar Fadlala, Bangui, 17 August 2016.

[110] Panel's missions to Béma and Ouango, 8 June and 7-9 October 2016.

[111] Confidential report, 5 July 2016.

[112] Meeting with Abdoulaye Ahamat Faya, Bambari, 3 August 2016; meeting with Achafi Daoud, Bangui, 4 August 2016; meeting with Oumar Fadlala, Bangui, 17 August 2016.

[113] Meeting with MINUSCA force, Bambari, 3 August 2016. Confidential correspondence, 3 August 2016.

[114] Ibid.

[115] Panel's mission to Bambari and surroundings, 3 August 2016.

Anti-balaka attack on dissident's convoy and MINUSCA

122. On 31 August 2016, a MINUSCA convoy with the UPC dissidents departed Bambari for Kaga-Bandoro by road (Nana-Grébizi prefecture). This was agreed upon with the defectors themselves and the national judicial and political authorities. However, in Grimari (60 km from Bambari), anti-balaka fighters had erected roadblocks preventing the convoy from proceeding. The MINUSCA Force Commander, who was on mission in Kaga-Bandoro, immediately flew to Grimari to ease tensions.[116] Negotiations failed, however, and the UPC defectors were brought back to Bambari. The same day, there were shootings directed at separate MINUSCA patrols on the road to Grimari and at the MINUSCA camp in Bambari,[117] reportedly by anti-balaka elements involved in the Grimari incident.[118] A few days later, MINUSCA was again fired upon by anti-balaka elements based at a former "Sangaris" camp.[119]

123. MINUSCA high ranking officials told the Panel that the setting-up of barricades and the blocking of the ex-Séléka convoy was a well prepared action, orchestrated by the mayor and sub-prefect of Grimari, who were in constant telephone communication with officials in Bangui.[120] According to several witnesses, anti-balaka elements were manipulated rather than being the driving force behind the attack.[121]

124. On 2 September 2016, 35 of the 37 UPC dissidents were relocated from Bambari to Kaga-Bandoro by MINUSCA aircraft, without further incidents.[122] They are currently living in a state-owned property that is under the de facto control of the MPC General Kader. There is, however, no official alliance between the dissidents and MPC in Kaga-Bandoro. Twelve out of 35 defectors have agreed to participate in the pre-disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration activities organized in Kaga-Bandoro, but they all seem to have plans to relocate to their home areas.[123]

Union pour la paix en Centrafrique: reorganization and territorial extension

125. The departure of part of the UPC Arab faction did not challenge Darassa's hegemony over Bambari, but it did result in some internal reorganization. Ali Darassa remains the Chief of Staff, Hassan Bouba is now the Political Coordinator, Habib Hody is the Secretary-General and Legal Adviser, and Souleyman Daouda is Ali Darassa's Political Counsellor and Spokesperson.[124] After the events of July 2016, UPC also changed its zone commanders in Béma and Satéma, two strategic

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[116] Panel's mission to Kaga-Bandoro, 31 August 2016.

[117] Confidential reports, 1 and 6 September 2016.

[118] Ibid.

[119] Ibid.

[120] Meeting with MINUSCA, 3 September 2016.

[121] Meetings with confidential sources, 3 and 5 September.

[122] One UPC defector escaped in Bambari and one UPC defector was brought to Bangui for medical assistance.

[123] Confidential correspondence, 20 October 2016.

[124] Confidential correspondence, 22 July 2016. Meeting with Ali Darassa and Souleyman Daouda, Bambari, 3 August 2016.

entry points for supplying UPC with military equipment (see S/2016/694, para. 61 and paras. 143-149 below).

126. In Ouaka, Mbomou and Basse-Kotto prefectures, UPC continued to reinforce its control (see S/2016/694, paras. 56-62). Notably, after the withdrawal of UPDF on 21 August 2016, UPC reinforced its presence in Nzako, strengthening its control over the diamond mining sites in the area (see S/2016/694, paras. 56-62). Members of the local population reported that on 27 August, the UPC zone commander in Nzako (Mbomou prefecture) showed them a document stating that Nzako officially became a prefecture under General Darassa's control, creating panic among the inhabitants.[125]

127. Ali Darassa also continued to build up the UPC presence in Basse-Kotto prefecture. In Zangba sub-prefecture, in the west of the Basse-Kotto, the reinforcement of UPC reportedly increased anxiety among the local population.[126] In the east of the Basse-Kotto prefecture, UPC established 19 strategic checkpoints along the road between Mingala and Pouloubo (Basse-Kotto), where UPC controls an important mining site.[127] In several villages around Mobaye, including in Melima and Lewa, UPC elements levy taxes and have established parallel justice systems.[128]

Union pour la paix en Centrafrique: weaponry

128. On 4 July 2016, the 37 UPC defectors handed over 27 pieces of conventional weaponry to MINUSCA, a precondition for them to enter the base and receive protection. The majority of these weapons were similar to what the Panel had previously seen in the hands of or seized from UPC (see S/2015/936, para. 69).[129] What calls for attention, however, are seven R4 Vector assault rifles with the same first serial numbers (see annex 4.3).

129. Following a request from the Panel, on 10 December 2015 South African authorities had informed the Panel that seven similar weapons had been delivered to the Rwandan Ministry of Defence in 1990. A plausible explanation is that the weapons were diverted from the State stockpiles of the Government of Rwanda in the 1990s during the political turmoil in that country, brought into the Democratic Republic of the Congo and then later trafficked into the Central African Republic. Possible entry points are Béma, Satéma and Mobaye, towns along the Ubangui River and under the control of UPC (see paras. 143-149 below).

130. The Panel has requested the Rwandan authorities to provide support for the further identification of the R4 Vector assault rifles, but at the time of the writing of the present report no answer had been received.

Human rights violations

131. UPC elements have been involved in a series of attacks that have severely impacted the security of local populations living in areas under UPC control. On 3, 4 and 6 October 2016, it was reported that UPC elements attacked the villages of

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[125] Confidential correspondence, 3 October 2016.

[126] Confidential report, 9 October 2016.

[127] Confidential correspondences, 3 and 6 October 2016.

[128] Confidential report, 9 October 2016.

[129] Panel's weapons database.

Tchemanguere, Ndempou and Boyo, where they killed and wounded several civilians.[130] On the road between Bambari and Ippy, UPC elements killed the chiefs of the villages of Kopia and Jitolakri and burnt down several houses.[131] The Kouango area has also been subjected to UPC violence once again, in retaliation for the killing of Fulani by anti-balaka (see annex 4.4).

132. In late October 2016, violence spiralled out of control, with the UPC allegedly killing 11 people in the village of Berima on the Grimari Bakala road on 27 October, and 6 gendarmes who were on their way to investigate the crime on 29 October.[132] Following the latter incident, anti-balaka erected roadblocks in Bambari's Kidjigira neighbourhood, and kidnapped two staff of the non-governmental organization International Medical Corps. Kidjigira's population fled, en masse, to two nearby camps for internally displaced people.

133. In all the areas under its control, UPC elements have continued to arrest, detain and physically abuse civilians (see S/2016/694, para. 62).[133] The use of illegal detention centres by UPC at the "Brigade de combatants" is a good example of the appropriation by the armed groups of State functions.[134] UPC also runs other illegal detention centres in Langandji village (22 km north of Mobaye) and in the pastoralist centre near Bambari.[135]

134. In addition, the Panel interviewed victims of forced marriages between UPC soldiers and girls between the ages of 13 to 16 years.[136] During its missions to Béma and Ouango, the Panel observed at least one child soldier.[137]

Anti-balaka groups

135. Attacks on the convoy of UPC dissidents in Grimari showed that anti-balaka fighters — large in number and armed with several new AK-type assault rifles — have maintained their military and mobilizing capacity in the region.[138] Anti-balaka factions continue to be divided and are either aligned with Maxime Mokom (operating under Omer Beba and Thierry Madibo) or Edouard Ngaïssona (operating under Gaëtan Bouadé). Both factions have divided their areas of responsibility.[139]

136. The non-aggression pact signed on 27 January 2016 between UPC and Ngaïssona's faction in Bambari (see S/2016/694, para. 45) is no longer in force. The parties have accused each other of being behind the violence around the Ngakobo internally displaced persons site on 15 October 2016, which left 11 people dead and 13 injured.[140]

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[130] Confidential report, 9 October 2016.

[131] Confidential report, 14 October 2016.

[132] Confidential report, 30 October 2016.

[133] Panel of Experts database of incidents, July-October 2016.

[134] Confidential report, 16 June 2016.

[135] Confidential reports, 18 August and 7 September 2016.

[136] Meeting with victims, Bema, 9 October 2016.

[137] Panel's mission to Ouango and Bema on 7-9 June and 7-9 October 2016.

[138] Meeting with MINUSCA officials, Bangui, 2 September 2016. Confidential report, 6 September 2016.

[139] Meeting with Gaëtan Bouadé, Bambari, 3 August 2016.

[140] Confidential report, 15 October 2016; meeting with Gaëtan Bouadé and Ali Darassa, Bambari, 3 August 2016.

137. Bouadé told the Panel that the disarmament of his fighters had started and issued a communiqué on 29 August 2016 reiterating his faction's participation in the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration process (see annex 4.5).[141] Two days later, however, he was reportedly involved in firing, using semi-automatic rifles, on MINUSCA vehicles.[142] Furthermore, the weapons to be handed over to MINUSCA within the framework of the pre-disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration process — and now stored in his house — are non-functional, mostly artisanal, rifles (see annex 4.6). Anti-balaka fighters of Bouadé's faction are among the anti-balaka forces killing and wounding civilians in Bambari.[143]

Mouvement de résistance pour la défense de la patrie: a new actor adding fuel to the fire

138. On 4 August 2016, MRDP was established in Bambari (annex 4.7). Most MRDP elements are from Ouaka prefecture.[144] Leaders of the group told the Panel that their ambition is to free the country from the presence of ex-Séléka soldiers, which they consider to be foreigners stealing resources of the Central African Republic.[145] They first plan to liberate Bambari and later the rest of the country. MRDP leaders reject the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration process, as they need weapons and ammunition to achieve their goal.

139. MRDP leaders dissociate themselves from anti-balaka groups, but the groups' rhetoric is very similar. MRDP leaders told the Panel that the anti-balaka are too weak from a military perspective and do not have the capacity to effectively combat ex-Séléka groups. However, several sources claim that there are interactions between both groups on the ground. Initially, Gaëtan Bouadé was even involved in the creation of MRDP.

140. One visible indicator of this possible link between the two groups is that MRDP's base in Bambari was initially established at Bouadé's anti-balaka base. The base was soon relocated and Bouadé issued a communiqué denying his support for MRDP only after MINUSCA's explanation that belonging to a new group would prevent him from participating in the pre-disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration process.[146] It is likely Bouadé has adopted an official position of rupture with MRDP to continue participating in the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration process, while actually cooperating with this new group.

141. On 4 September 2016, MRDP issued a memorandum giving MINUSCA 30 days to arrest Ali Darassa (see annex 4.8). When the ultimatum expired on 4 October, the group claims to have taken action. The MRDP spokesperson, Seraphin Komeya, claims that MPRC elements were involved in the attack against United Nations peacekeepers on the road between Grimari and Bambari on

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[141] Meeting with Gaëtan Bouadé, Bambari, 3 August 2016.

[142] Confidential report, 28 September 2016.

[143] Panel of Experts database of incidents, July-October 2016.

[144] Political Coordinator Arcad-Kennedy Redjé Waka; coordinator in charge of operations: Hans Nemandji III; adviser Emile Doungoupou; and spokesperson Seraphin Komeya.

[145] Meeting with members of the MRDP coordination unit, Bangui, 11 September 2016.

[146] Meeting with confidential sources, Bangui, 10 September 2016.

13 October.[147] In that attack, 5 MINUSCA soldiers were injured, while 2 assailants were killed and 2 were injured.[148] One civilian was also killed.

142. MRDP is very critical of MINUSCA, and it has requested the withdrawal of the Mauritanian contingent from Bambari, claiming that the United Nations troops are accomplices of UPC. The MRDP spokesperson was also one of the organizers of the anti-MINUSCA demonstration in Bangui on 24 October 2016 (see annex 3.14). Seraphin Komeya told the Panel that, should MINUSCA not disarm ex-Séléka groups, the group will conduct more hostile actions against peacekeepers.[149]

B. Union pour la paix en Centrafrique and cross-border arms trafficking in Mbomou prefecture

143. In its previous report the Panel highlighted arms and natural resources trafficking through Béma, Satéma and Mobaye, towns along the Ubangi River, all under the control of UPC forces. In October the Panel returned to Béma, and also visited Yakoma in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to further investigate the matter.

144. According to local authorities in Béma and Bangassou, as well as security forces in Yakoma, Tobi Nkotto, alias "Le Mabe", has been involved in trafficking of arms and ammunition from Kisangani, through Buta and Yakoma in the Democratic Republic of the Congo into the Central African Republic.[150] In February 2016, Congolese authorities supposedly arrested Nkotto in Yakoma for illegal weapons possession and transferred him to Kinshasa. The Panel has requested the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to confirm this and to provide further details of his arrest, but at the time of the writing of the present report no answer had been provided.

145. Trafficking of hunting rifles and ammunition between Yakoma and Béma is frequent. A confidential source in Bangassou showed the Panel a rifle purchased in Béma that had come from Yakoma (see annex 4.9). The rifle resembled a Baikal hunting rifle and appeared to be produced very recently as it was much different from the decades-old hunting rifles commonly inspected by the Panel. Producers of such weapons in Yakoma invited the Panel to visit their workshop, but local authorities opposed the visit.

146. Hunting ammunition is regularly traded between Yakoma and Béma alongside other commodities, and is openly sold on the market in Bangassou (see annex 4.10). The boxes of hunting ammunition inspected by the Panel were produced by the company Manufacture de cartouches congolaise in Pointe Noire, the Republic of the Congo. Nathanaël Wabi, a merchant based in Yakoma, was frequently cited as principal trader of hunting ammunition, as well as gold and diamonds, between

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[147] Meeting with Seraphin Komeya, Bangui, 21 October 2016.

[148] Confidential report, 14 October 2016.

[149] Phone interview with Seraphin Komeya, 25 October 2016.

[150] Meeting with officers of the DRC Army (FARDC) and Police (CNP) in Yakoma, 8 October 2016. Meeting with the Prefect of Mbomou province, Bangassou, 6 October 2016. Meeting with local officials, Béma, 7 October 2016.

Yakoma and Béma.[151] Harouna Babangida told the Panel that he is one of the principal traders bringing hunting ammunition from Béma to Bangassou for sale. In Béma, a young girl married to a UPC officer told the Panel that her husband regularly crossed the river to buy boxes of hunting ammunition in Yakoma, in order to sell them in the north of the country.[152]

147. To pick up merchandise from Béma, UPC soldiers from Nzako travel by motorcycle through Niakari, 18 km from Bangassou, joining the road between Bangassou and Béma, but without having to pass through Bangassou, where MINUSCA has a presence. UPC has threatened local authorities in Bangassou, instructing them not to deploy the national gendarmerie in Niakari, this after an incident on 5 October 2016 when gendarmes conducting a mission in the village, without knowing, questioned UPC soldiers in civilian clothing who were on their way to Béma.[153]

148. In its 2016 midterm report (see S/2016/694, para. 113 (c)), the Panel encouraged MINUSCA, in cooperation with the authorities of the Central African Republic, to establish a military presence and carry out inspections in Béma among other strategic cross-border arms-trafficking points. In response to that recommendation MINUSCA informed the Committee, in a letter dated 13 September 2016, that the mission had conducted four field missions to Béma since January 2016, while regular patrols continue from Bangassou in order to monitor the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In the same letter, MINUSCA stressed the logistical and security challenges if the forces were to be further split in border areas.

149. The Panel understands MINUSCA's limitations in terms of maintaining a permanent presence in all strategic locations such as Béma, but notes the absence of any arms inspection activities, as outlined in paragraph 36 (c) of resolution 2301 (2016) on MINUSCA's mandate, in this location and on access roads, which the Panel deems feasible and necessary to help implement the arms embargo.

C. Illegal taxation by anti-balaka on the Oubangui River between Bangui and Kouango

150. During the crisis, anti-balaka established illegal checkpoints in order to tax fishers and traditional boats transporting goods and passengers on the Oubangui River (see S/2015/936 paras. 59-66). The Panel was informed that although such activities have recently stopped south of Bangui they continue east of the capital.[154] Such illegal taxation drives up the prices of goods and is associated with physical assaults on, and the torture and raping of, passengers (see annex 4.11).

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[151] Meetings with merchants and local authorities in Bangassou, Béma and Yakoma, 7-10 October 2016.

[152] Meeting with young girl, Béma, 9 October 2016.

[153] Interview with local authorities, Niakari, 10 October 2010. Meeting with gendarmerie officer, Bangassou, 11 October 2016.

[154] Meeting with the fluvial brigade and a captain of a vessel coming from Congo-Brazzaville, Bangui, 4 October 2016. Meeting with confidential sources, Bangui, 20 September and 15 October 2016.

151. Following arguments over amounts of taxation, river transporters suspended their activities in November 2015. They restarted after anti-balaka leaders Thierry Lebène, alias Douze Puissance, and Thibault Zoni agreed on a fixed level of taxation (see annex 4.12). During a meeting with the Panel, Lebène claimed that he had signed a document to restore the free circulation of boats, denying his involvement in taxation and accusing another anti-balaka, called "Azous Azous", as the main beneficiary of the taxation on the river.[155]

152. After another suspension of activities in March 2016, the number of checkpoints between Bangui and Kouango was reduced from 9 to 3, at Danga, Mbata and Ombella. Tensions remain, however, in spite of gendarmes having been sent to Ombella. Various sources told the Panel that the gendarmes are not preventing illegal taxation, or that they even participate in such activities.[156] On 8 August 2016, passengers on one boat arrested a gendarme who tried to tax them and brought him to Bangui. Following that incident, river transporters once again suspended their activities for a week.

V. Eastern region and border with the Sudan and South Sudan

A. General Assembly of ex-Séléka in Bria

Ex-Séléka attempts to put forward civil society

153. Since Nourredine Adam's return, his objective has remained unchanged: the restoration of a unified political and military chain of command among ex-Séléka factions. However, the format of the General Assembly of ex-Séléka has changed over time. Members of civil society have been put forward as members of the Assembly to make it appear to be a meeting initiated by the broader population, allowing it to express general concerns and to agree on recommendations to be sent to the Government. Ex-Séléka members would rather participate as guests in a so-called "Forum of Civil Society" from the northern and eastern regions of the country.[157] Earlier, ex-Séléka had also considered organizing an assembly of all Muslim communities of the Central African Republic.

154. When mobilizing civil society, ex-Séléka leaders had two objectives. First, by meeting side by side with civil society, they could claim that they are acting on its behalf and appear as a transformed and unified political movement. Second, it was a way to alleviate the financial difficulties associated with the organization of the General Assembly. Ex-Séléka leaders hoped that their civil society partners would be able to receive funding from either MINUSCA or the Government (see annex 5.1). However, no such financial support was provided through official

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[155] Meeting with Thierry Lebène, Bangui, 12 October 2016. Other sources also mentioned "Azous Azous" as one of the beneficiaries of illegal taxation.

[156] Meetings with confidential sources, Bangui, 20 September and 15 October 2016.

[157] Meeting with Runga civil society leader Yaya Idriss, Bria, 13 September 2016; meeting with General Zacharia Damane, Bria, 13 September 2016; meeting with Moussa Maouloud, Bria, 14 September 2016.

channels, and ex-Séléka turned towards Bria's economic operators, notably diamond collectors, for financial support.[158]

155. Ultimately, the Forum of Civil Society was postponed, with no given date, while ex-Séléka organized their own assembly on 18 and 19 October 2016.

Ex-Séléka factions remain divided

156. The holding of the General Assembly was announced and postponed several times between June and October 2016. The delays were due to financial difficulties, but also to persisting divisions between the different factions.

157. During the months prior to the General Assembly, Nourredine Adam (FPRC) and Zacharia Damane, Rassemblement patriotique pour le renouveau de la Centrafrique (RPRC), tried to convince the other main factions, UPC and MPC, to join. Despite operational cooperation between FPRC and MPC in some regions (see S/2016/694, paras. 94-96), MPC did not participate in the Assembly. While some members of MPC remain undecided about their position regarding the establishment of a new Séléka coalition,[159] UPC has firmly opposed it. UPC is holding to its independent position and refusing to share any control over its growing area of influence.

158. Both the Executive President of MPC, El Bachar Idriss Ahmed, and the Chief of Staff of UPC, Ali Darassa, told the Panel that they would not take part in a coalition led by Nourredine Adam because he is under international sanctions.[160] The Executive President of MPC also indicated he would not agree to join a group that he would not himself chair.

159. Divisions also existed among those participating in the General Assembly, in particular on the allocation of key positions in the new coalition. In a meeting with the Panel, FPRC Deputy Coordinator Moussa Maouloud recognized the tensions between ethnic communities, in particular the Goula, who are strongly represented in RPRC, and the Runga, who are strongly represented in the FPRC.[161]

The outcome of the General Assembly: call for renewed dialogue and de facto partition

160. The "Bria Declaration" of 19 October 2016 (see annex 5.2) calls for renewed dialogue between the groups involved in the rebellion and the Government under the aegis of the African Union. It condemns the persecutions against minorities and the rearmament of the anti-balaka by the Government.

161. The Bria Declaration also calls for a de facto partition of the country. While committing themselves to abide by existing rules, the participants in the General Assembly declared that they would take care of public affairs in all areas under their control. This position, while it is likely to provoke negative reactions in Bangui, is less controversial than the one expressed in the explanatory statement issued by the

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[158] Meeting with economic operators in Bria, 14 September 2016.

[159] Confidential report, 1 September 2016.

[160] Meeting with El Bachar Idriss Ahmed, Kaga-Bandoro, 31 August 2016; Meeting with Ali Darassa and UPC Adviser Souleymane Daouda, Bambari, 3 August 2016.

[161] Meeting with Moussa Maouloud, Bria, 14 September 2016.

Assembly in advance of the meeting (see annex 5.3). The latter document reads like a plea for the independence of the north-eastern part of the Central African Republic.

162. The General Assembly established: (a) a High Supreme Council, with Nourredine Adam as President and Zacharia Damane as Vice-President; and (b) a National Council on Defence and Security with Abdoulaye Hissène as President (see annex 5.4). Sanctioned individual Haroun Gaye participated in the Assembly but has thus far not been given any role. Michel Djotodia, previously President of FPRC, did not participate in the meeting and was not assigned any position.

Formation of a new Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique or a step towards the reunification of Séléka?

163. Before the convening of the General Assembly, a new name for the coalition was considered, namely the "Mouvement de Résistance contre la marginalisation et l'injustice du peuple". All participants were finally gathered in Bria under the banner of FPRC. Rather than being an assembly to reunify all ex-Séléka factions, the meeting resulted in a mere transformation of FPRC, with an internal reshuffling of positions and with new members joining from RPRC.[162]

164. Nevertheless, participants considered that the General Assembly was a first move towards a general reunification. At its conclusion, participants planned to reach out to MPC and UPC leaders to convince them to join — and many positions have been left vacant in the organizational chart in order to accommodate possible newcomers. Given the strategic positions held so far by UPC and MPC in the country, it remains doubtful whether the goal of reunification will actually be achieved. At the time of the writing of the present report, it is still unclear whether all RPRC members will be part of the new coalition.[163]

MINUSCA: security challenge presented by the General Assembly

165. The organization of the General Assembly resulted in significant movements of armed men towards Bria. At the time of the holding of the Assembly, about 1,000 to 1,500 armed men, mainly from the prefectures of Vakaga, Bamingui-Bangoran and Haute-Kotto, were present in and around the town.[164] In addition to combatants of factions participating in the Assembly (FPRC and RPRC), there were also a small number of UPC fighters, some still under the control of Ali Darassa and others from the dissident branch of UPC under Yaya Scout.[165]

166. Given the significant flow of armed men arriving in Bria, MINUSCA was not in a position to uphold the weapons-free zone in town. For instance, delegations escorting "General" Joseph Zoundeko on 26 September 2016 and Abdoulaye Hissène on 3 October 2016, with 42 and 80 combatants respectively, were not

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[162] The reunification of FPRC and RPRC had already been informally agreed upon in July 2016 on the margins of the traditional meeting of the Gula community in Tingoulou, confidential report, 26 July 2016.

[163] For instance, Djono Abaha, who was not in Bria, and Joseph Zoundeko would not have committed to take part in the new coalition. E-mail correspondence with confidential sources, 26 and 27 October 2016.

[164] Confidential report, 6 October 2016.

[165] Before he seceded from UPC, Yaya Scout was UPC zone commander in Bria.

disarmed by MINUSCA.[166] Armed men generally bypassed MINUSCA checkpoints at entry points to the town. The presence of individuals under warrant of arrest was another challenge for the Mission (see paras. 31-33 above). Nourredine Adam did not physically attend the Assembly, but followed developments closely through his representatives.

167. No serious security incidents were reported during the event. As of 23 October 2016, most men had started to leave Bria to return to their respective localities.

B. Diamonds and security in Bria and the surrounding area

Diamonds and security

168. The town of Bria is the centre of the eastern production zone of the Central African Republic. While the town, its markets and government buildings have remained free of the visible presence of armed groups after MINUSCA dislodged General Arda Hakouma (FPRC) and his men in February 2015, ex-Séléka forces continue to occupy mining sites in the surrounding areas (see also S/2015/936, para. 128).

169. With over 12 mining sites in the immediate surroundings, the town of Aigbando, about 60 km north-east of Bria, and home to over 10,000 people, is one of the main areas of production where FPRC has set up a parallel administration regulating and taxing mine activities. FPRC is a dominant force in Aigbando, with over 35 men present in April 2016, in addition to 15 UPC combatants.[167] It is unclear whether UPC has left as a consequence of clashes that erupted in other locations between the two factions in June 2016. FPRC and UPC soldiers are in civilian clothing and do not openly carry arms, respecting MINUSCA's weapons free zone, but are in possession of arms.

170. When official mining authorities from Bria visited Aigbando in April 2016 to estimate production and identify operators, they were forced to show their mission orders to FPRC authorities in order to gain access to the area.[168] In addition to a number of licensed miners, in early 2016 a small number of licenced or formerly licenced collectors who had either arrived from exile in Cameroon and Chad or who had come from the western part of the country, settled themselves in Aigbando.

171. Other mining areas in close proximity to Bria are also militarized. Mine sites around Iramou, 20 km east of Bria, are under the control of a son of one Bria's most influential diamond collectors, Adoum Kette.[169] In Kalaga, 50 km north-east of Bria, RPRC has a base and extorts diamonds and money from travellers at a checkpoint on the road to Bria.[170]

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[166] Confidential reports, 23 September and 6 October 2016.

[167] Panel's visit, 23 April 2016.

[168] Meeting with the head of the prefectural department of mines, Bria, 14 September 2016.

[169] Abdoulaye Hissène is alleged to be another son of Adoum Kette. See Enough Project, "Behind the Headlines: Drivers of Violence in the Central African Republic", 1 May 2014, available from: http://enoughproject.org/reports/behind-headlines-drivers-violence-central-african-republic.

[170] Confidential report, 12 December 2015.

Official trade and trafficking of diamonds

172. Trade from Bria and other locations to the east of Bangui has not been officially suspended, but since the Ministry of Mines has insisted that buying houses store diamonds from the east separate from the west, under so-called "red" purchase slips (see S/2015/936, para. 131) and the sanctions listing of Badica in August 2015, no official transfers have taken place in 2016. Nevertheless, 16 licensed collectors are registered in Haute-Kotto prefecture. However, rather than selling to buying houses, they sell to each other to show the mining authorities that they are conducting a legitimate business. This, nevertheless, is in violation of the mining code. While fraudulent trade from Bria is rampant, seizures are few (see box 2).

Box 2
Seizure of diamonds from Bria

On 28 May 2016, the Special Anti-Fraud Unit confiscated around 550 carats of undeclared diamonds from collector Mahamat Nour[171] and his brother Mahamat Moustapha upon their arrival on a MINAIR[172] flight from Bria. They were accompanied by another collector of Israeli origin, Youri Freund, and an associate.[173] In addition to being suspected of illegal diamond purchases, Nour and Freund are suspected of having forged documents when obtaining Freund's collector's licence.

According to Nour, they had failed to declare the diamonds in Bria (all four parcels) because collectors had given them the parcels at the last moment for sale in Bangui, not leaving enough time to do the necessary expertise and paperwork, and also due to imminent bad weather conditions.[174] Aware of the arrival of Nour and associates, mining services in Bria informed the Panel that they had repeatedly asked both collectors whether they had purchased and/or wanted to transfer any diamonds up until the last moment before they boarded the plane.[175] Nour denied to the authorities to be in the possession of any diamonds. Nour claims to have immediately declared diamonds on arrival in Bangui, although, according to the Anti-Fraud Unit, they were found following a search.

Youri Freund was arrested in Mali in 2004 for smuggling rough diamonds out of Bamako Airport (see S/2009/640, para. 68). The Group of Experts on Ivory Coast also suspected him of being involved in the exportation of illegal diamonds from Ivory Coast (see S/2009/521, para. 326, and S/2008/598, paras. 152-161).

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[171] Mahamat Nour is the former deputy director general of the diamond-buying house BADICA, which was added to the sanctions list on 20 August 2015.

[172] MINAIR and BADICA are both part of Groupe Abdoulkarim of Abdoul-Karim Dan-Azoumi.

[173] Meeting with outgoing USAF commander, Bangui, 3 June 2016. Meeting with head of the prefectural department of mines, Bria, 14 September 2016. Meeting with Mahamat Nour, Bangui, 1 September 2016.

[174] Meeting with Mahamat Nour, Bangui, 5 October 2016.

[175] Nour and Freund had travelled together to Bria once before, on 4 May 2016, and both declared that they had not purchased any diamonds. Meeting with the head of the prefectural department of mines, Bria, 14 September 2016.

173. Part of the fraudulent trade of diamonds from Bria is likely to pass through Bangui, but another part is alleged to be trafficked by land to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see para. 146 above).

C. Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique: arms trafficking and recruitment in Vakaga prefecture

174. The Vakaga prefecture remains under the control of ex-Séléka groups FPRC and MLCJ (see S/2016/694, paras. 69-72). Previously much weaker than FPRC, MLCJ has reportedly gained ground in the city of Birao and the eastern part of the Vakaga prefecture.

175. The western part of the Vakaga prefecture and the bordering prefecture of Bamingui-Bangoran remain under the exclusive control of FPRC. The competition between MPC and FPRC in Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture and the movements of MPC armed elements on the Ndélé-Bamingui road highlighted by the Panel in its midterm report (see S/2016/694, paras. 81-92), seems to have stopped.[176] In the areas under its control, FPRC has continued to challenge State authority through illegal checkpoints and by imposed curfews in the Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture.[177] FPRC reiterated its rejection of the deployment of FACA (see S/2016/694, para. 75).[178]

176. Since his return to the Central African Republic, Nourredine Adam has mainly stayed in the area of Siki Kede in the west of Vakaga prefecture.[179] In July 2016, he reportedly went to Birao and up to three-border-town of Tissi from where he recruited about 100 fighters, mainly Sudanese.[180]

177. Tissi is also repeatedly cited as the key location for ex-Séléka groups and criminal gangs to purchase arms and ammunition.[181] In Ndélé, FPRC soldiers have been seen lately with brand new military weapons and uniforms.[182] According to several sources, in June 2016, Nourredine Adam organized and received an arms supply from three merchant trucks that reportedly drove from Tissi to Ndélé and Kaga-Bandoro.[183]

Tripartite cooperation

178. The rotation of troops in Am Dafok (Vakaga prefecture) also continues to face logistical challenges. The Panel repeatedly received phone calls from a FACA commander claiming that 93 members of FACA have been stuck in Nyala (the Sudan) since 5 October 2016. They are waiting for an agreement between the Sudan and the Central African Republic for a troop rotation, with the support of Sudanese

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[176] Panel of Experts database of incidents, July-October 2016.

[177] Confidential reports, 26 and 29 August 2016.

[178] Meeting with FPRC leadership, Kaga-Bandoro, 30 August 2016. Confidential report, July 2016.

[179] Ibid., meeting with Benjamine Nour, Bangui, 28 August 2016. Confidential report, August and September 2016.

[180] Confidential reports, 29 June, 30 July and 4 August 2016.

[181] Meeting with confidential source, Bangui, 12 October 2016. Meeting with confidential source, Kaga-Bandoro, 30 and 31 August 2016.

[182] Confidential report, 16 September 2016.

[183] Correspondence with confidential sources, 16 June 2016. Confidential report, July 2016.

aircraft, to be concluded, as exempted by the Committee.[184] The cabinet of the Ministry of Defence informed the Panel that the expected troop rotation would not take place before early November.[185]

D. Lord's Resistance Army

Lord's Resistance Army in the Central African Republic

179. The Lord's Resistance Army continues to pose a threat to the civil population of the Central African Republic. The data compiled by the Panel for 2016 show a sharp increase in the number of civilian abductions compared to last year (see annex 5.5). These abductions raise concerns about the possible enlargement of its ranks by the Lord's Resistance Army, something that it has not done in recent years. Witnesses report that the looting of gold, diamonds and money and the poaching of elephants for their ivory remain its main source of revenue.

180. Doctor Achaye's, a splinter group of the Lord's Resistance Army, continues to operate in the area of Rafai-Djéma-Obo (see annex 5.6).[186] The Panel has received unconfirmed information about a possible surrender of that group owing to a lack of trading opportunities. However, the Panel obtained information regarding a merchant based in Demia (Democratic Republic of the Congo), who would be trading ammunition and goods on behalf of the Doctor Achaye's group.[187]

Lord's Resistance Army in Kafia Kingi

181. During the period under review, the Panel met with several defectors and abductees in Obo, Bria and Bangui, as well as in Kampala, Uganda. The abductees and defectors reported that the Lord's Resistance Army is divided into five major groups scattered around South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic and the Sudan. They consistently affirmed that Joseph Kony was and may still be in the Kafia Kingi enclave, a disputed area between the Sudan and South Sudan.[188]

182. According to information obtained by the Panel and confirmed by defectors, in early January 2016, following a dispute with local Fullata traders from the town of Songo, a number of fighters in the Lord's Resistance Army were expelled from Kafia Kingi. On 5 January, one of the traders, referred to as Hassan, was allegedly

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[184] On 11 October 2016, the Central African Republic submitted an exemption request for troop rotation with Sudanese support, six days after the 93 FACA soldiers had departed Am Dafok to Nyala. The Sanctions Committee approved the rotation on 14 October 2016.

[185] Communication with the cabinet of the Ministry of Defence, 27 October 2016

[186] Several reports of attacks allegedly committed by Achaye's group. Confidential reports 31 January, 10, 11, 18 May, 7 June, 3 September 2016. Panel's database, October 2016.

[187] E-mail correspondence with a non-governmental organization based in the United States, 27 October 2016.

[188] According to the defectors interviewed by the Panel, there are two LRA groups in DRC, led by Maj. Ladera(e) and Capt. Otim Larwuodo (Larwedo) respectively; in CAR, two groups led by Maj. Aligace and Maj. Owila respectively; in the Darfur area, the main group is led by Joseph Kony. Each of these groups consist of approximately 40 armed people plus abductees (women and children). These groups could also be subdivided into smaller units (10-12 persons), depending on their missions.

killed at an agreed upon meeting point for the trading of goods by Colonel John Bosco Kibwola of the Lord's Resistance Army.[189] Kibwola was subsequently executed on Kony's orders for spoiling the relationship with the Songo traders.

183. It is unclear to what extent trade relations between the Lord's Resistance Army and other Songo merchants continued after the incident, notably with a leading Songo trader referred to as 'Musa Hatari', who was the Army's main supplier of food items and chief buyer of their gold, diamonds and ivory.[190] Lieutenant Okot Lukwang of the Lord's Resistance Army, who speaks fluent Arabic, was the principal liaison with the Songo traders, while Kony's sons, Ali and Salim, both listed by the Committee on 23 August 2016, were in charge of the security and finances for the trading operations.[191]

184. In the Panel's view, Kony's group may still be operating in Kafia Kingi. The Sudanese Government, however, strongly denies the presence of any elements of the Lord's Resistance Army in the area at any point in time.[192]

E. Sudanese poachers and anti-poaching efforts in Chinko National Park

185. In its 2015 final report (see S/2015/936, paras. 109-112) the Panel noted the presence of two groups of some 200 professional Sudanese poachers active in the eastern and northern parts of the Central African Republic. Nyala (South Darfur) is home to the organizers of poaching gangs and the main destination for poached ivory and other wildlife products.[193] In addition, nomadic cattle herders poach wildlife as they migrate, largely for their own consumption, but also collaborate with professional poachers from the Sudan, selling them ivory, skins and horns.

186. While Sudanese poaching gangs usually cohabitate with ex-Séléka forces, the latter have made seizures and arrests of associated traders on at least two occasions. In mid-August 2016, in Alindao, UPC seized a quantity of ivory worth FCFA 15 million. Merchants came from Haute-Mbomou prefecture and were reportedly on their way to the Sudan and Nigeria.[194] Customers in Nyala allegedly called upon "General" Yaya Scoot, from the dissident Arab wing of UPC, to help release the goods. Earlier, in May 2016, FPRC forces under "General" Tom Adam also apprehended traders from South Sudan who were supposedly also dealing in wildlife products.[195]

Chinko National Park

187. Much of the poaching in the eastern part of the Central African Republic takes place inside the Chinko National Park. During 2016, the Chinko Project, a public-

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[189] Debriefing of defectors consulted by the Panel. E-mail correspondence with confidential source, 24 August 2016.

[190] Confidential intelligence report, 10 August 2015; debriefing of defectors consulted by the Panel.

[191] Meeting with a defector from the Lord's Resistance Army, Kampala, 19 October 2016.

[192] Meeting with Sudanese authorities, Khartoum, 13 October 2016.

[193] Meeting with wildlife tracker in Ndelé, 31 May 2016. Confidential report, 7 September 2016.

[194] Confidential report, 7 September 2016.

[195] Telephone interview with economic operator in Sam Ouandja, 30 May 2016.

private partnership between the Ministry of Forestry, the Environment and Tourism and the conservation organization African Parks, has effectively started to manage the incursions of poachers, through sensitization, overflights and the occasional exchange of fire.

188. During operations in February and March 2016, with the assistance of judiciary police, 18 AK-47 weapons were confiscated and placed in the custody of the Chinko Project, thus allowing it to acquire weapons legally without violating the United Nations arms embargo (see annex 5.7). Yet, project managers explained to the Panel that the Chinko Project needs additional items of lethal and non-lethal equipment in order to extend anti-poaching activities. The Panel has provided advice to the Project in preparing an exemption request.

VI. Northern region and border with Chad

A. Anti-balaka challenge to ex-Séléka domination in the prefecture of Nana-Grébizi

189. In June 2016, FPRC and MPC had entered into a tactical alliance to counter the UPC intrusion into their sphere of influence (see S/2016/694, paras. 94-96). This opportunistic cooperation between the two groups continues. The two groups still have diverging views, in particular on disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration and the need for Séléka reunification, and remain in competition for the control of economic resources in the area (see S/2016/694, paras. 81-84). However, these groups peacefully share control over Kaga-Bandoro and collaborate operationally when confronted with common threats. As was the case in the fighting against UPC in June 2016, FPRC and MPC fighters fought side by side against the anti-balaka in Kaga-Bandoro and Ndomété in September and October 2016.

Anti-balaka revival: the case of Ndomété

190. During the night of 15 and 16 September 2016, MINUSCA removed an anti-balaka checkpoint in Ndomété (10 km south of Kaga-Bandoro). In response, on 16 September, about 100 anti-balaka elements moved towards Kaga-Bandoro and exchanged fire with MPC and FPRC combatants 5 km south of the city. The same day, ex-Séléka fighters reportedly looted and killed six people in Kaga-Bandoro and Ndomété.[196] Attacks, including looting, targeted houses of staff of the United Nations and non-governmental organizations, and the latter continued to be the target of attacks in the following days, leading three of them to suspend their activities on 1 October 2016.

191. These events triggered strong criticism of MINUSCA by the anti-balaka who accused peacekeepers of siding with ex-Séléka and not protecting civilian populations. On 28 September 2016, protests took place in front of the MINUSCA base in Kaga-Bandoro.[197] Following these incidents, MINUSCA deployed additional police and military units in the area.

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[196] Confidential reports, 17 and 21 September 2016.

[197] Confidential report, 28 September 2016.

192. In addition, the Government of the Central African Republic deployed 67 gendarmes and police officers from Bangui. However, once they reached Sibut, they were recalled by President Touadéra after MINUSCA leadership had advised him that such an initiative was likely to make the situation worse. However, the actual role of the President is unclear. Before he recalled the internal security forces, a Government communiqué published on 18 October 2016 indicated that they were deployed on the President's order (see annex 6.1).

193. Events illustrate the discontent of some anti-balaka with the status quo in the area and their attempt to challenge ex-Séléka supremacy. Between 10 and 15 September 2016, under the leadership of local leader Bertrand Gazamodo, more than 100 anti-balaka fighters gathered around Ndomété.[198] In establishing a checkpoint there, the anti-balaka hoped to have a bargaining chip to request the removal of checkpoints manned by ex-Séléka in Kaga-Bandoro.

194. While it was reported that most of the anti-balaka fighters came from Bangui, many of the anti-balaka from the area did not side with them.[199] Anti-balaka leader Maxime Mokom told the Panel that Bertrand Gazamodo was no longer working with him.[200] He also told the Panel that Bertrand Gazamodo claims to act on behalf of President Touadéra. Gazamodo and his affiliates also told other sources that they were acting upon orders from members of the Government.[201]

October violence in Kaga-Bandoro

195. On 12 October 2016, when the Advisory and Monitoring Committee for the national disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration programme met for the first time in Bangui, Kaga-Bandoro was the scene of serious fighting and looting, reportedly leaving at least 37 civilians and 12 alleged ex-Séléka fighters dead, and more than 50 people injured.[202] Approximately 6,500 internally displaced persons sought refuge around MINUSCA facilities. According to the Panel's database covering incidents since December 2013, this event was one of the most serious that ever happened in the prefecture of Nana-Grébizi.

196. Early in the morning on 12 October 2016, 15 to 20 individuals protested the killing of a Muslim resident that had taken place the previous day under unclear circumstances. These individuals, whose links to ex-Séléka groups are unclear, were attacked by alleged anti-balaka fighters. Later that day, several hundred Muslims, some of them members of MPC and FPRC, looted various buildings in town, including the office of the prefect, houses of the staff of humanitarian organizations and of the United Nations, as well as the internally displaced persons camp at the Catholic Church, which was mostly populated by Christians. MINUSCA had to resort to the use of force in order to protect civilians and drive out individuals from the Evéché internally displaced persons camp.[203]

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[198] Confidential report, 16 September 2016.

[199] E-mail correspondence with confidential source, 1 October 2016.

[200] Meeting with Maxime Mokom, Bangui, 21 October 2016.

[201] Confidential report, 21 September 2016.

[202] Human Rights Watch, "Central African Republic: Deadly Raid on Displaced People", 1 November 2016, available from https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/11/01/central-african-republic-deadly-raid-displaced-people.

[203] Confidential reports, 13, 14 and 18 October 2016.

197. This incident again strained relations between the Government and MINUSCA. The Minister of Interior, Jean Serge Bokassa, openly accused the Pakistani contingent deployed in Kaga-Bandoro of siding with the ex-Séléka.[204] On 17 October 2016 President Touadéra and the Head of MINUSCA visited Kaga-Bandoro together. Additional MINUSCA reinforcements were sent to Kaga-Bandoro from Bangui, Dékoa and Ndomété. On that occasion, the Government did not consider sending in national security forces.

198. In the Panel's view three factors have contributed to the escalation of violence. First, ex-Séléka were discontented with measures taken by MINUSCA since the incidents of 16 and 17 September 2016 in Kaga-Bandoro and Ndomété, such as the removal of their checkpoints, systematic searches at the town's entry points and the planned eviction of members of armed groups from public buildings.[205] Second, flooding in early October reduced economic activities and, therefore, racketeering at markets also decreased. Third, many civilians took part in the fighting, blurring the line between armed groups and the civilian population, and entrenching hostilities between religious communities similar to the situation in Bambari.

199. In the aftermath of this incident, anti-balaka from the area reportedly continued to build up their capacities in preparation for further fighting.[206]

B. Area of influence of the Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique and cooperation with Révolution et Justice

Failed attempt by MPC to establish a base in Nanga-Boguila

200. On 29 August 2016, MPC combatants entered the city of Nanga-Boguila (Ouham prefecture), 55 km north-west of Bossangoa, in an attempt to establish a permanent base in the city. Nanga-Boguila is a strategic location for the control of transhumance roads. On 3 September, MINUSCA dislodged MPC fighters, thereby putting an end to MPC's unchallenged territorial expansion along the Chadian border.[207] After they left Nanga-Boguila, 50 MPC elements reportedly looted the nearby village of Mbodi, and continued to the neighbouring villages of Bojomo and Kouki, where they settled in the premises of primary schools.[208]

201. MPC's continued quest for expansion in the area is a factor of discord within the group, in particular between the MPC zone commander in Paoua, General Mahamat Bahar, and his Deputy General, Saad Suleiman. General Bahar is critical of the continued expansion of MPC in the area, for which he blames General Suleiman, who is reportedly close to the MPC Chief of Staff General Mahamat Al-Khatim.[209]

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[204] Interview with Interior Minister Jean Serge Bokassa at the Network of Journalists for Human Rights, published on 15 October 2016, available from http://rjdh.org/centrafrique-gouvernement-accuse-minusca-de-connivence-seleka-de-kaga-bandoro/.

[205] Confidential report, 13 October 2016.

[206] Confidential report, 27 October 2016.

[207] Confidential report, 9 September 2016.

[208] Confidential report, 6 September 2016.

[209] Confidential reports, 31 August and 1 September 2016.

Cooperation between the Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique and Révolution et Justice in Ouham and Ouham Pendé prefectures

202. Created in 2013 as a self-defence group to protect populations against ex-Séléka fighters, Révolution et Justice (RJ) has, from early 2016 to date, engaged in a counter-intuitive alliance with the MPC. Colonel Belanga and Captain Esther, two high ranking members of RJ, told the Panel that this cooperation was tactical and necessary to avoid confrontation with MPC, which they consider to be militarily stronger.[210]

203. As observed by the Panel, in the Ouham-Pendé and Ouham prefectures, there are 12 checkpoints manned jointly by MPC and RJ. At these checkpoints, the number of MPC fighters largely exceeds the number of RJ fighters. Fighters of both groups are fully equipped, wearing military uniforms of various origin and armed with assault rifles of various categories, including Vektor R4-type, type 56-2 and MAT-49 submachine guns (see annex 6.2).[211]

204. MPC and RJ collect illegal taxes from passing traders, cattle herders and civilians, arresting those who refuse to pay.[212] Notwithstanding the stronger presence of MPC, RJ has managed to retain exclusive control over 12 checkpoints, mostly in and around Bedam (60 km north of Paoua), which is RJ's main base, under the control of Colonel Luther Betuban.

Obstruction of the restoration of State authority

205. MINUSCA has been able to dissuade armed groups from reinstalling themselves in Paoua, enabling gradual restoration of State authority. Outside Paoua, there is no evidence of State presence.

206. The leadership of RJ reported to the Panel that it supports the restoration of public institutions and the deployment of national security and armed forces in the zone.[213] In reality, RJ has prevented a number of efforts towards that end, as did MPC. For example, on 2 October 2016, MPC and RJ fighters forcefully disarmed FACA soldiers who were escorting the Member of Parliament for Paoua, Lucien Mbaigoto. In July, Mbaigoto also had to cancel his trip to Bemal because MPC refused to let him pass with a FACA escort.[214]

Human rights violations

207. Both RJ and MPC are responsible for serious human rights violations, including assaulting villagers for refusing to pay illegal taxation. RJ has admitted to recruiting child soldiers and RJ Colonel Luther has reportedly established an extrajudicial detention centre in Bemal.[215] With approximately 80 fighters under his

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[210] Meeting with Colonel Belanga, Paoua, 10 August 2016. Meeting with Captain Esther, Paoua, 9 August 2016.

[211] Panel's mission in Paoua and the Paoua-Bemal axis, 9-10 August 2016; confidential report, 21 September 2016.

[212] Confidential sources, Paoua-Bemal axis, 9-10 August 2016.

[213] Meeting with Colonel Belanga, Paoua, 10 August 2016; Meeting with Captain Esther, Paoua, 9 August 2016.

[214] Meeting with confidential sources, Paoua, 9 August 2016.

[215] Ibid.

direct control, Luther appears to be the main perpetrator of human rights violations in the area. On 17 June 2016, an arrest warrant has been issued against him for sequestration and intentional assault (see annex 6.3).

Continuing divisions within RJ

208. Divisions have continued to deepen within RJ (see S/2016/694, para. 91). On 22 April 2016, several RJ leaders, including Colonel Belanga and Captain Esther, dismissed Armel Sayo as the group's president (see annex 6.4). They told the Panel that Sayo had stopped giving money to RJ members when he became a minister of the transition Government in August 2014, and that since then he no longer had a day-to-day relationship with the group.[216] In a meeting with the Panel, Sayo denied these accusations and argued that those who attempted to dismiss him represent a negligible proportion of the group's members and control only few armed fighters.[217]

209. In their quest for leadership, Armel Sayo and Colonel Belanga have competed for the loyalty of Colonel Luther and his men, who represent RJ's main military force.

210. On 21 and 22 September 2016, Armel Sayo visited Paoua to reassert his authority over the group and established a new RJ structure (see annex 6.5). On that occasion, Colonel Luther recognized Sayo's leadership. He was upgraded to the rank of General and appointed RJ Chief of Staff, replacing Colonel Belanga, who did not receive any official position in the new structure. At the time of Sayo's visit, Colonel Belanga seemingly recognized Sayo's authority but immediately removed his recognition, reiterating his desire to chair RJ.

211. On 24 September 2016, Belanga sent a letter to the Government expressing his commitment to the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration programme (see annex 6.6). As a result, RJ is being represented in the Advisory and Monitoring Committee for the national disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration programme by two separate wings, one under Sayo and another one under Belanga (see annex 2.4).

212. For more information about Group des patriotes, an RJ splinter group, see annex 6.7.

C. Oil exploration

213. Oil exploration activities by the Chinese oil company PTIAL International Petroleum at Gaskai camp, north of Ndélé, were suspended in June 2016 because of the arrival of the rainy season. A small number of security personnel from the private security firm FIT Protection remained to guard material. The company's executive director reported no security incidents after the month of June, when three members of FPRC were wounded after a skirmish with cattle herders near the Chadian border.[218]

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[216] Meeting with Colonel Belanga, Paoua, 10 August 2016; Meeting with Captain Esther, Paoua, 9 August 2016.

[217] Meeting with Armel Sayo, Bangui, 15 August 2016.

[218] Incident report, 3 June 2016, FIT Protection, archived at the United Nations.

214. FIT Protection is in the process of recruiting staff for the coming dry season, and is working on improving the training, identification and screening of personnel, with reference to the Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies.[219]

215. The executive manager of FIT Protection insisted to the Panel that FPRC "General" Adoum Kanton had never been formally employed by the company, but did admit that he used to tax the salary of FIT Protection personnel.[220] While arguing that Kanton no longer has the leverage to do so, the Panel is concerned what will happen once Kanton, who participated in the Bria General Assembly, moves back to the area.

VII. Western region and border with Cameroon

A. Tensions between anti-balaka and Retour, réclamation et réhabilitation (3R)

216. The armed group 3R has consolidated its presence in the northwestern region of the Central African Republic, along the border with Cameroon (see S/2016/694, paras. 98-101). This presence is motivated by a desire to control transhumance roads. Under General Sidiki, 3R has attempted to deploy some of its members in several new locations, triggering severe clashes with the anti-balaka in the prefectures of Ouham and Ouham-Pendé.

217. A further description of fighting between 3R and anti-balaka, as well as human rights violations and violations of humanitarian law committed by the armed groups in this area, is contained in annex 7.1 to the present report.

B. Front démocratique du peuple centrafricain of Abdoulaye Miskine

218. The approximately 35 fighters of the Front démocratique du peuple centrafricain (FDPC) of Martin Koumtamadji, alias Abdoulaye Miskine, who arrived in the village of Zoukombo (Nana-Mambéré prefecture) on 20 May 2016, remain there to date, awaiting disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration. FDPC fighters liberated the school and set up a camp outside the village.

219. After having released three Cameroonian hostages on 10 July 2016 (see S/2016/694, para. 104), FDPC fighters in Zoukombo released the 11 remaining hostages on 17 July. Of the 15 hostages taken by FDPC on 19 March 2015 from a minibus near the Cameroonian border town of Garoua-Boulaï, one passed away in captivity and two died in hospital after their release on 10 July. Two additional local bystanders, who were witnesses to the FDPC assault on the minibus and who were

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[219] International Committee of the Red Cross. The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies, available from https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/0996-montreux-document-private-military-and-security-companies.

[220] E-mails from the Executive Director, FIT Protection, Christophe Gazam Betty, 22 and 23 October 2016.

taken hostage along with the others, escaped on 17 May with the help of the FDPC fighter Patrick Bissi.[221]

220. On 23 July 2016, FDPC also released the Mayor and sub-prefect of Baboua (Nana-Mambéré prefecture) and a pastor from Abba, who had been detained since July 2015 (see S/2016/694, para. 105).

221. It remains unclear what concessions have been made either by the Cameroonian or Central African authorities to FDPC fighters in Zoukombo, and its leader Martin Koumtamadji, alias Abdoulaye Miskine, in Brazzaville, for the release of the hostages. Two Cameroonian hostages told the Panel that two weeks after their captivity one of the hostages was obliged to talk over the phone with an unidentified individual and express a ransom demand of FCFA 5 billion ($10 million).[222] They also told the panel they had overheard their captors talking by phone to Abdoulaye Miskine, and mentioning his name in their conversations together.

222. Both in the press and to the Panel, the leadership of FDPC has denied responsibility for the hostage-taking on 19 March 2015.[223]

C. Diamonds and security

Official trade

223. On 19 September 2016, the Kimberley Process (Monitoring Team) declared the sub-prefectures of Boda, Carnot and Nola to be compliant zones, as per the requirements set forth in the operational framework annexed to the partial lifting decision of the Kimberley Process of June 2015, that is: (a) sufficient presence of State authority; (b) free movement of people and goods; and (c) no systematic presence of armed groups.[224] The national follow-up committee had also proposed the inclusion of Gadzi sub-prefecture, which was not readmitted because of limited State presence. Mining administration and the Anti-Fraud Unit in the adjacent sub-prefecture of Carnot currently covers Gadzi.

224. Since the partial lifting of the suspension of the Kimberley Process, three parcels have been exported, originating from mine sites within the sub-prefecture of Berbérati, which was the first to be declared compliant on 18 March 2016. The buying house Sodiam exported two parcels, totalling 5,969 carats.[225] The Coopérative des artisans de diamant et or exported 304, and the Coopérative minière chrétienne de Centrafrique made a request to export 40 carats, which the Monitoring Team still had pending at the time of the writing of the present report. The number of licensed collectors in Mambere Kadei prefecture, which includes three of the four

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[221] Bissi's name is among a list of FDPC elements retrieved by MINUSCA on 21 July 2015 from the FDPC base camp Zoukombo (see S/2015/936, annex 5.1).

[222] Telephone interview with two Cameroonian hostages, 2 August 2016.

[223] Interview with Abdoulaye Miskine at Cameroon Infonet, 2 August 2015, available from http://www.cameroon-info.net/article/cameroun-rca-interview-exclusive-le-general-abdoulaye-miskine-les-ravisseurs-du-maire-de-lagdo-245970.html. Meeting with FDPC liaison officer in Cameroon, Lucien Assalbaye, Bangui, 9 June 2016. Meeting with FDPC spokesperson Gustav Guingi, Zoukombo, 7 June 2016.

[224] Available from www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/2015-administrative-decision-car.

[225] Ministry of Mines, original export and trade documents, archived at the United Nations.

readmitted sub-prefectures, increased from 66 in 2015 to 91 in 2016. However, almost half of the licensed collectors are not selling to buying houses and it is therefore suspected that they may be selling diamonds fraudulently.[226]

Trafficking

225. Towns in eastern Cameroon, including Kenzou, Batouri and Bertoua, are principal diamond trading hubs of trafficked Central African diamonds. In the Panel's 2015 final report, it referred to a seizure in April 2015 of 160 carats of diamonds suspected to be of Central African origin (see S/2015/936, para. 237). The Indian nationals, Chetan Balar and Rushitkumar Patel, who had been in possession of the diamonds, were at the time assisted by Aboubakar Sidik, the owner of the buying house Etablissement Sidik.[227]

226. In December 2015, Sidik obtained a Kimberley Process certificate to export 146 carats of diamonds to the United States, but the parcel was returned and eventually exported to United Arab Emirates. Again, the diamonds were of dubious origin. Interestingly, the intended buyer in the United States was likewise of Indian origin and was formerly associated with collector Ismaila Sylla in Bangui, as was Balar.

227. Cameroonian exports have declined from 2,619 carats in the first 10 months of 2015, to 1,494 carats during the same period in 2016, suggesting that the potential illicit infiltration of Central African diamonds in the legitimate trade remains limited.[228]

Presence of armed group members in the trade

228. In 2016, Nice Démowance, who was under the command of Maxim Mokom from June 2015 onwards (see annex 7.2), renewed his artisanal mining licence (see annex 7.3). According to mining authorities in Berbérati, he has been demobilized and remains in Berbérati town. However, according to Démowance's chief of operations, he is still in command in adjacent Amada Gaza sub-prefecture, where combat between anti-balaka and armed Fulani continues, including over mine sites.[229]

229. None of the active anti-balaka members earlier identified by the Panel in Berbérati in 2015, Nice Démowance, Steve Private Sérégaza and Maximin Vobouadé (see S/2015/936, para. 224), are mentioned in the supply chain documents of the above-mentioned exporters.

Freedom of movement

230. The return of Muslim refugees and internally displaced persons to their homes in the western part of the Central African Republic is progressing, but not without

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[226] Official purchasing and sales data for collectors in the western production zone, archived at the United Nations.

[227] Meeting with official of the Ministry of Mines and Geology, Yaoundé, 28 April 2016; meeting with economic operator, Yaoundé, 27 April 2016.

[228] Official Cameroonian export data, archived at the United Nations.

[229] Meeting with Kempo Padom, anti-balaka chief of operations, in Amada Gaza, Berbérati, 16 August 2016.

problems, and it is oftentimes limited to the major towns of Berbérati, Sosso-Nakombo, Carnot and Nola.

231. In Berbérati, aggression against Muslims spiked during the period of clashes between 20 and 25 June 2016 in Bangui between the PK5 neighbourhood militia and national security forces (see annex 7.4). According to local security services, events in Bangui triggered action on the part of anti-balaka members to thwart the return of Muslims. For example, a representative of Muslim diamond operators, Haroun Waziri, living in exile in Cameroon, was physically harassed when consulting local authorities to facilitate the return of Muslim refugees. The local gendarmerie arrested Alban Sendemon, considered to be the main aggressor during this period. The latter allegedly admitted that certain diamond collectors had paid him to harass Muslim operators.[230]

232. In this connection, Hassan Fawaz, who, according to the Panel, maintained links with anti-balaka (see S/2015/936, para. 228), was brought to Bangui for questioning on the orders of the Minister of the Interior, but the public prosecutor in Bangui told the Panel he had no grounds to issue an arrest warrant.[231]

233. Alternatively, anti-balaka members seek to extort money from returnees by imposing their services as security providers. Maximin Vobouadé told the Panel that he sensitizes local populations on behalf of Muslim operators willing to return to or to access the diamond-producing area around Bania, in Berbérati sub-prefecture. Allegedly, Vobouadé and his associates, by force, took a list of returnees prepared for humanitarian assistance purposes by the Imam. According to Vobouadé, the anti-balaka needs to control returns in order to prevent ex-Séléka from coming back.

234. In Sosso-Nakombo, on 22 June 2016, some 20 Muslim returnees were forced to either move to Berbérati or to return to Cameroon following an attack against a Muslim mine operator who had re-established himself, in April 2016, at the main mine site of "Arabie", on the assurances of the anti-balaka leader Crepin Messamba, alias "General Dale" (see also S/2015/936, para. 223). Local gendarmerie officers confided to the Panel that they knew the identity and whereabouts of the attacker, but that they were understaffed and underequipped to make an arrest.

235. In Carnot, several incidents occurred on 20 and 21 June 2016. Anti-balaka looted five houses of Muslims. One house was burned, one Muslim was killed with a machete and at least 20 Muslim civilians were injured.[232]

236. While economic activities in the area seem to be recovering, in part as a result of slow and steady return of Muslim diamond collectors, peaceful coexistence in Carnot is still fragile and several surrounding areas are still considered unsafe for Muslims to return to (see annex 7.5).[233] Most of the 170 Muslim internally displaced persons, out of 554 in 2015, remaining within the premises of Carnot's Church are from villages outside the town of Carnot.

237. Events in Bangui in early October 2016 did not spark negative reactions to Muslim returnees in Berbérati, Sosso-Nakombo and Carnot compared to the events

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[230] Meeting with gendarmerie officer, Berbérati, 18 August 2016.

[231] Meeting with the public prosecutor in Bangui, 20 August 2016.

[232] Confidential report, 22 June 2016.

[233] Meeting with representative of Muslim IDPs, Carnot, 31 August 2016.

of late June 2016. In Nola, however, anti-balaka elements were allegedly preparing for an attack on the Muslim population.[234] On 9 October, MINUSCA reportedly dispersed assailants and arrested several of them.[235]

238. The examples given above show the continued volatile situation of Muslim returnees owing to the latent anti-balaka presence, which may be quickly reactivated. These examples also demonstrate the need for an international and national security presence to respond to such incidents, and for an extension of such a presence beyond the major towns to allow the return of internally displaced persons and refugees to those areas as well. While internally displaced persons sites are abandoned or largely abandoned, returns to smaller mining towns like Bania and Nandobo are still limited.

VIII. Recommendations

239. The Panel recommends that the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic:

(a) Encourage the Security Council to consider, in the next renewal of the MINUSCA mandate, the establishment of an arms embargo working group, potentially leading to the establishment of a MINUSCA arms embargo cell, with a view to coordinating the Mission's efforts on the implementation of the arms embargo;[236]

(b) Encourage the national security and defence forces of the Central African Republic, with the possible support of MINUSCA, to reinvigorate riverside patrols in Bangui, Mobaye and other locations upstream and to dismantle illegal checkpoints and conduct arms inspections;

(c) Encourage the member States of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community and all States Members of the United Nations to utilize exemption and notification procedures pursuant to Security Council resolution 2262 (2016) before they start training or otherwise assist elements of the Central African national security and defence forces;

(d) Encourage the authorities of the Central African Republic, in collaboration with MINUSCA and the European Union Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic, to provide equal opportunities for members of armed groups, whether anti-balaka or ex-Séléka, in the process of selecting eligible demobilized members for integration into the national security and defence forces;

(e) Remind the authorities of the Central African Republic that, following paragraph 13 (g) of resolution 2262 (2016), officials responsible for engaging listed individuals in the national security and defence forces are in violation of the sanctions regime;

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[234] Confidential report, 13 October 2016.

[235] Confidential report, 10 October 2016.

[236] In his March 2014 report on the possible transformation of the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA) (see S/2014/142, para. 78), the Secretary-General recommended the establishment of a small embargo cell within the proposed peacekeeping operation (i.e. MINUSCA) "comprising experts on arms, natural resources and customs in order to support the group of experts in monitoring the sanctions regime" and to advise his Special Representative.

(f) Encourage mining authorities in the Central African Republic, in cooperation with police, gendarmerie and justice authorities, to thoroughly examine the eligibility of diamond collectors applying for a licence, in line with the 2009 Mining Code;

(g) Encourage the office of the prosecutor of the Special Criminal Court for the Central African Republic to consider investigating possible war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by individuals and entities listed by the Committee, as well as those referred to in the Panel's reports;

(h) Encourage the authorities of the Central African Republic to carry out prompt, efficient, independent and impartial investigations and judicial proceedings against those who have committed serious violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law; and to take all reasonable and legal steps to secure decisions, including rulings and sentences, proportionate and appropriate to the offense committed.

Annexes to the final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2262 (2016)

Contents

Annex 1.1: Map of regions of Central African Republic 59

Annex 1.2: Table of correspondence sent and received by the Panel 60

Annex 2.1: Letter from local authorities in Chad. 62

Annex 2.2: Arrival of Freddy Libeba Baongoli at Bangui M'Poko airport 64

Annex 2.3: Screenshot of a video posted by Freddy Libeba Baongoli. 65

Annex 2.4: Participation of armed groups in the Advisory and Monitoring Committee on DDRR. 66

Annex 2.5: MPC Communiqué of 5 August 2016. 70

Annex 2.6: Letter dated 5 July 2016 from Maxime Mokom 72

Annex 2.7: FACA soldiers in ex-Séléka groups – cases of MPC and "Séléka Rénovée" 74

Annex 2.8: Letter dated 28 May 2016 from ex-Séléka General Younous 78

Annex 2.9: List of FACA soldiers dismissed under Minister of Defence 80

Annex 2.10: Decree on the reintegration of FACA soldiers 87

Annex 2.11: UPC and MPC proposals on the reform of the army 89

Annex 2.12: Cancellation of Maxime Mokom's appointment in the Police 96

Annex 2.13: Rulings on anti-balaka made by the Criminal Appeal Court in Bangui 98

Annex 2.14: Incidents against humanitarian personnel in 2016 100

Annex 2.15: Incidents against peacekeepers in 2016 101

Annex 2.16: Eugène Ngaïkosset's bank statement 102

Annex 3.1: Vehicles of Abdoulaye Hissène, Haroun Gaye and Hamit Tidjani's convoy 104

Annex 3.2: Grave of ex-Séléka fighter executed by anti-balaka elements 105

Annex 3.3: MINUSCA seizure of vehicles and military equipment from the convoy of Abdoulaye Hissène, Haroun Gaye and Hamit Tidjani 106
Annex 3.4: PK5 self-defence group of Matar Anemeri, alias "Force" 108
Annex 3.5: FACA Major and former bodyguard of Transitional President shot and killed in Bangui. 111
Annex 3.6: Public communiqué issued on 4 October 2016 by the *Coordination des Organisations Musulmanes de Centrafrique* (COMUC) 112
Annex 3.7: Weaponry circulating in PK5. 113
Annex 3.8: Map of Bangui indicating irregular FACA units deployed in Bangui. 118
Annex 3.9: Authorization for FACA deployment. 119
Annex 3.10: List of weapons officially in possession of Alfred Yékatom 120
Annex 3.11: Official letter sent to Alfred Yékatom on 21 July 2016 122
Annex 3.12: Letter dated 6 September 2016 informing the FACA Chief of Staff on the transfer of weapons and ammunition by Alfred Yékatom in Pissa 123
Annex 3.13: Official letter sent by FACA Chief of Staff to Alfred Yékatom. 124
Annex 3.14: Gervais Lakosso's letter suspending his participation in the Advisory and Monitoring Committee on national DDRR, SSR and reconciliation. 125
Annex 3.15: Lakosso's anti-MINUSCA petition 126
Annex 3.16: Gold sale and purchase agreement entered by Abdoulaye Hissène. 127
Annex 3.17: Document signed by Abdoulaye Hissène 129
Annex 4.1: UPC dissidents' communiqué dated 30 June 2016 130
Annex 4.2: 37 UPC defectors led by General Faya taking refuge inside the MINUSCA camp 131
Annex 4.3: List of the R4 Vector assault rifles 132
Annex 4.4: Analysis of Kouango and surrounding villages. 134
Annex 4.5: Communication dated 29 August 2016 from Gaëtan Bouadé 135
Annex 4.6: Gaëtan Bouadé's weapons to be handed over to MINUSCA 137
Annex 4.7: Declaration dated 4 August 2016 on the creation of the MRDP 138

Annex 4.8: Ultimatum issued by MRDP on 4 September 2016 141

Annex 4.9: Newly manufactured artisanal hunting rifle 144

Annex 4.10: Hunting ammunition 145

Annex 4.11: Abuses committed by anti-balaka on the Oubangui River 146

Annex 4.12: Agreement dated 7 November 2015 between boats representatives and anti-balaka leaders 148

Annex 5.1: Letter from the Civil Society Forum requesting support 150

Annex 5.2: "Bria declaration" dated 19 October 2016 151

Annex 5.3: Explanatory statement issued in advance of the Bria General Assembly.... 154

Annex 5.4: New FPRC structure 161

Annex 5.5: LRA violence against civilians. 164

Annex 5.6: Doctor Achaye's elements and structure 165

Annex 5.7: Weapons confiscated from poachers by the Chinko Project 167

Annex 6.1: Communiqué dated 18 September 2016 by the Government of the Central African Republic 168

Annex 6.2: MPC and RJ fighters 170

Annex 6.3: Arrest warrants against Colonel Luther (RJ) 172

Annex 6.4: Destitution of Armel Sayo as RJ's President 173

Annex 6.5: RJ structure as decided by Armel Sayo on 19 September 2016 175

Annex 6.6: Letter dated 24 September 2016 from Colonel Belanga 177

Annex 6.7: Groupe des patriotes (GP) 178

Annex 7.1: Retour Réclamation et Réhabilitation (3R) 179

Annex 7.2: Anti-balaka list of coordinators 181

Annex 7.3: Nice Demowance proof of payment for his artisanal mining license. 182

Annex 7.4: Incidents in 2016 targeting Muslims in the western diamond production zone in CAR. 183

Annex 7.5: IDP at Carnot's Church 185

Annex 1.1: Map of regions of Central African Republic defined by the Panel for the purpose of organising its reports, based on OpenStreetMap.[1]


Sudan
Chad
North
South-Sudan
East
Center
West
DRC
Cameroon
Congo Rep.

---

[1] https://www.openstreetmap.org

Annex 1.2: Table of correspondence sent and received by the Panel from 25 February to 29 October 2016

Country/Entity	Number of letters sent	Information fully supplied	Information partially supplied	No answer/ Information not supplied	Pending
Aljeel Aljadeed	1			1	
ARMSCOR	1			1	
Beltechexport	1	1			
BPMC	1	1			
BSIC	1			1	
CBCA	1	1			
Cameroon	1			1	
CAR	4			4	
Carter-Ruck Solicitors	1	1			
Chad	2		1	1	
Congo	3			1	2
Deenar Travels	1		1		
DRC	2			2	
DU	1			1	
ECCAS	1				1
Ecobank	2	2			
Ethiopia	3	2			1
Israel	2		1		1
Liechtenstein	1	1			
Marlink	1	1			
Ozkursan	1				1
Ooredoo	1			1	
Poland	1	1			
Qatar	1				1
Rwanda	1			1	
South Africa	2	1		1	
Sudan	2	2			
Switzerland	1				1
Thuraya Kuwait	1			1	

UAE	3	1		2	
Uganda	1	1			
UNDP	1	1			
USA[2]	1				1

---

[2] Deadline for reply is following the submission of the Panel's final report to the Committee.

Annex 2.1: Letter from local authorities in Chad informing their Central African counterparts about incursions of armed men. Document obtained by the Panel on 20 October 2016 from a confidential source.



REPUBLIQUE DU TCHAD
MINISTERE DE L'ADMINISTRATION
DU TERRITOIRE ET DE LA GOUVERNANCE
LOCALE
REGION DU MANDOUL
DEPARTEMENT DU BAHR-SARA
SECRETARIAT GENERAL

Unité – Travail – Progrès

Moissala, le 16 Septembre 2016

N° 083 /MATGL/RMDL/DBS/SG/2016

Préfet du Département
du Bahr-Sara

Objet : ***Arrêt des incursions des hommes armés en en provenance des territoires centrafricains dans le Département du Bahr-Sara au Tchad.***

PREFECTURE DE L'OUHAM
COURRIER ARRIVEE
LE [illegible]
SOUS N° [illegible]

aux autorités administratives et militaires
des circonscriptions administratives de la
RCA frontalières du Département du Bahr
Sara au Tchad

Mesdames et Messieurs,

Il nous a été donné de constater avec regret et amertume que depuis quelques mois les hommes armés en provenance de la République Centrafricaine font des incursions répétées dans les Villages du Département du Bahr-Sara en territoire tchadien, dans le but d'enlever les bœufs et autres biens des paisibles citoyens en direction de la RCA.

Aussi, il conviendrait de rappeler que ces incursions foulent énormément aux pieds le caractère sacré du principe de l'inviolabilité des frontières tracées par la colonisation, mettant en péril la quiétude de nos concitoyens épris de paix et de développement socio-économique.

Nous référant aux nombreux accords de coopérations entre le Tchad et la RCA sur les principes d'égalité, d'intérêts réciproques, du respect mutuel et de la souveraineté nationale, de l'intégrité territoriale et de la non-ingérence signés par les plus hautes autorités des deux Etats.

Nous avons l'honneur de vous demander d'user de tous les pouvoirs qui vous sont conférés pour mettre définitivement fin à ces actions organisées par vos compatriotes et punies par les Lois Pénales Internationales.

Si les raisons évoquées ci-dessus et la demande qui précède vous paraissent fondées et acceptables, nous vous prions d'affirmer votre opposition

totale à ces pratiques fondées sur les infractions qui violent les principes des droits de l'homme tels que définis par la Charte Africaine des Droits de l'Homme et des peuples de 1981.

Par conséquent, au cas où les éléments en provenance de la RCA supposés être sous vos contrôles mettent en péril l'ordre public et la sécurité des personnes et des biens dans le Département du Bahr-Sara dont nous avons la lourde responsabilités de veiller à sa sécurité, nous nous verrons dans l'obligation d'ordonner aux forces chargées du maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité implantées dans notre Département relevant de notre autorité ***d'user du droit de poursuite reconnu par la communauté internationale*** pour attaquer et sévèrement punir sur le territoire centrafricain les auteurs et complices des infractions causées sur le territoire tchadien.

Pour preuve, nous citons la dernière incursion sur notre territoire de dix (10) éléments armés de la R.J dans le Village MAÏNENE, Canton Gon à 2 h 34 mn du matin, le 06 Septembre 2016. Cette incursion s'est soldée par l'enlèvement de deux (2) bœufs en direction du Village BARA, Canton MADJIKOULOU, Sous-préfecture de MARKOUNDA avant d'être restitués aux propriétaires suite aux démarches entreprises entre les Autorités de MADJIKOULOU et nous même, le 09 Septembre 2016.

Afin d'éviter d'innombrables conséquences désastreuses et fatales qui en découleront, suite aux actions de poursuites sur votre territoire des potentiels fauteurs de troubles par nos forces de défense et de sécurité et la nécessité impérieuse de protéger les relations légendaires et fraternelles, qui existent entre nos deux Etats, nous vous prions de tout faire de ce qui relève de vos pouvoirs pour arrêter définitivement les incursions des hommes armés en provenance de la RCA sur notre territoire.

Veuillez agréer, Mesdames et Messieurs les autorités Administratives et militaires, les assurances de notre parfaite considération.

Le Préfet

Ampliations

- Gouverneur de la Région du Mandoul	1
- MATDL	1
- Commandant du Groupement Mobile d'Intervention	1
- M.SAYO, Responsable du R.J à Bangui	1
- Archives	2

Nounga

NAMBATINGUE NOUNGA

Annex 2.2: Arrival of Freddy Libeba Baongoli at Bangui M'Poko Airport on 5 July 2016. Photo obtained by the Panel on 13 August 2016 from a confidential source.



Annex 2.3: Screenshot of a video posted by Freddy Libeba Baongoli on his Facebook page.[3]



Freddy Libeba Baongoli heeft een **video** op zijn tijdlijn geplaatst
24 oktober om 23:24

42K weergaven

178

562 keer gedeeld 55 reacties

---

[3] Available from https://www.facebook.com/freddy.libebabaongoli.1/videos/pcb.212347522529943/212330915864937/?type=3&theater

Annex 2.4: Participation of armed groups in the Advisory and Monitoring Committee on DDRR.

Decree on armed groups' representatives to the Advisory and Monitoring Committee on DDRR. Document obtained by the Panel on 21 October 2016 from the Special Coordinator on DDRR, SSR and National Reconciliation.



PRÉSIDENCE DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE

RÉPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
Unité - Dignité - Travail

DECRET N° 16-317

PORTANT NOMINATION DES MEMBRES DU COMITE CONSULTATIF ET DE SUIVI DU PROGRAMME NATIONAL DE DESARMEMENT, DEMOBILISATION, REINTEGRATION ET RAPATRIEMENT (DDRR) A LA PRESIDENCE DE LA REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE

LE PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE,
CHEF DE L'ETAT

Vu la Constitution de la République Centrafricaine du 30 Mars 2016 ;

Vu le Décret n°16.0218 du 30 Mars 2016, portant promulgation de la Constitution de la République Centrafricaine ;

Vu le Décret n°16.0221 du 02 Avril 2016, portant nomination du Premier Ministre, Chef du Gouvernement ;

Vu le Décret n°16.247 du 18 Mai 2016, portant nomination des personnalités à la Présidence de la République ;

Vu le Décret n°94.87 du 08 Mars 1994, portant organisation et fonctionnement de la Présidence de la République ;

Vu le Décret n°16.286 du 02 Juillet 2016 portant organisation et fonctionnement de la Coordination DDR/RSS ;

Vu le Décret n°16.285 du 02 Juillet 2016 portant création du Comité Stratégique DDRR/RSS/RN ;

Vu le Décret n°16.285 du 02 Juillet 2016 portant création du Comité Technique DDRR/RSS/RN.

SUR RAPPORT DU MINISTRE CONSEILLER SPECIAL COORDONNATEUR DU PROGRAMME NATIONAL DE DESARMEMENT, DEMOBILISATION, REINTEGRATION, RAPATRIEMENT, DU PROCESSUS DE LA REFORME DU SECTEUR DE SECURITE ET DE LA RECONCILIATION NATIONALE

DECRETE



Article 1er : Sont nommés membres du Comité Consultatif et de Suivi du DDRR les personnalités dont les noms suivent :

A- Partie Nationale :

- Représentant du Ministère de la Défense Nationale :
  - Madame Solange **MARADAS NADO.**
- Représentant du Ministère de la Sécurité, de l'Immigration et l'Administration du territoire :
  - Lieutenant-Colonel Roger **KOY KOUASSI**
- Représentants de la société civile :
  - Maître Hyacinte **GBEGBIA**
  - Gervais **LAKOSSO.**
- Un Représentant de l'Assemblée Nationale.
- Trois Représentants de la plate-forme religieuse.

B- Groupes politico-militaires :

- Deux (02) représentants de la Coordination des **Anti-balaka** :
  - Capitaine Charles **NGREMANGOU.**
  - Monsieur Dieudonné **NDOMATE.**
- Deux (02) représentants du Rassemblement Patriotique pour le Renouveau de la Centrafrique (RPRC) :
  - Monsieur Mahamat **ABRASS.**
  - Monsieur Al bachar **FADOUL.**
- Deux(02) représentants de l'Union du Peuple Centrafricain(UPC) :
  - Monsieur Hassan **BOUBA ALI.**
  - Monsieur Souleymane **DAOUDA.**
- Deux (02) représentants l'Union des Forces Républicaines (UFR) :
  - Monsieur Philippe **WAGRAMALET NDOTO.**
  - Monsieur Augustin **ALDAM.**
- Deux (02) représentants l'Union des Forces Républicaines Fondamentales (UPRF)



- Monsieur Dieu Bénit Christian **GBEYA KIKOBET**.
- Monsieur Maxime **MBAINANI**.

- Deux (02) représentants de la Séléka-Rénovée :
  - Monsieur Ferdinand **NDJERAYOM**.
  - Monsieur ALi **IBRAKA**.
- Deux (02) représentants du Mouvement des Libérateurs Centrafricains pour la Justice (MLCJ) :
  - Monsieur Nerdine **MAHALBA**.
  - Monsieur Christian **ANGALAKA**.
- Deux (02) représentants de la Révolution Justice (RJ) :
  - Monsieur Jonathan **BOLMBAYE**.
  - Monsieur Bienvenu **KANKOU**.
- Deux représentants du Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain (FDPC) :
  - Monsieur Marcel **BAGAZA**.
  - Monsieur Jean Rock **SOBI**.
- Deux (02) représentants de la Révolution Justice (RJ) : alias Belangua :
  - Monsieur Labose **PASSI INGAM**.
  - Monsieur Jean Bernard **ALLAH-TO**.
- Deux (02) représentants du Mouvement Patriotique de Centrafrique (MPC) :
  - Général Abdel Karim **MOUSSA** ;
  - Monsieur Ghislain **BRIA**.
- Deux (02) représentants du Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC).
- Deux (02) représentants de la Coordination des Anti-balaka ; alias MOKOM Maxime.
- Deux (02) représentants du mouvement 3R (Réclamations, Réhabilitation et Retour).



C- **Personnes ressources :**

- *Monsieur* **KOKATET** *Joachim*
- *Monsieur* **Abdel Kader KALIL**
- *Monsieur* **HOUSSEN J BIBOUBA WAZIRI**
- *Monsieur Abdoulaye* **CHAIBOU.**

D- **Communauté Internationale :**

- *Un représentant de la MINUSCA ;*
- *Un représentant de l'Union Africaine ;*
- *Un représentant de l'EUTM*
- *Un représentant de l'Union Européenne.*
- *Un représentant de la Banque Mondiale.*

Article 3 : *Le présent décret qui abroge toutes dispositions antérieures contraires et qui prend effet à compter de la date de sa signature, sera publié et communiqué au Journal Officiel.*

Fait à Bangui le 24 MAI 2016

Le Président de la République,
Chef de l'Etat

Pr. Faustin Archange TOUADERA

To appease tensions within MLCJ and MPC regarding participants in the Advisory and Monitoring Committee's work, additional representatives were accepted during the meeting of 12 October. For MPC, in addition to the two Bangui-based representatives (General Abdel Kader Moussa and Ghislain Bria), a third representative from Kaga-Bandoro attended, ie. Adam Somate. For MLCJ, the MLCJ president Toumou Deya, unhappy with the representatives designated, was also allowed to participate in the meeting. All groups' leaders were invited to participate in the 12 October meeting. A few did, including Mohamed Moussa Dhaffane (Séléka Rénovée), Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona (anti-balaka) and Armel Sayo (RJ).

Annex 2.5: MPC Communiqué of 5 August 2016 on the failed meeting between the President and ex-Séléka factions in Kaga-Bandoro and on MPC's position on DDRR. Document obtained by the Panel on 15 August 2016 from a confidential source.



MOUVEMENT PATROTIQUE POUR
LE CENTRAFRIQUE (MPC)
****
PRESIDENCE
****
BUREAU EXECUTIF NATIONAL
****
SECRETARIAT GENERAL
****
N° _052_ /MPC/ PR/ BE/ SG / 2016

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
****
Unité – Dignité – Travail
****

COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE RELATIF AU PASSAGE A KAGA-BANDORO DU PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE ET CHEF DE L'ETAT CENTRAFRICAIN, SON EXCELLENCE M. FAUSTIN ARCHANGE TOUADERA

Le passage du Président de la République et Chef de l'Etat Centrafricain, ***Son Excellence Faustin Archange TOUADERA, le 04 aout 2016 à Kaga-Bandoro*** nous a laissé un sentiment d'indignation et de frustration totale. En effet, bien avant son arrivée, la Minusca et nous avions travaillé pour que cette venue du Président à Kaga-Bandoro soit un succès tant en terme d'accueil que de concertation. Nous avions en outre cru que ce déplacement sur Kaga-Bandoro devra être une réelle occasion d'échanger avec celui-ci, de mettre en place un canal de communication et de pouvoir relancer l'engrenage plus que jamais rouillé du dialogue et de la concertation.

De ce fait, nous avions décidés de présenter une équipe à la hauteur de la rencontre. Cette délégation sensée le rencontrer était constituée du bureau politique (trois personnes[1]) et du bureau militaire (deux personnes[2]). Mais malheureusement, le jour de la rencontre, une fois que nous avions franchi la cour préfectorale (lieu de la rencontre), le Bataillon Pakistanais nous stoppa derechef et nous signifia qu'il avait reçu instruction ferme (de la part du service protocolaire) de ne pas laissez-passer les hommes en treillis. ***Malgré nos moult efforts d'explication de l'importance que revêt la rencontre, il nous avait signifié une fin de non-recevoir et nous renvoya sans autre formule. De ce fait, nous étions obligés de rebrousser chemin.***

---

[1] Les membres du bureau politique étaient habillés en tenues de villes.

[2] Comme il est de coutume dans toute armée du monde, les deux membres du bureau militaire qui étaient des militaires de la république étaient habillés en treillis militaires.

Page 1 sur 2

En dépit de cet incident malheureux, nous, ***membres et sympathisants du MPC*** (Mouvement Patriotique pour le Centrafrique), continuons de croire à la sortie négociée de la crise et réaffirmons notre entière disponibilité pour « **le dialogue et la concertation**» car la paix véritable ne s'installera en République Centrafrique que par « **le dialogue et le compromis** ». En effet, dans une situation post-crise comme la nôtre, toute politique de fermeté absolue (aussi souhaitée soit-elle par les uns) est contre-productive et ne fera que retarder le processus de normalisation et de stabilisation du pays.

Par conséquent, il semble logique et nécessaire de mettre en place un cadre de discussion nationale (une médiation nationale ou internationale) qui pourra faciliter la réduction des incompréhensions et la ratification d'un « ***Accord Politique Global Inclusif*** *».* ***Seule la ratification de ce dernier qui pourra répondre efficacement et durablement aux racines des maux de la société centrafricaine*** *(le mépris de l'autre, l'oppression, la marginalisation et l'exclusion). Tant que ceux-ci ne sont pas extirpés, toute tentative de façade tentant à embaumer«* ***le mal- centrafricain»*** *ne sera que vaine entreprise.* ***Il est donc plus que jamais nécessaire de régler le problème de fond de la crise centrafricaine avant d'engager tout processus de DDRR (aussi nécessaire soit-il)***

Fait à Kaga-Bandoro, le 05 aout 2016
Le Président Exécutif du MPC

M. Elbachar IDRISS AHMED
Economiste- Consultant
Tel: (+236) 75559292/ 77668471
Email: aalwadabi@gmail.com
idrissahmed@hotmail.com

AMPLIATION

- Mission Multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation de la Centrafrique (MINUSCA),
- Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale (CEEAC),
- Médiation Nationale et Internationale,
- Ambassade de France à Bangui,
- Ambassade des Etats- Unis d'Amériques à Bangui,
- Ambassade de Chine à Bangui,
- Représentation de l'Union Européenne (UE) à Bangui,
- Représentation de l'Union Africaine (UA) à Bangui,
- Présidence de la République et Primature,
- Presse Nationale et Internationale,
- Archives.

Annex 2.6: Letter dated 5 July 2016 from Maxime Mokom on the non-participation of his group in the Advisory and Monitoring Committee on DDRR. Document obtained by the Panel on 18 August 2016 from Maxime Mokom.



COORDINATION NATIONALE DES PATRIOTES
DES ANTI-BALAKA
****
SECRETARIAT GENERAL
****
N° 0137 /CNP ATB/SG

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
Unité-Dignité-Travail
****

Bangui, le 05 Juillet 2016

A

Monsieur le Ministre, Conseiller Spécial,
Coordonnateur DDR /RRS/RN
Bangui

Objet Désignation des deux(2) Représentants des Anti-Balaka
au CCSPNDDRR

Réf - V/L n° 019/MCSCDDR/RSS/RN.SEC.16 du 14 Juillet 2016
- N/L n°136 /CN .ATB/SG /16
Votre courrier n°018/MCSCDDR/RSS/RN.SEC.16 du 28 Juillet 2016
et les textes en apostille

Monsieur le Ministre,

En date du 28 Juillet 2016, vous avez bien voulu faire parvenir au Bureau de la Coordination Nationale des Patriotes Anti-Balaka, les trois textes de régulation du processus DDR/RSS/RN, à cet effet, nous vous en remercions infiniment. Mais seulement, à l'exegèse des éléments de structuration de ces différents textes, suite à une approche conceptuelle, analytique et de la contexture desdits textes, nous pouvons inférer ceci :

Premièrement, c'est avec stupéfaction que nous avons constaté que les groupes armés ne font pas respectivement partie des Comités stratégique et technique du DDRR/RSS/RN, ce qui leur confère d'emblée, outre un caractère prétorien, mais surtout non consensuel et anti-démocratique étant entendu, le nombre pléthorique des Ministres et Cadres de l'administration au sein desdits Comités taillés sur mesure. D'où l'impression d'un gouvernement bis. Or, nous considérons que dans un souci de gouvernance acceptable par tous, ce mécanisme devait renfermer toutes les composantes recensées et reconnues pour être aptes à lui restituer sa légitimité [illegible], malheureusement , tel n'est pas le cas.

Deuxièmement, le Comité consultatif plus précisément le secrétariat consultatif auquel feront partie les groupes armés n'est rien d'autre qu'un épiphénomène c'est-à-dire un



organe virtuel sans importance et dépourvu de tout pouvoir de décision. Pire, aucun mécanisme d'arbitrage n'est prévu en cas de mutabilité ou de divergence de vues entre d'une part le Comité consultatif et le Comité stratégique, d'autre part, le Secrétariat consultatif et le Secrétariat technique.

En définitive, ces différents textes sont à la fois anti-démocratiques et non consensuels, tant dans leur conception de base, leur nature et leur contexture.

En conséquence, la Coordination Nationale des Patriotes Anti-Balaka ; au regard de ce qui précède, émet des lourdes réserves quant à l'envoi de ses représentants en l'état actuel des textes.

Considération Distinguée

Le Coordonnateur National des
Patriotes Anti-Balaka

Maxime MOKOM

Copie :

- S.E Monsieur le Président de la République,
  Chef de l'Etat ;
- Monsieur le Président de l'Assemblée Nationale ;
- Monsieur le Premier Ministre, Chef du Gouvernement ;
- Monsieur le Représentant spécial du Secrétaire Général des Nations-Unies ;
- l'UE ;
- MINUSCA ;
- CEEAC ;
- l'UA
- CEMAC
- Chrono

Annex 2.7: FACA soldiers in ex-Séléka groups – cases of MPC and "Séléka Rénovée". List of FACA members in MPC (not dated). Document obtained by the Panel on 1 July 2016 from a confidential source.



MPC

LISTE DES ELEMENTS FACA

N°	Grade	Nom et prenoms	Matricule
1	S/Lt	ALI Issaka	2003 2 1514
2	S/Lt	YOUNOUS Moussa	2003 2 1507
3	S/Lt	SOUMAINE Mahamat	2003 2 1509
4	Adj Chef	IBRAHIM Djabora	2003 2 1555
5	Adj	FAISSAL Mahamat Hassabballah	2004 1 1216
6	Adj	HISSENE Adam	2003 2 1552
7	Sergent	MOUCTAR Younous Tidjani	2004 1 1495
8	C Chef	HISSENE Khalil	2003 2 1274
9	C Chef	IBRAHIM Zakaria	2003 2 1284
10	C Chef	ADOUM Abdallah Moussa	2004 1 1018
11	C Chef	ABAKAR Makadji Abdou	2004 1 1451
12	C Chef	MAHAMAT Idris	2003 2 1332
13	C Chef	ADOUM Ibrahim	2004 1 1291
14	C Chef	MAHAMAT Sam sam Hemid	2003 2 1331
15	Caporal	MAMOUD Ibrahim Adef	2004 1 1946
16	Cap	ABDEL SAMAT Hamat Seid	2004 1 1926
17	Cap	MOUSSA Wakil	2004 1 1561
18	Cap	MAHAMAT Abdel Karim	2004 1 1470
19	Cap	ISSA Ayato	2003 2 1786
20	Cap	ABDEL Karim Dougous Hissene	2004 1 1871
21	Cap	ADAM Hissene Abdel Karam	2004 1 [illegible]
22	Cap	ABDALLA Issa Djibrine	2004 1 1531
23	Cap	YASSIR Adam	2004 1 1664
24	2°Cl	MAHAMAT Issa	2003 2 1326
25	2°Cl	HISSENE Djibrine	2004 1 1124
26	2°Cl	ABDRAMANE Ahmat	2004 1 [illegible]
27	2°Cl	DJIBRINE Dagachene	2004 1 1511
28	2°Cl	HASSANE Abdramane Younous	2004 1 1546
29	2°Cl	MOUSSA Issa	2005 2 1542
30	2°Cl	HASSANE Nour	2004 1 1686
31	2°Cl	IDRIS Djibrine	2003 2 1988
32	2°Cl	MAHAMAT Abdel Karim	2004 1 1142
33	2°Cl	AHMAT Yacoub	2003 2 [illegible]
34	2°Cl	HAMAT Idris Saleh	2004 1 1437
35	2°Cl	ABAKAR Allabora	2004 1 1084
36	2°Cl	MAHAMAT SALEH Youssouf Bourma	2004 1 1509
37	2°Cl	MAMADOU Seidou	2004 1 1668
38	2°Cl	MOUSSA Adam Issa	2004 1 1015
39	2°Cl	DJIDA Mahamat	2003 2 1276
40	2°Cl	DJAMAL Abdel Nassir	2003 2 1229
41	2°Cl	BRAHIM Abakar Ramadan	2004 1 1230
42	2°Cl	ABDALA Tibek Alkanew	2004 1 1237
43	2°Cl	YOUSSOUF Youssouf Abkar	2004 1 1721
44	2°Cl	MAHAMAT Yassin Abdramane	2004 1 1240
45	2°Cl	ZAKARIA Djibrine	2003 2 1496
46	Gardien de la paix	YOUSSOUFA [illegible]	614521

To determine the profile of these individuals, the Panel has used:

- A database of FACA and gendarmes obtained by the Panel from the Ministry of Defense of the Central African Republic in August 2016;
- A 2012 database of FACA obtained by the Panel from a confidential source;
- The list of FACA soldiers dismissed under Minister Marie-Noëlle Koyara (annex 2.9).

The Panel notes that out of 46 individuals on the list:

- Nine correspond to the first category described in this report– i.e., FACA soldiers still on the payroll and without a proper function allocated to them. Among them, seven were dismissed during the transition period under Minister Koyara, but later reintegrated (at an unknown date).

  According to confidential sources, among the nine individuals, five have been vetted.[4] As the list of FACA soldiers in MPC is not dated, the Panel cannot confirm whether these individuals are (or have been) paid while being armed group members.

- Twenty-seven correspond to the second category described in this report – i.e., FACA soldiers dismissed under President François Bozizé. Their names are not in the August 2016 FACA database, nor do they appear on the 2012 list of FACA. All 27 have regimental numbers starting with 2003 or 2004 and are, therefore, most likely "liberators".

- Nine correspond to the third category described in the report – i.e., FACA soldiers dismissed during the transition period (and not reintegrated thereafter). All 9 appear on the list of FACA dismissed under Minister Koyara. One of them has had his regimental number allocated to another individual. During the meetings with the Panel, many ex-Séléka have complained about the practice of regimental numbers' reallocation.

- None of them correspond to the fourth category described in the report – i.e., FACA soldiers integrated under President Michel Djotodia. Indeed, none has a regimental number starting with 2013.

- Another individual on the list has his regimental number now corresponding to another individual. As he does not appear on the 2012 list of FACA soldiers, it is impossible to know whether his regimental number has also been allocated to someone else, or whether he has simply indicated a false or an erroneous number.

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[4] The vetting process was stopped before completion in July 2016 upon the decision of the Central African authorities.

The letter below is a list of former MPC combatants who joined "Séléka Rénovée" in January 2016. Six of them present themselves as FACA with regimental numbers.



LE DELEGUÉ des officiers
EX SELEKA (FACA)
TEL: 75-83-33-08
77-26-09-81

BANDORO le 21 JANVIER 2016

AU
Bureau de la Minusca
de KAGA BANDORO
(RCA)

objet: A TITRE DE Rappel (Requête)

Nous, les officiers du parti M.P.C dont les noms seront cités dessous, avons l'honneur de venir très respectueusement auprès de votre haute autorité pour porter à votre connaissance les faits suivants:

En effet, juste pour vous signaler que dorénavant nous ne sommes pas avec le M.P.C mais nous allons devoir s'aligner derrière "la Seleka Rénovée" du Général DAFFAN MAHAMAT suite à une situation qui ne nous plaît pas c'est pourquoi il est évident qu'on vous informe.

Il s'agit de

- General ALI ISSAKA (matricule 2003-2-1514)
- General MAHAMOUD IBRAHIM (matricule 2004-1-1946)
- General HAMIT DAOUD (matricule 2004-2-6320)
- General ATAHIR ZOROGA (matricule 2003-2-3075)
- General SIECILE MAHAMAT
- Colonel DJIMA ACHIBER (matricule 2012-1-1018)
- Colonel MAHAMAT ISSA (matricule 2003-2-1326)
- Colonel MAHAMAT ABDEL AZIZ
- Colonel HIDJAZI ABDELKARIM
- Colonel ABDRAHMAN AHMAT
- Colonel BACHIR ABDEL AZIZ
- Colonel ANOUR MAHAMAT

Veuillez-agréer Monsieur, l'expression
de nos considérations distinguées.

Fait le 21/01/2016

Delegués des officiers
EX SELEKA (FACA)

ALI ISSAKA
75-83-33-08

Delegué Adjoint
EX SELEKA (FACA)

MAHAMOUD IBRAHIM
75-05-25-71

Based on the same sources, the Panel notes that out of six elements with a regimental number mentioned in the list:

- Four correspond to the second category described in this report – i.e., FACA soldiers dismissed under President François Bozizé. They are not in the FACA database, nor do they appear on another list of FACA from 2012. Two of them have regimental numbers starting with 2003 and may therefore be "liberators".

- Two belong to the third category described in the report – i.e., FACA soldiers dismissed during the transition period (and not reintegrated thereafter). Both are in the list of FACA soldiers dismissed under Minister Koyara. One of them also appears in the list of MPC elements mentioned above.

Annex 2.8: Letter dated 28 May 2016 from ex-Séléka General Younous requesting the reintegration of 207 "liberators" in the FACA. Document obtained by the Panel on 18 September 2016 from General Younous.



GL YOUNOUS MOUSSA AYAT
MLLE : 2003-2-15 07

Bangui, le 28/05/2016

A

Son Excellence Monsieur le Président
De la République, Chef de l'Etat
-BANGUI-

Objet : Demande de Réhabilitation et d''avancement des grades à titre normal dans les FACA

Excellence Monsieur le Président,

Nous Représentants du collectif des Officiers Subalternes du Bataillon de Protection et de Sécurité de la Garde Rèpublicaine, cassés et rayés des contrôles de l'Armée Nationale par Décret n°04 160 du 19 Mai 2004, avons l'honneur de venir très respectueusement porter à votre connaissance nos doléances suivantes :

En effet, nous avons été de ceux qui ont sacrifié leur vie communément appelés Libérateurs pour permettre à l'ancien Président François BOZIZE de renverser le feu Président Ange Félix PATASSE le 15 Mars 2003. Après la conquête du pouvoir, nous avons été autorisés à contracter un engagement de trois (3) ans à compter du 1er Août 2003, affectés au BPS/GR le 02 Octobre 2003 et rayés des contrôles de l'Armée Nationale pour compter du 17 Avril 2004 par Décret n°04 160 du 19 Mai 2004 pour le fameux motif de DESERTION EN TEMPS DE CRISE. L'effectif des militaires musulmans à être radiés des contrôles de l'Armée Nationale était de 207 parmi lequel figuraient 12 officiers. Pourquoi cette indifférence ?

Excellence Monsieur le Président, quelle crise existait-il dans le pays à cette époque pour qu'on qualifie notre radiation des contrôles de l'Armée Nationale de désertion en temps de crise? Cela ne signifie-t il pas l'adage courant qui dit : « Si on veut se séparer de son chien, on l'accuse de rage ». N'est-ce pas là, ce que l'on appelle ingratitude ou injustice? Monsieur le Président, votre sagesse permettrait de régler cette injustice pour que la paix revienne définitivement dans le pays car le peuple en a trop souffert.

Excellence Monsieur le Président, nous avons été injustement rayés des contrôles de l'Armée Nationale. Par conséquent, nous nous en remettons à votre sagesse pour solliciter notre réhabilitation dans les



Forces Armées Centrafricaines (FACA). Nous sommes tous les fils de ce pays et nous sommes entièrement décidés de vous accompagner dans l'œuvre de réconciliation nationale et de redressement de notre cher et beau pays selon votre vision

Pour l'intérêt de la Nation Centrafricaine toutes entière, nous faisons le choix de renoncer à tous recours aux armes et de s'aligner derrière la décision des autorités démocratiquement élues en vue de parvenir à une sécurité durable et d'assurer la défense du territoire national de écarte ceux qui ne sont pas de centrafricains, car un seul doigt n'ôte pas les poux des cheveux mais c'est l'union qui fait la force. Nous vous demandons de prendre en compte les matriculées de 2013 qui ont suivis des formations dans les differentes centre d'instruction en RCA

La République Centrafricaine est trop vaste et a besoin de la participation de toutes ses filles et de tous ses fils sans distinction d'ordre communautaire pour assurer sa défense.

Espérant que notre requête retiendra votre attention particulière, Veuillez agréer, Excellence Monsieur le Président de la République, à l'assurance de notre haute considération.

Ci-joint :

La copie (1) de la décision d'engagement dans l'armée FACA
La copie (1) de l'ordre d'affectation
La copie (1) du décret de radiation
La copie (1) de l'acte de naissance
La copie (1) de certificat de nationalité centrafricaine

Ampliations

- Présidence de la République.............1
- Ambassade de la France.......................1
- Ambassade des Etats Unis d'Amérique...1
- Nations Unies...1
- Union Africaine......................................1
- Union Européenne..................................1
- Etat-major de l'Armée Centrafricaine 1
- Minusca...1
- Etat- Major des FACA............................1

Les Représentants :

GL YOUNOUSS MOUSSA
Tél: 75 18 28 75

CDT SOUMAIL MAHAMAT

CL ALI ISSAKA

Annex 2.9: List of FACA soldiers dismissed under Minister of Defence Marie-Noëlle Koyara (January-October 2015). Document obtained by the Panel on 26 August 2015 from the Minister Koyara.



ANNEXE

LISTE DES MILITAIRES EN POSITION DE DESERTION, DECEDES RADIES ET AUTRES MOTIFS



55	[illegible]	[illegible]	BANAMAI	CELESTIN	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	62
56	[illegible]	[illegible]	BANGANAKELE	BIENVENU	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
57	[illegible]	[illegible]	BANGUIO	VINCENT	SERGENT CHEF GARDE REPUBLICAINE	34
58	[illegible]	[illegible]	BEFIO BAOLA	CALVIN	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
59	[illegible]	[illegible]	BEDIA-BEFIO	HABIB	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	34
60	[illegible]	[illegible]	BEMAKIANGBANEN	GHYSLAIN	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
61	[illegible]	[illegible]	BENAKOUANGOLA	PROSPER	COMMANDANT ARMEE DE TERRE	[illegible]
62	[illegible]	[illegible]	BENA-KOVISSI	SYMPHORIEN	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	34
63	[illegible]	[illegible]	BEOBO FEI	DORE-ADOLPHE	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	34
64	[illegible]	[illegible]	BERTRAND	LOUIS	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
65	[illegible]	[illegible]	BIDINE	GOUVELA	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
66	[illegible]	[illegible]	BILIO MAC	BERENICE	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	34
67	[illegible]	[illegible]	BISSA ERIC	JEAN DE D	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
68	[illegible]	[illegible]	BISSAKOUNOU	GABRIEL	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 1ERE CLASSE	34
69	[illegible]	[illegible]	BISSEDO-YAMISSI	BRICE-BERTIN	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
70	[illegible]	[illegible]	BOGONGO	BRUNO FLAVIEN	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
71	[illegible]	[illegible]	BOKALIDO	PRIVAT	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
72	[illegible]	[illegible]	BONGUIO-YAMANDO	MAXIMILIEN	CAPORAL-ARMEE-TERRE	34
73	[illegible]	[illegible]	BOUNGUINZA FREDDY	FREDDY	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
74	[illegible]	[illegible]	BOUSSA	OLIVIER	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
75		[illegible]	BOZIZE	JEAN FRANCIS	COLONEL ARMEE DE TERRE	34
76	[illegible]	[illegible]	BOZIZE	FRANCLIN	SOUS LIEUTENANT ARMEE DE TERRE	34
77	[illegible]	[illegible]	BOZIZE KEVIN	JONATHAN	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
78	[illegible]	[illegible]	CHAIBO	ADEF	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
79	[illegible]	[illegible]	CHAIB-SAFI	ASSANE	SERGENT GARDE REPUBLICAINE	34
80	[illegible]	[illegible]	COMMANDA	TEDDY	SERGENT GARDE REPUBLICAINE	34
81	[illegible]	[illegible]	DANBOY	SALOMON	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
82	[illegible]	[illegible]	DANBOY DEDANE	ROSMOND	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	34
83	[illegible]	[illegible]	DEANAMSE	FRANCIS	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
84	[illegible]	[illegible]	DEGACHE-BABAKIR	MISTRAL	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
85	[illegible]	[illegible]	DEGOTO-CLOUM	BENI-PEHE	SAPEUR POMPIER DE 2EME CL	34
86	[illegible]	[illegible]	DELLO	JEAN CLAUDE	COMMANDANT ARMEE DE TERRE	34
87	[illegible]	[illegible]	DEMOTIER FARE	MAXIME	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
88	[illegible]	[illegible]	DENE HERESSE	RODRIGUE-AUB	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
89	[illegible]	[illegible]	DETOUA MADIBKON	RODRIGUE SYLV	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
90	[illegible]	[illegible]	DIMA	JUNIOR	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
91	[illegible]	[illegible]	DJABAR	TIDJANI	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
92	[illegible]	[illegible]	DJAMAL	ABDEL NASSER	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	34
93	[illegible]	[illegible]	DJIKOULOU	STEPHANE	SOLDAT-DE-1ERE-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
94	[illegible]	[illegible]	DIMET ISSENE	ADAM	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
95	[illegible]	[illegible]	DIOUMA	SCHEICK	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
96	[illegible]	[illegible]	EL-MAKINE MOURAD	BACHABARAM	ADJUDANT ARMEE DE TERRE	34
97	[illegible]	[illegible]	EMTENGU	IDRIA	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
98	[illegible]	[illegible]	EPOUA MIGUEL	WILFRID	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
99	[illegible]	[illegible]	EVARIO	EVARISTE	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	34
100	[illegible]	[illegible]	FAISSAL MAHAMAT	HASSABALA	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	34
101	[illegible]	[illegible]	FATADIALL-GUMAR	ABDEL-KARIM	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	34
102	[illegible]	[illegible]	FEIDANGARE	CHRISTIAN	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
103	[illegible]	[illegible]	FEIKOUMON	NARCISSE	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
104	[illegible]	[illegible]	FELEMA DEOUBA	FRANCO	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
105	[illegible]	[illegible]	FIMBONA	JEAN NOEL	CAPORAL-ARMEE-TERRE	62
106	[illegible]	[illegible]	FISSA	KEVIN	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
107	[illegible]	[illegible]	GANDA	DANIEL	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
108	[illegible]	[illegible]	GAZAMBETI MAXIME	PATERNE	SOUS LIEUTENANT ARMEE DE TERRE	34
109	[illegible]	[illegible]	GBEANGAI	BENJAMIN	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
110	[illegible]	[illegible]	GBENDIGAINA	TEDDY	SOUS LIEUTENANT ARMEE DE TERRE	34
111	[illegible]	[illegible]	GODOMAN	NAZAIRE	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
112	[illegible]	[illegible]	GOMBETI DETOUA	MATURIN SIMPL	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
113	[illegible]	[illegible]	GONESSINGA PIERRE	CHRISOLOGUE	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34



	2004-1-1702	92776L	GONDAN	KEVIN	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	34
115	2006-2-1657	[illegible]	GOTIAS	PATRICK	CAPORAL CHEF GARDE REPUBLICAINE	34
116	200321235	93131Y	GORIA	MAHAMAT	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	34
117	2006-1-1789	90782V	GOUNDANE	JUSTIN	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
118	201221490	[illegible]	GOUSSEIMA DEBE	BORIS ZACHARI	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
119	2004-1-1042	91564H	GREMALE	AIME	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
120	06-2-1060	96095E	GUEOBPLET JULES	ALFRED SPEED	SOUS LIEUTENANT ARMEE DE TERRE	34
121	9421018	90227P	GUEKASSA	JEAN PAUL	SOUS LIEUTENANT ARMEE DE TERRE	34
122	2009-2-2229	99519F	GUESSA-BADET-BASSOU	DESTIN-[illegible]	SERGENT ARMEE DE TERRE	34
123	2008-1-1314	99600Y	GUINET	EDGARD	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
124	2001-2-1067	90027L	HADI	[illegible]	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
125	200321269	93140H	HAMADOU	[illegible]	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
126	2004-1-1693	90975G	HAMAT	MAHAMAT	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
127	2004-1-1723	[illegible]	HAMAT	MOUSSA	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	34
128	2004-1-1438	91135P	HAMAT	GANDOLE ADAM	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	34
129		95813R	HAMAT ABDEL	[illegible]	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	34
130	[illegible]	90527S	HAMET	MATAR	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 1ERE CLASSE	34
131	200321271	93152D	HAROUN	ABDRAMANE	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	34
132	2004-1-1236	90282A	HASSANE-LAWANE	NGABOULA	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	34
133	2008-2-1096	96811T	HISSEIN MAHAMAT	APOLIN	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	34
134	200321270	93155G	HASSINE	KALIL	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 1ERE CLASSE	34
135	2004-1-1744	90796K	HISSEINE-HASSANE	BARKA	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
136	2009-2-1167	98495X	HOROYEMBA	AMEDEP	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
137	2004-1-1470	91276E	IBRAHIM	MADUNDE	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
138	2005-1-1003	92069U	IBRAHIM	AMDA	SERGENT GARDE REPUBLICAINE	34
139	200321264	92105J	IBRAHIM	ZAKARIA	CAPORAL-2EME-TERRE	34
140	200321555	90838L	IBRAHIM	GRABORA	SERGENT GARDE REPUBLICAINE	34
141	2003-2-1032	99690E	IBRAHIM	REGIS	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
142	200221830	99813C	IBRAHIM	ABDOULAYE	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	33
143	2003-2-1280	93161E	IBRAHIM	MAHAMAT	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	34
144	200321288	93109N	IDRISS	DIBRILE	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	34
145	[illegible]	[illegible]	IDRISS	HAMAT	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
146	2006-2-1061	96990P	IDRISS	AMADOU	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	34
147	2004-1-1434	91170S	IDRISS ABDOULAYE	ADRAM	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
148	200221862	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	34
149	2004-1-1412	91720N	ISMAEL MAHAMAT	ZAKARIA	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	34
150	2004-1-1082	91097B	ISSA	HAMAT	SERGENT GARDE REPUBLICAINE	34
151	2003-2-1106	99643D	ISSA	AYATOUM	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	34
152	[illegible]	91427V	ISSA SANOU	ADAMOU	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
153	20031296	93178P	ISSAKA	ELVIS	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
154	2004-1-1472	91346V	ISSAKA AZALO	HAROUNE	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
155	99-2-1470	[illegible]	ISSA-MAHAMAD	LAGOU	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 1ERE CLASSE	34
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158	200321552	95033H	ISSENE	ADOUM	SERGENT GARDE REPUBLICAINE	34
159	2009-2-1784	94987F	ITANDJI	TRANQUILLIN	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	34
160	200221511	900023R	KAIGANDJI	TEDDY	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
161	201411220	900787Y	KAKERO	ALSON	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
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170	201221524	[illegible]	KOKUNGOU ANICET	BODOIN	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
171	9721320	97219Y	KOLIKA	LUCIEN	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARMEE-AIR	34
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

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

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

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293	98-1-1583	951277	OTTO	FRIDOLIN ANAT	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
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298	2004-1-1899	96618L	OUEKPANAM-TRIBUNAL	BIDE-FORT	SOLDAT-DE-1ERE-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
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300	2004-1-1509	93449F	OUMAR ADRAMANE	MOUSSA	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
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312	2006-2-1100	99210X	REKANO	ZEPHIRIA	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	34
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318	2003-2-1437	93520R	SALLET ZIDA	MAHAMAT	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	34
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320	9521762	98920J	SANA	LUC	CAPORAL-ARMEE-TERRE	34
321	2004-1-1626	90950U	SANDOKA	PRIVAT	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
322		93601H	SANDOH	FRANCOIS	CAPORAL-ARMEE-TERRE	62
323	99-1-1391	97420D	SAORIYA	IGOR	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
324	2008-1-1080	93400A	SAZON	DIEUDONNE	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	32
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326	2004-1-1391	90530V	SEREGAZA	SYLVAIN	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
327	2000-1-1575	91867E	SEREGAZA	SEVERIN DAVIS	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
328	2000-1-1037	90453K	SEREMALET	ALAIN	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
329	9811044	97719K	SHOOOSI	JEAN DE DIEU	CAPORAL-ARMEE-AIR	34
330	200121540	93624L	TABAK	ABDOULAYE	SERGENT GARDE REPUBLICAINE	34
331	9811149	97857T	TAR ADMANO	GILDAS	CAPORAL-ARMEE-TERRE	34
332	2001-1-1049	99971J	TCHIAMANGAKA-LAGOS	SERGE BRUNO	SOLDAT-DE-1ERE-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
333	2000-2-2302	95330V	TEMOUNGUE	ISAIE	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
334	2006-2-1038	93691C	TENGAINA FEITOUNE	GERCLAIN ROOR	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	40
335	86201021086	98872M	TEWANE DONEFE HERVE	PATRICE	SERGENT ARMEE DE TERRE	34
336	200171431	98362J	TIDJANE	VINGARE	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
337	2004-1-1195	90634D	TIDJANI	DJARAS	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	34
338	2004-1-1969	92068G	TOM	ESSENE	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
339	9911362	97997N	TOUABOYE	LANDRY	LIEUTENANT-ARMEE-DE-TERRE	34
340	71-200911983	94698X	TOUNGOU	ISIDORE NGARA	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	62
341	200221384	99350J	VIZANGABA	ALIAS	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
342	2003-2-1483	93348P	WANDIG	NANDDY	CAPORAL-ARMEE-TERRE	34
343	201321090	90017G	WAPOUNABA IDA	CHRISTIANE	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
344	201221096	90017W	WAPOUNABA ALEXIA	ROLANDE	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
345	03-1-1472	95681C	WILIBONA	YVES	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
346	201121974	93845W	WILIKON NABANA	DONATION	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
347	201129077	92941W	WIYABONA PATRICE	STEPHANE	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	34
348	2004-1-1280	90369L	YABUTA ELISE	BERNARD	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	34
349	9811092	97718N	YACKOISSET	ALALI	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARMEE-AIR	34



	2001-2-1331	98736X	YADIMANDJI-ZABO	ARTHUR-BLAISE	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	74
351	03-2-3475	95683C	YAODUA	VINCENT	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	74
352	2003-2-1476	93359T	YAGUESSE	JUDICAEL	CAPORAL CHEF GARDE REPUBLICAINE	74
353	200421039	91474N	YAHAYA	ISSA	SERGENT GARDE REPUBLICAINE	74
354	2006-2-1582	97465C	YAKITE	ANICET	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	74
355	2006-1-1716	98036	YAKITE	JEAN CLAUDE	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	74
356	2003-2-1482	93365R	YAMBAIJI GABIN	CHRISOSTUM	CAPORAL GARDE REPUBLICAINE	62
357	2009-1-1223	90480G	YAMBELE	F BORIS	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	74
358	DOUIATH	94147L	YAMBISSI	EMILIENNE	SERGENT ARMEE DE TERRE	74
359	2009-2-2377	95924C	YAMODO-YANDENGUE	LUDOVIC	SERGENT ARMEE DE TERRE	74
360	2009-1-1725	96051H	YANDOKO CLAUDIA	TATINE EVELYN	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	74
361		92397V	YANGAWOU	GARAPHIN	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	74
362	2004-1-1320	90438D	YANINGUERE	HUBERT-AUBIN	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	74
363	2004-1-1683	90965D	YASSIR	ADAM	CAPORAL-ARMEE-TERRE	74
364	200321530	95014C	YAYA	ALI	SERGENT GARDE REPUBLICAINE	74
365	2003-2-1000	93373R	YAYA IDRISS	ALECK	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 1ERE CLASSE	62
366	9931491	92102P	YERIMA GOUROU ASSANE	SIMON	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	74
367	2004-1-1031	92271B	YOUNOUSS	MANIR	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	74
368	2004-1-1717	91001S	YOUSSOUF	MOUMINI	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	74
369	2003-2-1495	93378W	YOUSSOUF	IBRAHIM	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	74
370	82-09-1-1738	94880D	YOUSSOUF	MOUSSA	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	74
371	2004-1-1072	92072X	YOUSSOUF-BACHIR	DOUDOU	SOLDAT-DE-1ERE-CL-ARM-TERRE	74
372	2000-1-1650	91966C	YPOUMANDJI	RICHARD	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	74
373	2008-1-1079	93412E	ZIKI	CONSTANT	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	74
374	2004-1-1818	90837U	ZINGAI	CONSTANT	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	74
375	2007-1-1023	92983Y	ZOCKO-KOSSOUMANZE	ROBERT-BIENVE	LIEUTENANT-ARMEE-DE-TERRE	74
376	98-2-1168	97679Z	ZOUMANDE	LYDIE-JULIETT	ADJUDANT ARMEE DE TERRE	74
377	2006-2-1137	99387Y	ZOUMBETI	BRICE	GARDE REPUBLICAIN 2EME CLASSE	74
378	201122039	94035F	ZOUWA YONPEIGANE	ALFRED	SOLDAT-DE-2EME-CL-ARM-TERRE	74

Annex 2.10: Decree on the reintegration of FACA soldiers issued under President Djotodia (illegible date). Document obtained by the Panel on 17 October 2016 from a confidential source.



[illegible]

CABINET

[illegible]SION

---ooOOO---

[illegible] PERSONNEL NON OFFICIER DE L'ARMÉE NATIONALE

LE MINISTRE DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE, CHARGÉ DE LA RESTRUCTURATION DE L'ARMÉE ET DU PROGRAMME DE DÉSARMEMENT [illegible] DÉMOBILISATION ET DE LA RÉINSERTION

VU [illegible] 2013 portant Charte Constitutionnelle de Transition

VU le Décret n° 13.270 du 18 juillet 2013 portant promulgation de la Charte Constitutionnelle

VU le Décret [illegible] juillet 2013 portant confirmation du Premier Ministre, Chef du Gouvernement de Transition

VU le Décret [illegible] 2013 portant nomination ou confirmation des [illegible]

VU le Décret n°13.289 du 18 Juin 2013, portant organisation et fonctionnement du Ministère de la Défense Nationale, chargé de la Restructuration de l'Armée et fixant les attributions du Ministre ;

VU Le Décret n°85.422 du 12 Décembre 1985 fixant la réglementation applicable au Personnel militaire non Officiers de l'Armée Nationale ;

VU le Décret n°00.005 du 05 Janvier 2001 modifiant et complétant le Décret n°82.005 du 04 Janvier 1982 portant règlement du régime de rémunération applicable aux militaires, Gendarmes et Gardes Républicaines de l'Armée Nationale

DÉCIDE

Art.1er Les dispositions des décisions portant radiation des contrôles de l'Armée Nationale pour divers motifs, des sous-officiers et militaires du rang suivants sont rapportées.

Il s'agit de

ADC	NDANGO KPAKO	Augustin	Mle 1982-2-1076
ADJ	MBANDO KOGBO	Toby Evariste	Mle 1989-1-1037
[illegible]	GBEOUAKOUA GBANZI	Marcel	Mle 1990-2-1573
CAL	GNISSOBANGA	Faustin	Mle 1999-2-[illegible]
[illegible]	SAID AHAMAT	MOUSSA	Mle 2004-1-1229
[illegible]	ABAKAR AMIR	IBRAHIM	Mle 2004-1-1511
[illegible]	ANOUR	MOUSSA	Mle 2004-1-[illegible]
[illegible]	MAHAMAT ADAM	ASSIL	Mle 2004-1-1510
CL	IDRISS MAHAMAT	[illegible]	Mle 2004-1-1474
[illegible]	ABDELHAZIZ	MAHAMAT	Mle 2004-[illegible]
[illegible]	IBRAHIM ABAKAR	[illegible]	Mle 2004-[illegible]



[illegible]	OUDAM ABAKAR	ASSANE	Mle [illegible]
[illegible]	CHADAKA	ABOUTESS	Mle [illegible]
2° CL	HASSANA MATAR	MAHAMAT	Mle [illegible]
2° CL	ADAM SALE	ALBACHAR	Mle [illegible]
2° CL	HABIB ADAM	TOM	Mle [illegible]
2° CL	TAHIR ABDELKARIM	AHAMAT	Mle 2004-1-[illegible]
2° CL	ABDEL TABEL	HILEDO	Mle 2004-1-[illegible]
2° CL	ANIMERI MATAR	DJAMOUSSE	Mle 2004-1-[illegible]
2° CL	RAMADANE RADJI	MOUSSA	Mle 2004-1-1458
2° CL	ASSANE	OUMAR	Mle [illegible]
2° CL	ABDRAHIM MAHAMAT	SALE	Mle 2004-1-[illegible]
2° CL	ABAKAR	AMIR	Mle 2004-1-[illegible]
2° CL	ABDELKADIR	HASSANE	Mle [illegible]
2° CL	MAHAMAT SALE ISSA	ASSILEK	Mle 2004-[illegible]
2° CL	SALE	AWAT	Mle 2004-1-[illegible]
2° CL	AZOUKA	FRED	Mle [illegible]
2° CL	DAN	PARFAIT	Mle 2004-1-[illegible]
2° CL	[illegible]	DAGAZENE	Mle 2004-[illegible]
2° CL	ASSIL BACHAR	MADDI	Mle [illegible]
2° CL	ABDALMAHAMOUD	MAHAMAT	Mle [illegible]
2° CL	IBRAHIM AHMAT	IDRIS	Mle 2004-[illegible]
2° CL	HAROUN	MAHAMAT	Mle 2004-1-1433
2° CL	ALI	HACHIM	Mle 2004-[illegible]
2° CL	YAKOTA	BAROUM	Mle 2003-[illegible]
2° CL	ABDELBAGUI	NOURENE	Mle 2003-[illegible]
2° CL	ALI HACHIM	AHMAT	Mle 2004-[illegible]
2° CL	AHAMAT	ABDOULAYE	Mle 2004-1-1527
2° CL	OUMAR	ALI	Mle 2004-1-[illegible]
2° CL	AHAMAT YOUNOUS	DAOUD	Mle 2004-[illegible]
2° CL	[illegible] IBN	FOTOR	Mle [illegible]

Art 2 : les intéressés sont repris en activité avec leurs grades et échelons qu'ils détenaient à compter du 1er Septembre 2013.

Art 3 : [illegible] pour tous services des intéressés n'est pas prise en compte ni pour la durée de service, ni pour le calcul de la pension, ni pour l'Avancement.

Art 4 : La présente Décision qui abroge toutes dispositions antérieures contraires et qui prend effet à compter de la date de sa signature sera enregistrée, publiée par extraits et communiquée partout où besoin sera.

Fait à Bangui, le

Le Général de Brigade, Ministre
Délégué à la Présidence de la République
Chargé de la Défense Nationale

Bertrand MAMOUR

Annex 2.11: MPC and UPC proposals on the reform of the army. MPC memorandum dated 1 August 2016 proposing the establishment of a corps of border guards. Document obtained by the Panel on 9 August 2016 from a confidential source.



MOUVEMENT PATROTIQUE POUR
LE CENTRAFRIQUE (MPC)
•••••••
PRESIDENCE
•••••••
BUREAU EXECUTIF NATIONAL
•••••••
SECRETARIAT GENERAL
•••••••
N° _____ /MPC/ PR/ SG/ 2016

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
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Unité – Dignité – Travail
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CADRE DE DISCUSSION GLOBALE DEFINI PAR LE MPC



I. INTRODUCTION

Depuis les premières heures des indépendances jusqu'au règne de Catherine SAMBA-PANZA, *la République Centrafricaine s'est distinguée par une gouvernance approximative marquée par une mauvaise gestion des finances publiques et des ressources naturelles, un népotisme aggravé, une absence criarde de vision globale d'avenir (capacité limitée d'élaboration d'orientations politiques stratégiques), une improvisation ahurissante, une exclusion accentué et par l'exacerbation à outrance des différences socioculturelles etc….*

Ce mode de gouvernance approximatif combiné avec une administration surannée et trop bureaucratique et avec une « ambition démesurée du pouvoir » de la part de certains décideurs politiques Centrafricains (manifestement animés par des motivations personnelles lucratives et népotiques) ont provoqué un *dysfonctionnement structurel de la société centrafricaine et une liquéfaction du système étatique centrafricain. Et, comme si le mal ne suffisait pas, au cours de la même période s'y adjoint une réelle crise de confiance intercommunautaires et une autre entre les citoyens, les acteurs politiques et l'Etat.*

C'est cet ensemble corrélé de causes qui justifia le fait que l'*amorce d'un dialogue franc et sincère entre les communautés, les différentes forces politiques et les autorités de la transition était devenue à son temps biaisée ou impossible. Par conséquent, le retour de la concorde nationale (garante de la cohésion sociale et de la paix) et la mise en route des institutions de l'Etat devenaient à leurs tours compromises.*

Dans ce climat confus et délétère les élections avaient eu lieu. Celles-ci étaient rendues possibles grâce à l'adhésion et à l'implication active de certaines factions politico-militaires (en l'occurrence le MPC qui a su rallier l'UPC à ladite cause et œuvrer dans ce sens). Lors de ces élections, la population centrafricaine (toute tendance confondue) s'était déplacée en masse pour exprimer son choix. Ces élections qualifiées par certains observateurs de la crise centrafricaine comme « une élection de dernières chances » avaient au révélées au monde entier la volonté effrénée de la population centrafricaine et de certaines factions politico-militaires (en l'occurrence le MPC) de tourner la page sombre de notre histoire et d'embrasser l'avenir avec un espoir meilleur.

A la lumière de tous ces constats, ***que doit-on envisager au lendemain de ces élections en termes d'approches stratégiques pouvant permettre la mise en route d'un nouveau « contrat social » garant de la paix, de la réconciliation nationale et de la prospérité pour tout le peuple centrafricain ?***

Proposition du MPC au Candidat à l'élection Présidentielle Page 2 sur 5

II. PROPOSITION DU MPC

Afin d'exorciser le mal et chasser définitivement les démons de la division, de l'exclusion, du tribalisme et *réaliser* ***« le Rassemblement et la Réconciliation »*** *et* ***« l'émergence d'une nouvelle classe politique, d'un vrai leadership et d'une élite engagée et au service de la nation »***, nous demandons au Président de la République et Chef de l'Etat Centrafricain d'être sensible à la détresse de la population, à la désarticulation du pays et aux maux qui avaient conduit le pays à la désagrégation et au chaos (l'exclusion, le clientélisme, le népotisme, le mépris de l'autre, le clanisme et le favoritisme comme mode de gouvernance).

Cette présidence post-crise nous offre donc l'opportunité d'asseoir des bases saines pour la mise en route tant des institutions républicaines que d'une politique de développement économique et sociale enthousiaste. Pour ce faire, nous vous demandons d'une part de *prêter un* ***serment solennel*** *(écrit) bannissant la discrimination identitaire des citoyens (quel que soit leur appartenance religieuse, ethnique et régionale) et de traiter d'une manière égale et équitable tout* **« Citoyen Centrafricain »** *en droit et en devoir. Et d'autre part, nous vous proposons de faire participer les personnalités qualifiées, compétentes et motivés issues du MPC dans les organes de hautes décisions de l'appareil étatique. Ce souhait peut être libellé comme ce qui suit :*

- *Nous vous proposons de favoriser la participation d'élite qualifiée et compétente issue du MPC au sein du futur gouvernement qui verra le jour en nous accordant* ***deux (2) portefeuilles ministériels dont un (1) au rang de Ministre d'Etat.*** *Les ministères que nous souhaiterions avoir la charge sont les suivants :*

    - ***Le Ministère de l'intérieur, de l'aménagement du territoire et de la Sécurité publique.***

    - ***Le Ministère*** **des équipements, des infrastructures, des services gouvernementaux et de l'intégration régionale.**

- *Nous vous proposons de nous accorder* ***quelques places dans les Représentations Internationales et Sous- régionales, dans les Ambassades, les Consulats, les divers départements ministériels et dans les structures préfectorales et sous-préfectorales.***

- *Nous vous proposons de nous accorder une voix délibérative dans les instances du DDRR, de la RSS et de la Réconciliation Nationale.*

- *Nous vous proposons de garantir la sécurité individuelle et collective à nos membres et sympathisants et de garantir la non-discrimination dans la promotion sociale.*

- *Nous vous proposons de* ***reconnaitre officiellement quelques grades que portent les membres de notre mouvement ainsi que nous attribuer le poste de sous-chef d'état-major de la nouvelle armée centrafricaine accompagné de quelques postes de cet état-major****.*

- *Nous vous proposons de prendre en compte le* ***retard comparatif de développement de la « minorité arabe » dans la mouture finale du « Projet de Société » à soumettre à la nation****.*

- Nous vous proposons de mettre en place un corps de « **Gardes-Frontières** » qui aura la lourde responsabilité de veiller sur la défense de l'intégrité territoriale du pays et plus particulièrement sur la défense des frontières avec nos voisins immédiats (Soudan du Sud, Soudan, Tchad, Cameroun, Congo et République Démocratique du Congo).

- *Nous vous proposons d'****adopter des mesures pouvant assister (dédommagées et/ou indemnisées) les victimes civiles et militaires de l'actuelle crise*** *qui sont lâchement assassinées, violées, violentées ainsi que ceux qui ont perdu leur capital de production.*

- *Nous vous proposons de* ***rouvrir, sécuriser et réorganiser tous les corridors et circuits commerciaux du bétail vers les différents marchés à bétail locaux ainsi que vers les pays voisins.***

- *Nous vous proposons de* ***faciliter la transformation de ce mouvement en Parti politique et l'appuyer substantiellement*** afin de permettre son déploiement sur tout le territoire national et de lui permettre de prendre activement part à l'animation politique de la nation.

III. CONCLUSION

En vue de réhabiliter « **l'unité nationale** » *mise à rude épreuve durant cette crise*, nous vous demandons M. le *Président de la République et Chef de l'Etat Centrafricain, personnalité éprise de paix et de justice d'incarner un* « **grand espoir** » *pour la jeunesse et pour tout le peuple centrafricain dans sa diversité à travers une véritable politique de rassemblement et de justice sociale.*

Nous souhaitons aussi voir de votre part une « ***volonté politique affirmée*** » *de transformer la RCA en un vaste chantier capable de mobiliser l'énergie créatrice c'est-à-dire capable de mobiliser toute la jeunesse désœuvrée autour d'un* ***objectif d'équité, de justice sociale et de bien-être pour tous.***

Tels sont les propositions que nous vous soumettons pour la réintégration sociale de nos combattants dans la légalité républicaine. Les propositions que nous avons énoncées ci-haut et dont nous pouvons vous apporté d'autres enrichissements constituent une base de discussion avec vous, autorité suprême de la Nation Centrafricaine.

Fait à Kaga-Bandoro, le 01 aout 2016
Président Exécutif du MPC

M. Elbachar IDRISS AHMED
Tel : (+236) 7555 9292/ 7766 8471
Email : idrissahmed@hotmail.com/
aalwadabi@gmail.com

UPC memorandum dated 25 March 2016 on the reform of the army. Document obtained by the Panel on 27 April 2016 from a confidential source.



MOUVEMENT DE
L'UNITE POUR LA PAIX
EN CENTRAFRIQUE
COORDINATION MILITAIRE
SECRETARIAT GENERAL

REPUBLIQUE
CENTRAFRICAINE
Unite – Dignite – Travail

Bambari le 25/03/2016

RECOMMANDATION DE L'UPC DANS LA REFORME ET RESTRUCTURATION DE L'ARMEE NATIONALE

VISION GLOBALE

Conscient de la nécessité de reconstruire les forces armées et les forces de sécurité intérieure au service de la Nation et de ses citoyens tout en respectant la pluralité ethnique et religieuse de la République.

L'UPC considérant :

- La Constitution de la République centrafricaine ;
- Les accords de la cessation des hostilités signés à Brazzaville le 23 juillet 2014;
- Le Forum National de Bangui sur toutes les thématiques ;
- L'accord sur les principes de désarmement, démobilisation, réintégration et rapatriement (DDRR) ;
- Les lois, décrets et règlements nationaux portant la création, le statut et l'organisation des forces de défense, sécurité intérieure et de la justice centrafricaines ;
- La volonté des centrafricains de contribuer activement au retour de la paix durable et à la stabilité du pays ;
- Pour une répartition équilibrée des forces de défense et de sécurité sur toute l'étendue du territoire National.

Tél : +236 72- 48-25-12/ 75- 87- 70- 48

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L'UPC propose, sur l'ensemble des combattants U.P.C éligibles qu'une répartition soit faite d'une manière équitable :

1. 35% des combattants U.P.C soit déversé dans les FACA afin de maintenir ou rétablir la stabilité sécuritaire du pays face à une menace armée en provenance de l'extérieur ou intérieur et en coordination avec les capacités et les moyens des FSI, comme en cas de déclaration de guerre ou d'état de siège et ou d'urgence ;
2. 25% des combattants U.P.C soit déversé dans la Gendarmerie Nationale pour assurer la défense des institutions et des intérêts Nationaux, le respect des lois, le maintien de la paix et de l'ordre publique et la protection des personnes et des biens dans leur zone de compétence ;
3. 20% des combattants U.P.C dans la police Nationale pour assurer la sécurité publique et l'ordre publique dans leur zone de compétence géographique ;
4. 10% des combattants U.P.C dans la douane pour lutter contre les grands trafics frauduleux, contrôler la circulation des produits stratégiques, lutter contre les fraudes fiscales et douanières dans le secteur commercial, lutter contre les transferts illicites de capitaux et blanchiment d'argent ;
5. 10% des combattants U.P.C dans la garde forestière afin de faire respecter les codes, règlements et arrêtes de protection de la faune, de la flore et des ressources naturelles ;
6. création d'un corps des Archers, structuré et équipé, mandaté pour remplir des missions spécifiques de sécurisation des troupeaux et des éléments transhumants ;
7. des représentants de l'U.P.C au ministère de la défense afin de pouvoir participer aux décisions Militaires Nationales ;
8. le poste de l'Etat-major Générale des armées au compte de l'U.P.C ;
9. des postes de responsabilité à la Gendarmerie Nationale au compte de l'U.P.C ;
10. des postes de responsabilité à la douane et à la police Nationale au compte de l'U.P.C.

L'U.P.C vous assure de sa pleine implication dans le processus de paix et de reforme du secteur de la sécurité et de sa disponibilité pour une cohésion sociale et à l'installation d'une paix durable.

Chef d'Etat-major de l'UPC

Général de Division, Ali Darrassa Mahamat.

Tél : +236 72- 48-25-13/ 75- 67- 70- 4

Le format de cette lettre est un document officiel et authentique de l'UPC. Tout autre modèle est un faux.

Annex 2.12: Cancellation of Maxime Mokom's appointment to the Police. Document obtained by the Panel on 23 August 2016 from a confidential source.



REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
Unité-Dignité-Travail

ARRETE

RAPPORTANT LES DISPOSITIONS DE L'ARRETE N° [illegible] DU [illegible] JUIN 2016, PORTANT REVERSEMENT DES FONCTIONNAIRES DU CADRE DE L'ADMINISTRATION GENERALE DANS LES DIFFERENTS CORPS DE LA POLICE CENTRAFRICAINE

LE MINISTRE DE L'INTERIEUR, DE LA SECURITE PUBLIQUE ET DE L'ADMINISTRATION DU TERRITOIRE

Vu la Constitution de la République Centrafricaine du 30 mars 2016 ;



ARRETE

Art. 1er : [illegible] les dispositions de l'Arrêté n° [illegible] du [illegible] 2016, portant [illegible] des fonctionnaires [illegible] de l'Administration Générale [illegible] de la Police Centrafricaine.

[illegible] en conformité avec les dispositions des Art. 10, 11 et [illegible] de la Loi n° 08.016 du 20 [illegible] 2008, portant Statut Spécial de la Police Centrafricaine.

Art. 2 : Le présent Arrêté qui abroge toutes dispositions antérieures contraires et qui prend effet à compter de la date de sa signature, sera notifié aux intéressés, enregistré et communiqué partout où besoin sera.

Fait à Bangui, le [illegible]

Annex 2.13: Rulings on anti-balaka made by the Criminal Appeals Court in Bangui during the session from 26 August to 23 September 2016.







		NDENDOUA Stéphane GUERAM Romain NAMSENE Eric BISSAYI Sylvain NDOMANDJI YOSSI Narcisse DIKAS Raoul TOMONGUA TOMANGAI Christian Saint Pierre	[illegible] [illegible] Faux et usage de faux	[illegible] pour le [illegible] à la [illegible] des [illegible] ; Sur l'action publique : [illegible] YAPELE [illegible], [illegible], NDENDOUA Stéphane, GUERAM Romain, NDOMANDJI YOSSI [illegible] [illegible] ; [illegible] ; Sur le pénal : Condamne [illegible] ; Constate que l'accusé a purgé sa peine ; Le condamne aux dépens.
39	15.09.2016	NAMKOISSE Bellary GAPAYO Jospin Martial NDENDOUA Stéphane	Assassinat	Au nom du peuple centrafricain Après en avoir délibéré conformément à la loi, [illegible] l'égard des [illegible] ; La Cour ; Par Arrêt Avant Dire Droit ; Ordonne un complément d'information ; Commet le 2e Juge d'instruction [illegible]

[illegible] Cour d'Appel de Bangui du [illegible] au 23 septembre 2016 [illegible] Page [illegible]

Annex 2.14: Incidents against humanitarian personnel in 2016[5]



According to OCHA, there have been more than 80 incidents against humanitarian personnel from January to the end of September 2016.[6]

---

[5] Based on Panel of Experts database which only covers the gravest attacks, 25 October 2016.

[6] Communications with OCHA personnel, October 2016.

Annex 2.15: Incidents against peacekeepers in 2016[7]

Fatalities	
Military	FPU
1 (17/04/16)	1 (24/07/16)
Total 1	1

Injured	
Military	FPU
1 (17/01/16)	
1 (05/06/16)	
1 (20/06/16)	
2 (04/09/16)	
4 (17/10/16)	
4 (24/10/16)	1 (24/10/16)
Total 13	1

---

[7] Panel's database, 27 October 2016.

Annex 2.16: Eugène Ngaïkosset's bank statement showing his salary and personal loan at Ecobank. Document obtained by the Panel on 6 October 2016 from Ecobank.



RELEVE DE COMPTE

NGAIKOSSET EUGENE BARRET
BP 961 BANGUI BANGUI BP
961 BANGUI

31/03/16	REF : 001ATMCXAF 00002 # TAXE SUR LA VALEUR AJOUTEE (TVA) # #	01/04/16	285		-4 377
05/04/16	REF : 001MHTA112880101 # 001MHTA112880101 INTERETS SUR PRETS # # LOAN CONTRACT LIQUIDATION	05/04/16	18 590		-22 967
05/04/16	REF : 001MHTA112880101 # 001MHTA112880101 PENALITE SUR IMPAYE # # LOAN CONTRACT LIQUIDATION	05/04/16	1 971		-24 938
05/04/16	REF : 001MHTA112880101 # 001MHTA112880101 LIQUIDATION PRÊT ECHU # # LOAN CONTRACT LIQUIDATION	05/04/16	301 531		-326 469
05/04/16	REF : 001MHTA160960001 # 001MHTA160960001 PRÊT AU STAFF # # LOAN CONTRACT INITIATION	05/04/16		1 456 908	1 130 439
05/04/16	REF : 001INTR160960105 # 001INTR160960105 TRANSFERT DE FONDS MEME CLIENT # # REGLEMENT DUE	05/04/16	29 067		1 101 372
05/04/16	REF : 001MHTA112880101 # 001MHTA112880101 INTERETS SUR PRETS # # LOAN CONTRACT LIQUIDATION	05/04/16	1 081		1 100 291
05/04/16	REF : 001MHTA112880101 # 001MHTA112880101 LIQUIDATION PRÊT ECHU # # LOAN CONTRACT LIQUIDATION	05/04/16	648 348		451 943
05/04/16	REF : 001BL16160960001 # DEBIT DIRECT # # VIREMENT	05/04/16	430 000		21 943
05/04/16	REF : 001MHTA112880101 # 001MHTA112880101 PENALITE SUR IMPAYE # # LOAN CONTRACT LIQUIDATION	05/04/16	9		21 934
08/04/16	REF : 001CS08160990001 # DEBIT DIRECT # # FRAIS SOUSCRIPTION CARTE BANCAIRE	08/04/16	5 950		15 984
11/04/16	REF : 001AKB3161020001 # DEBIT DIRECT # # FRAIS DE SOUSCRIPT° CARTE NGAIKOSSET EUGENE	08/04/16	5 950		10 034
12/04/16	REF : 001MHTA112880101 # 001MHTA112880101 INTERETS SUR PRETS # # LOAN CONTRACT LIQUIDATION	12/04/16	216		9 818
18/04/16	REF : 001JM12161080016 # DEBIT DIRECT # # FRAIS CHEQUIER	18/04/16	14 875		-5 057
27/04/16	REF : 001SDI1161163868 # CREDIT DIVERS CLIENT # # Salaire Avril 2016	27/04/16		380 158	375 101
27/04/16	REF : 001BL10161180002 # DEBIT DIRECT # # REMISE CHQ8796736 FAV OUASSONGO ANGLIKA	27/04/16	375 000		101

Annex 3.1: Vehicles of Abdoulaye Hissène, Haroun Gaye and Hamit Tidjani's convoy painted white in order to resemble MINUSCA vehicles.

Photographs taken by the Panel in Sibut on 4 September 2015.



Annex 3.2: Grave of ex-Séléka fighter executed by anti-balaka elements in Damara on 12 August 2015.

Photographs taken by the Panel in Damara on 29 August 2016.

Annex 3.3: MINUSCA seizure of vehicles and military equipment from the convoy of Abdoulaye Hissène, Haroun Gaye and Hamit Tidjani, 40 km south of Sibut, on 13 August 2016.

Photographs taken by the Panel in Sibut on 31 August and 4 September 2016.







Annex 3.4: PK5 self-defence group of Matar Anemeri, alias "Force".

1. Meeting of the Panel with "Force". Photograph taken by the Panel on 14 October 2016.



2. Photographs of "Force" and members of his self-defense group. Photographs obtained by the Panel on 20 October 2016 from a confidential source.

The pictures below were shared by "Force" with President Touadera to inform him of his readiness to leave the PK5 area if his requests are taken into account. His requests include the integration of the group's members in national security and armed forces, as well as the re-integration of "Force" in the FACA.



PAIX-SE
AUTO-
PAIX-SEC
AUTO-
AUTO

AIX-SE
AUTO-DEFE


PAIX


PAIX-SECU







Annex 3.5: FACA Major and former bodyguard of Transitional President Catherine Samba-Panza, Marcel Mombeka, who was shot and killed in the 3rd district of Bangui on 4 October 2016.

Photographs received by the Panel on 5 October 2016 from a confidential source and later transmitted on social media.



Annex 3.6: Public communiqué issued on 4 October 2016 by the *Coordination des Organisations Musulmanes de Centrafrique* (COMUC) following the killing of FACA Major Marcel Mombeka.



COORDINATION DES ORGANISATIONS MUSULMANES DE CENTRAFRIQUE
التنسيقية العامة للجمعيات و المنظمات الاسلامية بجمهورية افريقيا الوسطى
وحدة — عمل — تقدم

COMUC
CONSEIL DES SAGES
CONSEIL D'ADMINISTRATION
SECRETARIAT EXECUTIF
N° 007/COMUC/CS/CA/SE/2016.-

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
Unité-Dignité-Travail

COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE N°06/2016

Suite à l'assassinat lâche et crapuleux du Commandant **Marcel MOMBEKA** survenu ce jour Mardi 04 Octobre 2016 au Km5 dans le 3ème arrondissement de Bangui et perpétré par des individus armés assimilés au groupe du tristement célèbre **Abdoul DANDA**, un regain de tension sur fond de conflit intercommunautaire refait surface.

Par ailleurs, et en représailles, des bétailleurs innocents de confession musulmane se trouvant dans le 6ème arrondissement (SEGA) pour vendre leurs bœufs ont été lynchés et d'autres été livrés à la vindicte populaire dans d'autres quartiers.

Face à cela, la Communauté Musulmane toute entière par la voie de la Coordination des Organisations Musulmanes de Centrafrique (COMUC) condamne avec la dernière énergie ces actes ignobles et barbares de part et d'autre qui viennent une fois de plus entrainer des pertes inutiles en vies humaines et remettre en cause la paix chèrement acquise dans notre Pays et lance un appel au calme et à la retenue à l'endroit de la population et au gouvernement d'ouvrir une enquête, d'établir les responsabilités et traduire les responsables devant la justice.

Enfin, la communauté musulmane veut attirer l'attention de l'opinion nationale et internationale qu'il ne s'agit nullement d'un acte imputable à toute la communauté mais plutôt un acte crapuleux perpétré par des bandits sans scrupules qu'il faut traquer sans relâche et les mettre hors d'état de nuire pour la quiétude des paisibles citoyens centrafricains de tout bord.

Fait à Bangui, le 04 Octobre 2016

Le Chargé de Communication

Ibrahim Hassan FREDE.-

Coordination des Organisations Musulmanes de Centrafrique (COMUC), KM5, 3e Arrondissement, BANGUI – République Centrafricaine
Tél. 00 (236) 75 50 82 58 / 75 01 06 21/75 06 [illegible]
Email : [illegible]

Annex 3.7: Weaponry circulating in PK5.

1. The circulation of arms and ammunition in Bangui and in particular its 3rd district remains significant. This is most apparent from the large number of firearms incidents in the area, as well as the large number of interventions by UN Mine Action Service to remove ammunition and remnants of war in the area.[8] Recent seizures following Hissène's departure from Bangui, and information received by the Panel on Anemeri's arsenal, demonstrate that many problems persist.

2. In September 2016, the Panel received 18 pictures of the military arsenal of Anemeri given to the President in view of the negotiations on his departure from Bangui. In the pictures, there are about 15 hand grenades, 10 AK-type assault rifles, at least two RPG launchers, one machine gun and an unidentified amount of rounds of ammunition.

3. In August and September 2016, the Panel conducted two missions to Sibut (some 190 km north of Bangui) in order to inspect the belongings of Hissène, Gaye and Tidjani seized from their vehicles by MINUSCA on 13 August. The Panel also inspected the ammunition seized in the house of Hissène on 16 August.[9] An important amount of lethal and non-lethal military equipment was recovered in the six vehicles and from the apprehended ex-Séléka combatants from PK5 neighborhood and BSS camp.[10]

4. All ammunition rounds inspected were produced prior to 2005. The inspected weapons were old, some even being unserviceable, and most likely originating from State stockpiles. Besides lethal equipment, the convoy also transported important quantities of non-lethal materiel such as binoculars, radios and uniforms of various origin, some very new (see photographs below).

---

[8] Meeting with UNMAS MINUSCA, Bangui, 5 October 2016.

[9] Inspection at the Gendarmerie (SRI), Bangui, 3 September 2016.

[10] The convoy transported machine guns (3), submachine guns (1), RPG launchers (2), a 60 mm mortar tube, a mousqueton (1), a pistol (1) and assault rifles of various types: type 56(4), type 56-2 (1), AKM-type (1), SKS-type (1), MAS 36 (1). The convoy also transported hand grenades (1), rocket-propelled grenades (17), mortar bombs (26), and significant quantities of 7.62x39 mm, 7.62x51 mm, 9x19 mm, 9.3x62 mm, 9.3x74 mm ammunition from several countries of origin.

Photographs taken by the Panel in Sibut on 31 August and 4 September 2016.

Chemisette camouflage de type US M 81 Woodland (possible FACA) origine USA	***Treillis complet camouflage de type désert Origine Norvège***
Treillis complet camouflage de type désert Origine NC	***Veste manche courte camouflage de type DPM (Disruptive Pattern Material) désert 1er modèle-GB vu chez Mauritaniens Origine Royaume-Uni***
	
Treillis complet camouflage de type tricolor Vu chez les FACA et dans l'armée nigériane Origine NC	***Pantalon de treillis F2 et UBAS (haut) camouflage de type centre Europe Origine France***

Treillis complet camouflage de type US tricolor desert pattern *Origine USA*	*Treillis complet camouflage de type M81 Woodland Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF)* *Origine Ouganda*
Treillis complet camouflage de type A-TACS Camo (civil)-vu au Tchad *Origine NC*	*Treillis complet de type lézard ou léopard* *Utilisé Tchad, Gabon, Soudan, Rwanda, Maroc…* *Origine France*
Treillis complet camouflage de type tiger stripes *Origine USA*	*Treillis complet camouflage de type MARPAT (US MArines PATtern)* *Origine USA*

Treillis complet camouflage de type **Origine NC**	**Treillis complet camouflage de type Desert Flecktarn pattern** **Origine Allemagne**
Treillis complet camouflage de type lezard **Service Eaux et Forêts Ivoirien** **Origine France**	**Treillis complet camouflage de type** **Origine NC**
Veste et chemisette camouflage de type MARPAT (US MArines PATtern) **Origine USA**	**Treillis complet camouflage de type Olive Drab Long Sleeve Military (US Army Vietnam)** **Origine USA**

Treillis complet Mle 64 (satin 300) camouflage de type noir *Origine France*	*Treillis complet camouflage de type US M81 Woodland* *Origine USA*

Annex 3.8: Map of Bangui indicating irregular FACA units deployed in Bangui, made by the Panel based on information obtained from international forces.


Map of identified irregular FACA units in Bangui
Source: international forces, October 2016
Bangui
1er
1er
2e
3e
4e
5e
6e
7e
8e
La Colline
Zongo
Île Bongo-Soua
République centrafricaine
République démocratique du Congo
Oubangi
Landja
PK12
Sassara
Ngola
Golf-Club
Petit-Poto
Damala
UCATEX
Aéroport
Fou
Cité Jean XXIII
Gobongo
Boy-Rabé
Galabadja
Combattants
Mandaba
Ngaroua
Ndress
Ngatoua
Camp Kassai
Kasaï
Ouango
Ngaragba
Gbangouma
St. Paul
Lycée Pie XII
Collège des Rapides
Hippodrome
Boeing
Kokoro
Pétévo
Ngongonon
92 Logements
Lakouanga
Kpéténé
Pk5
Sica 2
Sica 3
Sica 1
Camp F. Obrou
Village Ndrès
Colline
Centre Ville
Boy-Rabé
Cité
Boeing
Pelemongo
Nzongo
Carmel
Mboussoro
Kolongo
Sorombo
Baraka
Bodolwa
Camp F. Obrou
Boy-Rabé
Mamadou Mbaïki
Sénégalais
Kolongo
Fatima
Mission Fatima
Mboussoro
200 Villas
14 Villas
36 Villas
Bangui-M'Poko
Ndangoué
Malimaka
Ouango
Kasaï

Annex 3.9: Authorization for FACA deployment signed on 2 September 2016 by Lieutenant-Colonel Emmanuel Ngboya, Director-General of the Presidential Security.

Document obtained by the Panel on 6 September 2016 from a confidential source.



[illegible]

DIRECTION GENERALE
DE LA SECURITE PRESIDENTIELLE

N°0165/PR/DGSP

[illegible]
Unité – Dignité – Travail

Bangui, le 02 SEPT 2016

AUTORISATION

Nous Lieutenant Colonel Emmanuel NGBOYA, Directeur Général de la Garde Présidentielle, autorise les éléments de la garde présidentielle du KM5 de prendre service au Commissariat du 3ème arrondissement et ses environs afin de collaborer avec leurs frères d'armes de la MINUSCA.

En foi de quoi la présente autorisation est établie pour servir et valoir ce que de droit.

[illegible] Général de la
[illegible] Présidentielle

[illegible] NGBOYA

Annex 3.10: List of weapons officially in the possession of Alfred Yékatom. archived at the Joint Staff.

Document obtained by Panel from FACA Chief of Staff on 6 October 2016.



BLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
nité – Dignité - Travail

MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE,
DE LA RESTRUCTURATION DES ARMEES, DES ANCIENS
COMBATTANTS ET
DES VICTIMES DE GUERRE

ETAT-MAJOR DES ARMEES

ARMEMENT FACA POSITION ET LOCALISATION

N° D'ORDRE	MARQUES D'ARMES	N° D'ARMES
01	ARMEMENT EN POSSESSION YEKATOM ET SES ELELEMENTS	
02	PA	
03	AK 47	3070243
04	AK 47	3718635
05	MAS 36	03594
06	AK 47	15045
07	AK 47	12003448
08	AK 47	2008998
9	AK RUSSE	3717500
10	AK 47	14818
11	AK 47	03799
12	AK 47	04566
13	RPG7	05253
14	AK 47	102764
15	AK 47	05187
16	MAS 36	03594
17	AK 47	G81738
18	AK 47	22620781
19	AK 47	905830
20	AK 47	22 053
21	AK 47	49 621
22	AK 47	11 19 86
23	AK 47	05 760
24	AK 47	680 4091
25	RPD	030 955
26	AK 47	19700384
27	AK 47	89 107 55
28	AK 47	89 11 0023
29	AK 47	18 854
30	FAL	350 424 24
31	AK 47	013 665
32	AK 47	300 00697
33	MOZER	300 8549
34	AK 47	
35	RPG 7	280 0900
36	PM MAT 49	1000 76
37	PM MAT 49	70852
38	AK 47	62 063
39	AK 47	QT 0739
40	AK 47	075 02
41	AK 47	62 542
42	MAS 36	562 1200 0022
43	MAS 36	0457
44	AK 47	78 485
	AK 47	312 000 701
		10 637



45	RPJ 7	
46	AK 47	30 2799
47	AK 47	059 20
48	AK 47	262 781
49	AK 47	282 701
50	AK RUSSE	392 3208
51	PM MOUSE	020 28
52	GALIL	34 27
53	MAS 36	701 333
54	AK 47	69 924
55	PM MAT 49	015 72
56	AK 47	22 39
57	PM MAT 49	22 974
58	AK 47	35 28
59	AK 47	58 091
60	AK 47	27 141 63
		065 20

RECAPITULATIF PAR ARME

TYPE ARME	NOMBRE	TOTAL ARMES
AK 47	42	59
PA	01	
MAS 36	05	
PM MAT 49	05	
GALIL	01	
FALL	01	
RPG 7	03	
RPD	01	

Annex 3.11: Official letter sent to Alfred Yékatom on 21 July 2016 requesting the return of weapons. Document obtained by the Panel from FACA Chief of Staff on 6 October 2016.



EPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
Unité-Dignité-Travail

MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE
ETAT-MAJOR DES ARMEES
CABINET
N° 219 /MDN/EMA/CAB

BANGUI, le 21 JUIL 2016

Le Général de Brigade
Chef d'Etat-Major des Armées
-BANGUI-

A

Monsieur Alfred YEKATOM, Honorable
Député
-BANGUI-

OBJET : Restitution des Armes.

Honorable,

A l'issu de la passation de service entre mon prédécesseur le Général de Brigade **André-Bonaventure LENANGUY** et moi le 07 Juin 2016, les documents relatifs à la situation des Armes font ressortir que vous détenez des Armes.

Dans le cadre de la préparation opérationnelle et la perspective du redéploiement des Forces Armées Centrafricaines ;

J'ai l'honneur de vous demander de bien vouloir restituer les Armes que vous détenez à l'Etat-Major des Armées, 4ème Bureau pour besoins de services

Vous trouverez en annexe la liste des armes comportant les marques et numéros

En vous souhaitant bonne réception, recevez Honorable, l'assurance de ma considération.

Copie à Monsieur le Ministre de la Défense Nationale (ATCR)

Ludovic NGAIFEI

Annex 3.12: Letter dated 6 September 2016 informing the FACA Chief of Staff on the transfer of weapons and ammunition by Alfred Yékatom in Pissa on 7 April 2015.

Document obtained by the Panel from FACA Chief of Staff on 6 October 2016.



MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE
****
DIRECTION DE CABINET
****
DIRECTION DE L'ARMURERIE CENTRALE
****
SECRETARIAT
****
N°03_/MDN/DIRCAB/DACS.

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
Unité-Dignité-Travail
****

Le Directeur de l'Armurerie Centrale.

Bangui, le 06 SEP 2016

C. Cab
Lettre à l'attention de
Honorable YEKATOM lui
assurant le respect de l'EMA
et [illegible]
d'[illegible] 10/09/16

AU

Général de Brigade, Chef d'Etat - Major des Armées-

Objet: Compte-rendu de restitution des armes et munitions de Guerre.

Dans la journée du 07 Avril 2015, sur instruction de Madame la Ministre d'Etat à la Défense Nationale, le Comité de collecte, **d'enregistrement et d'entreposage des armes et munitions de Guerre** remise volontairement par les Forces de Défense et de Sécurité, a **effectué une mission de travail à Pissa dans la Préfecture de la Lobaye.**

Nous trouverons ci-joint l'état des armes et **munitions collecté par le groupe de la milice « Anti-Balaka » sous le Commandement du Caporal-chef *Alfred YEKATOM-ROMBHOT*. Ces armes et munitions après contrôle technique ont été affectées aux autorités Civiles et militaires de la Place.**

LE DIRECTEUR

Le Lieutenant ***JONAS BISSAKOUNOU***

Annex 3.13: Official letter sent by FACA Chief of Staff to Alfred Yékatom.

Document obtained by the Panel from FACA Chief of Staff on 6 October 2016.



REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
Unité-Dignité-Travail

MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE
ETAT-MAJOR DES ARMEES
CABINET
N°______/MDN/EMA/CAB

BANGUI, le

Le Général de Brigade,
Chef d'Etat-Major des Armées
-BANGUI-

A

Monsieur Alfred YEKATOM, Honorable
Député
-BANGUI-

ETAT-MAJOR DES ARMEES

OBJET : Lettre de Reconnaissance.

Honorable,

Les graves violations des Droits de l'Homme commises pendant les derniers évènements Militaro-Politique que le pays à connu vous à pousser de réagir en tant que Soldat pour défendre la Patrie.

Les Autorités Politiques de la Transition, en vue de stabiliser et pacifier la ville de BANGUI et ses environs ont mis en place un comité de collecte, d'enregistrement et de stockage des armes et munitions de guerre remises volontairement par les Forces de Défense et de Sécurité.

Vous avez adhéré à cette politique de désarmement volontaire en remettant des armes et munitions de guerre de tous calibres au comité.

Par cet acte patriotique, l'Etat-Major des Armées vous assure le respect et reconnaissance du rôle que vous avez joué dans la stabilité de notre pays. En espérant que vous continuerez toujours à contribuer au retour définitif de la paix en République Centrafricaine.

En vous souhaitant bonne réception, recevez Honorable, l'assurance de ma considération.

Copie à : Monsieur le Ministre de la Défense Nationale (ATCR)

Ludovic NGAIFEI

Annex 3.14: Gervais Lakosso's letter suspending his participation in the Advisory and Monitoring Committee on national DDRR, SSR and reconciliation. Document obtained by the Panel from confidential source on 19 October 2016.



GTSC

Groupe de Travail de la Société Civile sur la Crise Centrafricaine

N°042/GTSC/C -16

Bangui, le 17 octobre 2016

17|10|2016
11 23

A Monsieur le Ministre Conseiller Spécial, Coordonnateur au DDRR, RSS et à la Réconciliation Nationale

Objet : Suspension de notre participation au Comité Consultatif et de Suivi du DDRR

Monsieur le Ministre,

Nous avons le regret de vous annoncer par la présente que nous suspendons notre participation au Comité Consultatif et de Suivi du DDRR pour protester contre la violation constante de l'accord de principe du DDRR par les groupes armés bénéficiaires de ce programme et les tâtonnements constatés au lancement de ce comité le mercredi 12 octobre 2016 à la Présidence.

Nous souhaitons qu'une rencontre préalable avec toutes les Forces Vives de la Nation et la présence effective de tous les groupes armés se tiennent avant la reprise des activités dudit comité.

Si cela n'est pas observé, nous maintiendrons la suspension de notre participation et aviserons.

Restons à votre écoute pour toutes fins utiles, recevez l'expression de notre considération distinguée.

Le Coordonateur, Porte Parole

Gervais LAKOSSO

CC : Minusca, PR, PAN, PM

Annex 3.15: Lakosso's anti-MINUSCA petition with telephone numbers of Gervais Lakosso, Marcel Mokwapi and Seraphin Komeya (MRDP).

Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source in Bangui on 20 October 2016.



Ê Zingo Biani

Mouvement Citoyen et Pacifique pour la résolution définitive de la Crise Centrafricaine et l'appropriation de la destinée du pays

APPEL A SIGNATURE DE LA PETITION POUR EXIGER :

- **LE RETRAIT DE LA MINUSCA ET**
- **LA PRISE DES MESURES POLITIQUES VIGOUREUSES PAR LE GOUVERNEMENT POUR L'AMELIORATION DE LA SITUATION SECURITAIRE EN CENTRAFRIQUE.**

Peuple Centrafricain, tu es invité à prendre ta responsabilité en signant massivement cette pétition car :

- La Minusca a failli à sa mission en devenant complice de la Séléka qui continue de massacrer, de violer et de détruire nos villes et villages ;
- Et les Autorités que nous avons établies démocratiquement, nous ont totalement déçus par leur laxisme et leur indifférence face à la souffrance chronique du peuple

Notre déclaration du 26 septembre étant restée sans suite, nous prenons nos responsabilités pour éviter le pire.

Pour signer la pétition, contactez les points focaux de votre arrondissement

1^{er} 75046334	$2^{ème}$ 75502444/75046167	$3^{ème}$ 75895050	$4^{ème}$ 75302310	$5^{ème}$ 72646485/75093747	$6^{ème}$ 75015258/72727637/75036075
$7^{ème}$ 72312778	$8^{ème}$ 75033303/75806107	Begoua 72134025/72613184 75806107	Bimbo 72727637 75036075	Coordination 75500295/72502444 70502444/77502444	

LEVONS NOUS TOUS POUR DEFENDRE LA PATRIE EN DANGER

FAIT A BANGUI LE 18 OCTOBRE 2016

Merci de photocopier pour partager l'information autour de vous

Annex 3.16: Gold sale and purchase agreement (first and last page) entered by Abdoulaye Hissène; document seized at Hissène's house on 16 August 2016.

Document obtained by the Panel on 18 October 2016.



[illegible]

a) COMMODITY: Alluvial Gold [illegible]

b) FORM: Alluvial Gold high grade [illegible]

c) PURITY: [illegible]

d) FINENESS: 22+ Carats plus. SELLER [illegible]

e) ASSAY: Final assay to be made at the Buyer's nominated Refinery, and the result of [illegible] will be accepted by both Buyer and Seller.

f) ORIGIN: EAST AFRICA

g) PACKING: Suitable packaging commonly used in the trade.

h) QUANTITY: [illegible]

i) PRICE: [illegible] Thirty Three Five Thousand US dollars per kg

j) BUYER'S DESIGNATED REFINERY AND ULTIMATE DELIVERY DESTINATION FOR THE SHIPMENT: DUBAI

k) PAYMENT: The first tranch to be shipped will be 25kgs.

2. DELIVERY TERMS

2.1 The delivery for this Agreement shall be on a C.I.F basis (by Private Jet) to the Buyer's nominated Refinery. A senior executive of the Seller (or the Seller's legal counsel) shall personally coordinate the delivery of the Shipment and shall be present at Buyer's nominated Refinery on the day that the COMMODITY is delivered to the Buyer's nominated Refinery and also on the day of the Assay Report.

2.2 Buyer or Buyer's Designated Entity will pay all required charges [illegible] the COMMODITY has been assayed, the Seller will sell the COMMODITY [illegible] agreed price (Agreed Price as defined in paragraph 1.) above, [illegible] Contract. The Seller will be notified by the Buyer or Buyer's [illegible] or e-mail of the date on which the COMMODITY has been [illegible]



SIGNATURE PAGE

SELLER:

SIGNED: (Seal)

PRINTED: [illegible] ABDOULAYE [illegible] (MINISTER)
Title/Position:
Passport No: [illegible]
Nationality: CENTRAFRICAINE
Signed and Sealed on this 1st day of September 2014

BUYER:

SIGNED:

PRINTED: MR. PATEL SABBIR ADAM
Title/Position:
Passport No: [illegible]
Nationality: INDIAN
Signed and Sealed on this 1st day of September 2014

2/09/2014

NBC 14/04

Annex 3.17: Document signed by Abdoulaye Hissène declaring to take one kilogram of gold from Kenya to Dubai for an estimate; document seized at Hissène's house on 16 August 2016.
Document obtained by the Panel on 18 October 2016.



REPUBLIC OF KENYA

UNDERTAKING

I HON. ABDOULAYE ISSENE, MINISTER REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE Passport No. 000004262 do hereby undertake and state as follows:

a) THAT I have taken possession of 1 Kilogram of gold from MR. JULIUS KIBE of SOVEREIGN FREIGHTERS LTD who are my duly appointed clearing agents.

b) THAT I will take the said 1 Kilogram of gold to DUBAI for the purpose of conducting an Assay.

c) THAT I do undertake to return the said 1 Kilogram of gold to SOVEREIGN FREIGHTERS LTD who have given a parallel undertaking to the Kenya Customs Department with the promise to return the same back to the main consignment of 300 Kilograms for purposes of shipment.

d) THAT I now therefore upon signing hereof acknowledge receipt of the above stated 1 Kilogram of gold.

Signed by:

HON. ABDOULAYE ISSENE

Annex 4.1: UPC dissidents' communiqué dated 30 June 2016 expressing their disappointment regarding the policy and practice within Ali Darassa's UPC.

Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 18 July 2016.



Communiqué de presse N°001 du 30/06/2016

Relatif à la déception des six (6) Généraux du mouvement de l'UPC du Général ALI Darassa.

Nous les généraux, YAYA SKOTTE Chef d'Etat Major Adjoint de l'UPC, Ahamat FAYA Abdoulay Chef d'Etat Major chargé des opérations, FADLALA Oumar, MOUSSA Bachir, Achafi DAOUD et Haroun MAHAMAT tous conseillers à l'Etat Major de l'UP réunis ce jour 30/06/16 à BAMBARI décidons ce qui suit :

-considérant la gestion clanique et discriminatoire de l'UPC par le General ALI Darassa ;

-considérant le non respect et violation des idéaux de ce mouvement politico-militaire au prétexte que ce parti aurait été crée uniquement pour la défense de la communauté peuhl ;

-considérant que l'UPC étant composé de plusieurs ethnies aux motif de protéger et de défendre les de la communauté musulmane menacée d'extermination durant les événements tragiques qu'à traversé notre pays la République Centrafricaine ;

-considérant le manque de confiance venant au niveau du staff de l'état major de l'upc et souhait hardant du général ALI Darassa de persister dans ses intentions belliqueuses, décidons de nous démarquer définitivement de ce mouvement et comme libre à adhérer à n'importe quel PARTI .

Aussi nous n'oublions pas de saisir l'opinion publique nationale et internationale de cette déception intervenue au sein de l'UPC.

Fait à bambari le 30/06/16

Les participants

Ont signés

1. **YAYA Skotte ,**
2. **AHAMAT faya Abdoulaye,**
3. **FADLALA Oumar**
4. **MOUSSA Bachir,**
5. **ACHAFI Daoud,**
6. **HAROUN Mahamat**

Annex 4.2: 37 UPC defectors led by General Faya taking refuge inside the MINUSCA camp where they stayed for seven weeks.

Photographs taken by the Panel in Bambari on 3 August 2016.



Annex 4.3: List of the R4 Vector assault rifles documented in the CAR. Source: Panel of Experts weapons database.

Date documented	Date captured	Location documented	Location captured	Type	Serial/ Marikings	Origine
24 April 2015	April 2015	Bangui (Antenne de collecte)	Bangui	R4 Vector assault rifle	791860A1	South Africa
01 June 2015	Unknown	Bossangoa	Bossangoa area	R4 Vector assault rifle	781182A1	South Africa
16 April 2015	Unknown	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Bria	R4 Vector assault rifle	711282A1	South Africa
16 April 2015	Unknown	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Bria	R4 Vector assault rifle	792539A1	South Africa
16 April 2015	Unknown	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Bria	R4 Vector assault rifle	796167A1	South Africa
22 August 2015	22 August 2015	Kaga-Bandoro/ Mbres area	Kaga-Bandoro/ Mbres area	R4 Vector assault rifle	NA	South Africa
26 September 2015	26 September 2015	N'dele area	N'dele area	R4 Vector assault rifle	NA	South Africa
07 November 2014	Unknown	M'POKO	Unknown	R4 Vector assault rifle	NA	South Africa
06 November 2014	Unknown	Camp De Roux	Unknown	R4 Vector assault rifle	NA	South Africa
06 November 2014	Unknown	Camp De Roux	Unknown	R4 Vector assault rifle	NA	South Africa
12 November 2014	Unknown	M'POKO	Unknown	R4 Vector assault rifle	19000301	South Africa
30 October 2014	Unknown	RDOT	Unknown	R4 Vector assault rifle	790480A1	South Africa
30 October 2014	Unknown	RDOT	Unknown	R4 Vector assault rifle	790480A1	South Africa
03 November 2014	Unknown	Camp De Roux	Unknown	R4 Vector assault rifle	791959A1	South Africa

03 November 2014	Unknown	Camp De Roux	Unknown	R4 Vector assault rifle	792299A1	South Africa
03 November 2014	Unknown	Camp De Roux	Unknown	R4 Vector assault rifle	797297A1	South Africa
06 November 2014	Unknown	Camp De Roux	Unknown	R4 Vector assault rifle	NA	South Africa
04 November 2014	Unknown	Camp De Roux	Unknown	R4 Vector assault rifle	NA	South Africa
04 November 2014	Unknown	Camp De Roux	Unknown	R4 Vector assault rifle	NA	South Africa
19 January 2015	Unknown	Camp De Roux	Unknown	R4 Vector assault rifle	NA	South Africa
24 April 2016	Unknown	Bria (MINUSCA)	Bria	R4 Vector assault rifle	795828A1	South Africa
8 August 2016	4 July 2016	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Bambari	R4 Vector assault rifle	779057A1	South Africa
8 August 2016	4 July 2016	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Bambari	R4 Vector assault rifle	801415A1	South Africa
8 August 2016	4 July 2016	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Bambari	R4 Vector assault rifle	789183A1	South Africa
8 August 2016	4 July 2016	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Bambari	R4 Vector assault rifle	791271A1	South Africa
8 August 2016	4 July 2016	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Bambari	R4 Vector assault rifle	789804A1	South Africa
8 August 2016	4 July 2016	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Bambari	R4 Vector assault rifle	786698A1	South Africa
8 August 2016	4 July 2016	Camp de Roux (Bangui)	Bambari	R4 Vector assault rifle	786698A1	South Africa
7 October 2016	7 October 2016	Ouango	Ouango	R4 Vector assault rifle	787327A1	South Africa

Annex 4.4: Analysis of Kouango and surrounding villages.

1. In its 2015 final report (see S/2015/936 paras. 63-84), the Panel indicated the tense situation in the Bambari-Grimari-Kouango area between anti-balaka and UPC, but also among anti-balaka groups. In 2016, the presence of anti-balaka lead by zone commander "Fally" put at risk the population of Kouango and surrounding villages.[11] On 19 April, "Fally" was killed allegedly by another anti-balaka leader, Gaëtan,[12] who also attacked UPC elements at Ganamandji and Somba, near Kouango. Clashes between the two anti-balaka groups continued on 20 April.[13]

2. In addition to the presence of armed groups in Kouango, the region is a transit area for Fulani herdsmen. This increases the possibility of clashes between the local population and the armed groups. On 10 August 2016, two Fulani were killed in Maiguery area, near Kouango, allegedly by anti-balaka elements. In retaliation, UPC members detained between 10 and 20 persons from the villages of Zou 1, Zou 2, Kédja, and Kouboulayadé, who later were released.[14] The conflict between Fulani and anti-balaka further escalated with the killing, on 6 September, of a pastor and two others injured.[15] Attacks against humanitarians were also reported on 8 September.[16]

3. On 10 September 2016, a Muslim was killed in the Kouango-Bianka axis, apparently by anti-balaka elements, which provoked a violent reaction from UPC elements against the Christian population.[17] An estimated 19 people were killed and between 2,000 to 3,000 people were displaced. Some 380 houses were torched in 11 villages.[18] Since the beginning of October 2016, around 670 IDPs have returned to the Koungo area.[19] However, insecurity remains a major threat to the local population.

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[11] For example, "Fally"'s group attacked the village Ganemandji (approx. 40km northeast of Kouango), looting the office of a national NGO. Confidential report, 19 April 2016.

[12] The Panel has previously reported about the ongoing dispute between Gaëtan and "Fally" factions. Panel's 2015 final report (see S/2015/936, para. 75).

[13] Confidential report, 20 April 2016.

[14] People were freed after MINUSCA intervention. Confidential report, 11 August 2016.

[15] Confidential report, 6 September 2016.

[16] A humanitarian, traveling in an international NGO car from Kouango to Grimari, was injured by a stone thrown at her. Confidential report, 8 September 2016.

[17] Confidential reports, 11 and 15 September 2016.

[18] Confidential reports, 18 September and 11 October 2016.

[19] Confidential report, 11 October 2016.

Annex 4.5: Communication dated 29 August 2016 from Gaëtan Bouadé, in which he reiterates his factions' participation in the DDR process.

Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 3 September 2016.



COORDINATION PREFECTORALE./UK/

PARTIE CENTRAFRICAINE
POUR L'UNITÉ ET LE
DÉVELOPPEMENT (P.C.U.D.)

RÉPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
UNITÉ-DIGNITÉ-TRAVAIL
****

A MONSIEUR LE CHEF DE BUREAU DE LA M.I.N.U.S.C.A.
ET L'O.N.U.BAMBARI (OUAKA).

OBJET : LETTRE DE DÉCOMMANDASSION

Nous officier, générale de la paix Monsieur BOADE GAETON du Partie Centrafricaine pour L'Unité et le Développement (PCUD) de Edouard NGAISSONA :

- Conformément aux déclarations N°001 de la coordination du Mouvement de Résistance pour la Défense de la Patrie (MRDP) sur les ondes internationales, a la MINUSCA et autres ; au nom de la population de la Ouaka .
- Vu l'identification des combattants révolutionnaires, au programme de : près (DDR)
- Vu le retour de la paix ; et la cohésion sociale dans Bambari Ouaka ;
- Vu le décret N°16 /317,
  Portant nomination des membres du comité consultatif et de suivi du programme nationale de Désarmement, Démobilisation Réintégration, et Rapatriement (DDRR) ; à la Présidence de la République Centrafricaine.

Nous décommandons, et lançon un vibrant appel au chef de bureau de la MINUSCA-tous les chefs des forces de l'ordre, tous les combattants de (PCUD) et toutes la population de la Ouaka.

Que le mouvement dénommé Mouvement de Résistance pour la Défense de la Patrie (MRDP). Est rejeté tout simplement dans la partie des groupes politico-militairesde (PCUD).

VIVE LE (P.C.U.D.)

AMPLIATIONS Faite à Bambari la 29/08/2016

- Présidence de la République
- Primature
- Assemblée Nationale
- MINUSCA
- Union Africaine
- Union Européenne
- Ambassade de France
- Ambassade des USA
- Partie Politique
- Presse
- Archive

-Le Générale de la Paix
GAETAN BOADE.

-Le conseiller Générale
BONIFACE PADOUNDJI

-Le chef d'état-major
MALEMASSI. M.FERANOCE

-Le SG : ALIX.M. OROGBO

Annex 4.6: Gaëtan Bouadé's weapons to be handed over to MINUSCA in the framework of pre-DDRR and now stored in his house. Most weapons are non-functional artisanal rifles.

Photograph taken by the Panel in Bambari on 3 August 2016.

Annex 4.7: Declaration dated 4 August 2016 on the creation of the MRDP. Document obtained by the Panel on 15 August 2016 from a confidential source.



Mouvement de Résistance pour
la Défense de la Patrie (M.R.D.P)
Tél : (00236) 72 64 64 85

République Centrafricaine
Unité-Dignité-Travail
-•-•-•-

DÉCLARATION N°001/UK/MRDP /16



- [illegible] que ces opérations se déroulent à la connaissance de certains [illegible] de la [illegible] RCA, complices et acolytes de Ali DARASSA [illegible] dans la Ouaka, alors que [illegible] de la France [illegible] de prolonger l'embargo sur les armes [illegible] des éléments des Forces Armées Centrafricaines (FACA) ;

- [illegible] que les exactions [illegible] par les ennemis de la paix [illegible] à déstabiliser le régime démocratiquement élu, et à mettre en cause l'idée de la partition de la RCA ;

- Considérant le retour à l'ordre constitutionnel de la RCA depuis cinq(5) mois qu'aucune [illegible] la protection des populations civiles de la Ouaka ;

- [illegible] de la Ouaka avons décidé de prendre en main notre destinée [illegible] au sein d'un Mouvement [illegible] « Mouvement de Résistance Pour la Défense de la Patrie » en abrégé « MRDP »

- [illegible] les résultats des élections présidentielles et [illegible] le régime du pouvoir en place ;

Demandons

Au Gouvernement

- [illegible] de toutes les barrières illégales mises en place par les éléments de l'UPC [illegible] Kouango.

- D'extrader les Sieurs Ali DARASSA, AMATH FAYA ABDOULAYE NAORECH, MABUTA, ABDOULAYE YOUSSOUF, COLONEL GONI, GÉNÉRAL DAOUDA, AMIDE, DAHARO, FADALA OUMARO, YAYA SCOTTE, ACHAFI DAOUDE, AROUN MAHAMAT, ALABIBE, MOUSSA BACHIR et tous leurs acolytes [illegible] dans leurs pays d'origine ou de les traduire devant la justice ;

- De traduire leurs complices Centrafricains tels que WANGAYE Didier, [illegible] Hardo Mamma à Ngakobo et leurs chefs de guerre anti-population ;

- De traduire en justice tous les auteurs, co-auteurs et les complices des violences à l'égard des femmes, des personnes du 3ème âge, et jeunes devant les juridictions compétentes ;

- [illegible] la protection des populations civiles et leurs retours chez eux dans des bonnes conditions ;

- De fermer les chantiers d'exploitation de diamants et or [illegible] et autres

- De démanteler par la force tous les milices et plus précisément [illegible] dans la Ouaka.

- [illegible] de vigilance quant à [illegible] de la MINUSCA ;



[illegible] en RCA.

- [illegible] Forces de Défense et de Sécurité (FDS) dans la Ouaka

À LA MINUSCA

- [illegible] le Gouvernement Centrafricain [illegible]
- [illegible]
- [illegible] « MINUSCA »
- [illegible] la Résolution 2127 [illegible]

À L'ENDROIT DE LA POPULATION CENTRAFRICAINE EN GENERAL, ET CELLE DE LA OUAKA EN PARTICULIER

[illegible] de la République Centrafricaine, [illegible]

[illegible]

VIVE LA PATRIE
UN POUR TOUS, TOUS POUR UN !
POUR QUE VIVE LA OUAKA !

Faite à Bambari le 04 août 201

Ampliations
- Présidence de la République
- Primature
- Assemblée Nationale
- MINUSCA
- Union Africaine
- Union Européenne
- Ambassade de France
- Ambassade des USA
- Partis Politiques
- Presse
- Archives

Pour la Coordination
Le Porte Parole

[illegible]

Annex 4.8: Ultimatum issued by MRDP on 4 September 2016. Document obtained by the Panel on 11 September 2016 from the MRDP coordination.



Mouvement de Résistance pour la
Défense de la Patrie (M.R.D.P)
Tél : +(236) 72 64 64 85
75 15 34 97

BAMBARI

République Centrafricaine
Unité-Dignité-Travail

MEMORANDUM

A

L'ATTENTION DE MONSIEUR LE

CHEF DE BUREAU DE LA MINUSCA DE BAMBARI

Nous, populations de la Ouaka, sommes mécontentes du mutisme et du laissez aller vis-à-vis de l'insécurité chronique qui sevit à Bambari, Ngakobo, Kouango, et les environs.

Constatons que :

Ali NDARASSA et ses hommes tuent depuis 2014 jusqu'à ce jour et n'est jamais inquiet;

Aucun pouvoir public n'a posé des actes concrets pour arrêter ces barbaries;

En une semaine, 09 Centrafricains sont tués à Ngakobo par éléments de la Séléka Peulhs de Ali NDARASSA avec la complicité des Mauritaniens de la MINUSCA.

Avons écouté sur les ondes de la Radio Ndéké Luka, les propos injurieux de Mr ONIANGA – ANIANGA Représentant Spéciale du Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies en Centrafrique traitant les Centrafricains de voleurs de bœufs, alors que ces derniers démunis de toutes forces ne vivent que des produits champêtres.

Ce Centrafricain du nom de DANDI Bienvenue tué à Ngakobo, revenait du champ avec ses épouses et n'a jamais mis pied dans un parc qui n'existe nulle part à Ngakobo.

Dans d'autres prefectures regnent la paix et la sécurité, et la libre circulation des

1 *Memorandum du MRDP Bambari Ouaka*

biens et des personnes est une réalité quotidienne.

Pourquoi et toujours la Ouaka qui continue de souffrir ? Pourquoi la population de la Ouaka doit-elle continuer à subir des actes de barbaries ?

Nous avons espérer qu'avec le retour à la légalité constitutionnelle, la Préfecture de la Ouaka devrait respirer une aire nouvelle ; hélas nous vivons le pire.

Les éléments de la MINUSCA affectés dans la Ouaka sont tous des musulmans et entretiennent leurs frères au détriment du reste de la population ; ce qui n'est pas acceptable.

La complicité de la MINUSCA est visible et claire, car c'est elle qui fournit des armes et des munitions aux éléments de la Séléka pour tuer la population civile.

Les éléments de la Séléka se promènent librement l'arme aux poings, érigent des barrières au su et au vu de la MINUSCA qui ne réagi pas.

La Ouaka est vue comme un dépotoir où il faut y déverser tous les criminels musulmans, d'une part et, la MINUSCA qui se déplace avec éléments de la Séléka qui sont des rebelles dans les véhicules des Nations Unies que de Mr. ONIANGA ANIANGA qui n'ose pas condamner ni dénoncer, mais se contente de les défendre d'autre part.

Nos souffrances ont trop durées et nous disons tous de vive voix **« ça suffit »**.

Recommandons:

. L'arrestation immédiate d'Ali DARASSA n'excédant pas 30 jours;

. Le départ sans condition des Mauritaniens et leur remplacement par des contingents non musulmans.

. Départ sans condition du chef de Bureau de la MINUSCA de Bambari

. La levée immédiate de toutes les barrières érigées par les SÉLÈKA ainsi que leur cantonnement et isolement sans condition à 30 Kms hors de la ville ;

. Le départ de Monsieur ONIANGA - ANIANGA à la tête de la MINUSCA qui n'est pas à la hauteur de la tâche, et qui injurie les centrafricains alors que le mandat qui lui a été accordé est classé pour ne jouer qu'à l'amateurisme.

. Que la volonté du peuple soit respectée.

. Non à une forme de complot de "PARTITION" à travers un silence et une inaction du Gouvernement.

Paix = volonté du peuple

Excédée, nous prendrons nos responsabilités aux prix de notre "**VIE**"

Ampliation

- Présidence de la République
- Primature
- Assemblée Nationale
- Ambassade des USA
- Ambassade de France
- Union Européenne
- Union Africaine
- MINUSCA
- Partis Politiques
- Presse
- Archives

VIVE LA PATRIE !
UN POUR TOUS
TOUS POUR UN

Fait à Bambari, le 04 Septembre 2016

Pour la population de la Ouaka
Le Coordonnateur du MRDP

REDJE OUAKA Arcad-Kennedy

Annex 4.9: Newly manufactured artisanal hunting rifle purchased from Yakoma (DRC) and trafficked via Béma (CAR).

Photograph taken by the Panel on 6 October 2016 in Bangassou.



Annex 4.10: Hunting ammunition produced by *Manufacture de cartouches Congolaise* (MACC) in Pointe Noire, Republic of the Congo, and sold on the markets in Bangassou, Béma and Yakoma.

Photographs taken by the Panel in Bangassou on 10 October.


SOLDE
PROMOTION
WHITE CHALK
M.A.C.C.

Annex 4.11: Abuses committed by anti-balaka on the Oubangui River. Document obtained by the Panel on 20 September 2016 from a confidential source.



A.P.B.M.E.C
ASSOCIATION DES PROPRIETAIRES DE BALEINIERES ET MENUES EMBARCATIONS DE CENTRAFRIQUE
Entraide – Solidarité – Progrès

BUREAU EXECUTIF NATIONAL
SECRETARIAT GENERAL
N°_____/APBMEC/BE/SG/16

Bangui, le 14 Mars 2016

MESSAGE PORTE

Expéditeur : Le Président National de l'APBMEC……………………Bangui

Destinataire : Le Ministre des Transports et de l'Aviation Civile…..Bangui

Pour informations : Le Ministre de la Défense Nationale……………Bangui
Le Ministre de la Sécurité Publique……………Bangui
Le Ministère des affaires Sociales ……………Bangui
L'Archevêque……………………………………Bangui

TEXTE

Regret de vous informer pour la 2ième fois plusieurs cas de viols et braquages enregistrés le Mercredi 24 Février 2016 et le Vendredi 04 Mars 2016, sur deux Baleinières sur l'axe haut Oubangui par les Anti-Balaka lieux de sévices corporels et matériels (Bata et Ombella) Stop.

1- La baleinière dénommée TERRE PROMISE de partance Bangui, le Mercredi 27 Février 2016 pour un marché hebdomadaire POSSEL, Pandu (RDC), les femmes ont été violé au poste de [illegible] Stop.

2- La Baleinière dénommée [illegible] DE DIEU de partance de Bangui pour Kouango, [illegible] son embarcation a été [illegible], deux femmes ont été [illegible] village Gouala [illegible] Anti-Balaka [illegible] Stop.

3- [illegible] commerçants [illegible] pour Bangui en vue de vendre leurs marchandises [illegible] blessures [illegible] Stop.

L'affaire est pour l'instant [illegible] Stop.



De ce qui précède, l'APBMEC, demande :

1- Le démentiellement des barrières illégales érigées sur les voies d'eau par ces bandes armées Stop

2- La traduction systématique de ces auteurs de violation des Droits de l'Homme devant la juridiction compétente Stop

3- L'implication permanente du Gouvernement dans la sécurisation des voies d'eaux navigables de l'Oubangui. Stop.

Haute considération Stop et fin.

Pour le Bureau Exécutif National

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
ASSOCIATION DES [illegible]
DES BALEINIERS ET [illegible]
EMBARCATIONS DE CENTRAFRIQUE
I A P B M E C I
UNITE - DIGNITE - TRAVAIL

Le Président

Antoine KOYAMBOUNOU

Annex 4.12: Agreement dated 7 November 2015 between boats representatives and anti-balaka leaders on the taxes amount on the Oubangui River. Document obtained by the Panel on 20 September 2016 from a confidential source.



Bangui, le 7 Novembre 2015

TARIF DES MARCHANDISES POUR LES FORMALITES A PAYER PAR POSTE DES ANTI-BALAKA BANGUI-KOUNGO

ALLER

Sac farine = 200 F
Sels = 25 F
Carton savon 80 = 50 F
Carton Cube = 50 F
Carton biscuit = 25 F
Sac soude = 100 F
Casier bière = 75 F
Carton pille = 100 F
Grande cuvette = 50 F
Tôle = 25 F
Balle choisie = 250 F
Fût essence = 500 F
Carton médicament = 500 F
Carton bonbon = 25 F
Carton fil à pêche = 50 F
Sac tapette LB = 500 F
Palette tapette = 100 F
Palette tomate = 50 F
Sac pièce dame = 500 F
Pneu moto = 50 F
Carton pièce détachée = 500 F
Moulin = 500 F
Mousse = 250 F
Lit = 250 F
Meuble salon = 500 F
Carton divers = 500 F
Groupe électrogène = 250 F
Sac natron = 200 F
Carton pille = 150 F
Carton cigarette = 250 F
Sac thé = 150 F
Radio = 50 F
Pousse-pousse = 250 F
Vélo = 250 F
Carton machette = 500 F
Sac oignon = 500 F
Filet oignon = 500 F
Grande marmite = 25 F
Douzaine parapluie = 100 F
Fer à béton = 100 F
Carton pomme = 150 F



RETOUR

Bœuf	2000 F
Porc	250 F
Chèvre	250 F
Mouton	250 F
Panier poisson (Ngoundou)	500 F
Fût d'huile	500 F
Bidon d'huile de 20 litres	50 F
Sac étoile café [illegible]	500 F
Sac café non décortiqué	250 F
Sac courge	250 F
Fretin	250 F
Panier d'oranges	250 F
Panier de mangues	250 F
Frigo	500 F

En foi de quoi, le présent document a été signé pour servir et valoir ce que de droit.

MODALE **ZAWARA** **DANGA** **MBATA**

POSSEL **NDIOUKOU** **NDENGOU**

Le Général

Thierry LEBENE

Le Commandant de Zone : [illegible]

Thibault ZONI

Le Coordonnateur Superviseur [illegible]

[illegible]

Le Président [illegible]

Annex 5.1: Letter from the Civil Society Forum requesting support. Document obtained by the Panel on 26 September 2016 from a confidential source.



COMITE PREPARATOIRE DU FORUM
INCLUSIF DE LA SOCIETE CIVILE DU
NORD-EST BRIA (HK)
N°/Réf……

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
****
Unité- Dignité- Travail

Bria, le 14 Septembre 2016

Le Président du Comité Préparatoire

A
Monsieur le Représentant du Programme

des Nations Unies pour le Développement
(PNUD)

Objet : Lettre d'Appui Financier

Monsieur le Représentant,

Dans le cadre de l'organisation du Forum de la société civile de la Région Nord-est relatif à la paix, la sécurité, la cohésion sociale, le droit pour tous et le développement socio-économique, initialement prévu du 20 au 25 Septembre 2016 à Bria, nous sollicitons votre appui financier et matériel indispensable à la réussite du Forum.

Veuillez agréer Monsieur le Représentant, l'expression de nos considérations distinguées.

El HADJ YAYA Idriss Doungouss

Identical letters were sent to the International Committee of the Red Cross, UNICEF and the World Food Programme. The Forum also requested support from the Government of the Central African Republic and MINUSCA for logistics and aerial lifting of participants coming from other prefectures.

Annex 5.2: "Bria declaration" dated 19 October 2016. Document by the Panel obtained on 22 October 2016 from a confidential source.



FRONT POPULAIRE POUR **REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE**
LA RENAISSANCE DE CENTRAFRIQUE **Unité -Dignité -Travail**

HAUT CONSEIL SUPREME

COMITE D'ORGANISATION DE
L'ASSEMBLEE GENERALE

DECLARATION DE BRIA

Nous participants, réunis à l'Assemblée Génerale du Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique (FP R C) **tenue à Bria** (HAUTE-KOTTO) en date des 18 et 19 Octobre 2016.

Préoccupésprofondement par le contexte socio-sécuritairetrès alarmant que traverse le pays en général et la RégionNord –Est en particulier caractérisé en grande partie par les pratiques de la mauvaise gouvernance, la politique d'exclusion ainsi que les menaces sérieusés qui pèsent sur la paix, la sécurite l'unité, et le developpementsocio-économique dans les différentes provinces du Nord-Est

Affirmant que les causes profondes de la crise Centrafricaine s'expliquent surtout par des raisons politiques et institutionnelles

Rappelant respectivement :

-Au peuple Centrafricain

-et A l'opinion internationale

Ce qui suit :

-Le non-respect de tous les Accords signés avec lesrégimes politiquesprécédents et l'actuel Gouvernement ;

- le non-respect des engagements officiels souscrits avec les Institutions Sous Regionales ;

-L'absence quasi-totale d'unité dans le Sud-Ouest du pays ;

1

-Le climat d'insécurité récurrente qui se manifeste dans toute la partie Sud-Ouest du pays ainsi que dans la capitale Bangui ;

- le processus du Désarmement, Démobilisation, Réinsertion et Rapatriement ne repose pas sur des garanties réelles des droits et qui est souvent entaché de recours à l'usage de la force ;

- le réarmement des milices Anti-balaka et leur reconversion dans les Forces Armées Centrafricaines par le régime actuel ;

Rappelant également les conditions de vie précaire des réfugiés et personnes déplacées internes victimes des conflits. Le manque d'initiative des dirigeants politiques centrafricains dans la mise en œuvre des stratégies efficientes en faveur de la paix, de la sécurité, de l'unité nationale et de la reconstruction du pays en général et la Région Nord-Est en particulier.

Convaincusque la Résolution 2301 adoptée par le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations-Unies en sa 7747eme séance en date du 26 juillet 2016 n'ayant rien à reprocher au Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique (FPR C)

Convaincusque la présentedéclaration constitue les nouvelles orientations politiques du F P R C devant aboutir aux compromis de paix durable gage d'unité et de relance des activitéssocio-économiques dans le Nord-Est.

Félicitant la parfaite réussite de,cette AssembléeGénérale qui s'est déroulée dans une ambiance paisible et d'échanges constructives.

Félicitant la Communauté Internationale notamment le Secrétaire General des Nations-Unies l'Union Européenne ,l'UnionAfricaine. LaCommunauté des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale (C E A C) et la Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale (C E M A C) pour leurs interventions salutaires dans la résolution de la crise Centrafricaine.

De tout ce qui précède et à l'issue des résolutions prises à l'unanimité lors cette Assemblée Générale en sa session ordinaire tenue àBria, nous déclarons solennellement au nom du FPRC:

1-Accepter la tenue d'un dialogue sincère et concret avec le gouvernement en présence de la communauté internationale exclusivement au sien du siège de l'Union Africaine à ADDIS-ABEBA.

2-S'engager à entretenir des relations étroites et agissantes avec les pays voisins sur tous les plans dans le strict respect des textes et lois en vigueur.

3-Assurer la gestion des affaires publiques dans tous les domaines dans nos zones respectives.

4-Permettre la sécurisation et la libre circulation des personnes et des biens, ainsi que des organisations humanitaires internationales en activitédans le Nord-Est et leur demandant d'observer les principes de la neutralité et d'impartialité

5-Demander aux pays voisins de procéder à l'ouverture des couloirs humanitaires en vue du retour des réfugiés dans leurs foyers habituels sous l'égide des agences humanitaires des Nations-Unies et des pays amis et leur procurer de l'assistance humanitaire nécessaire.

6- Condamner énergiquement le réarmement des milices Anti-balakas ,la passivité et l'inaction du gouvernement et de la communauté internationale au sujet des atteintes flagrantes aux droits humains, d'extrême gravité perpétrées par les milices Anti-balakas dans les provinces du Sud-Ouest à l'égard des minorités rendues esclaves et sans la moindre protection.

Ainsi prononcée la présente déclaration solennelle ce jour 19 Octobre 2016 pour servir et valoir de feuille de route.

L'ASSEMBLEE GENERALE

Le Présidium

GENERAL DAMAN ZAKARIA

AMIT IDRISS

Annex 5.3: Explanatory statement issued in advance of the Bria "General Assembly". Document obtained by the Panel on 22 October 2016 from a confidential source.



EXPOSE DE MOTIFS

I- GENESE D'UNE CRISE LATENTE

Par nord-est centrafricain, on entend le Bure sud-est du bassin du Tchad située en Républi Centrafricaine, et particulièrement l'espace circonscrit au nord par le Bahr Aouk et l'Aoukale, q ~~marque la frontière avec le Tchad, et au sud par le Koukourou et la ligne de partage des eaux ent~~ le bassin secondaire de l'Aouk et celui de la Chinko. D'une superficie totale de 191.350 km² et u population d'environ 500.800 habitants, soit une densité de 2 habitants au kilomètre carré. E constitue historiquement la région du Dar El Kouti ou du Fertit qui regroupe les préfectures de Haute-kotto, de la Vakaga et du Bamingui-Bangoran. Elle est limitée à l'est par le Soudan du Sud la préfecture du Haut-Mbomou, à l'ouest par la préfecture de la Nana-Gribizi, au nord par le Tch au nord-est par le Soudan du nord et au sud par les préfectures de la Ouaka, de la Basse-Kotto et Mbomou

Avant l'indépendance de la RCA, cette région était autonome suivant le traité signé en 1897 entre République Française, représentée par son administrateur colonial, Emile Gentil et le Pays de Da Kouti représenté par Mohamed El-SENOUSSI (cf traité). Ce traité politique a permis l'administration coloniale française à reconnaitre l'autorité politique du Dar El Kouti et autonomie par l'ouverture de l'Ambassade de France à NDELE en 1900 représenté par commandant MERCURY. Cet instrument juridique international établi en français et en arabe, a signé après la conférence de Berlin qui a acté le partage de l'Afrique. L'arrêté du 12 octobre 1909 gouverneur général, publié au journal officiel du 15 octobre 1909, page 396, a reaffirmé l'autono de cette localité. Plusieurs années, après avoir été annexée de force, la région du Dar El KOU connu et continu de connaitre les difficultés de tous ordres : persécution, discriminati marginalisation, tribalisme, clanisme et régionalisme qui ont été érigés en mode de gestion de l' par les régimes successifs.

Cette région est l'une des plus défavorisées du pays et se caractérise entre autres, par l'absence structures administratives et socioéconomiques, l'absence d'infrastructures routie conséquences de l'inégalité de chance et l'inégalité dans la répartition des actions développement.

Outré par cette injustice sociale, des mouvements de révolte ont été créés à partir de 200 n'avaient pour revendication que le développement socioéconomique de la région.

Pour répondre aux exigences des groupes armés, différents accords ont été signés :

- l'accord de Syrtes en Lybie le 3 février 2007 ;
- l'accord de cessation des hostilités de Birao, le 13 avril 2007 ;
- l'accord de cessez-le feu et de paix, signé le 09 mai 2008 à Libreville ;
- l'accord de paix globale signé le 21 juin 2008 à Libreville ;
- les recommandations du dialogue politique inclusif de Bangui du 20 décembre 2008
- L'accord de paix du 26 Aout 2011 à Bangui.

Ces différends accords de paix ainsi que les recommandations du dialogue national de 2003 e dialogue politique inclusif de 2008 n'ont pas été suivies d'effet.

Ayant compris que ces accords n'ont servi que d'alibi pour permettre au régime de BOZIZE gagner du temps face aux différentes réclamations, les groupes armés se sont regroupés et ont la SELEKA en 2012. Face à l'avancée spectaculaire de cette rébellion, BOZIZE et ses acolytes ont l'organisation terroriste COCORA, dirigée par le défunt Lévis YAKITE et Josué BINOUA et distribué des armes et des machettes puis erigé des barrières partout dans le pays afin d'ident et exterminer tous les musulmans et ressortissants du nord-est. La communauté internationale intervenue pour faire signer le 11 Janvier 2013 à Libreville un autre accord politique. Cet ac prevoyait entre autres, le demantelement des barrieres, la liberation des détenus et le partag pouvoir en tenant compte du double équilibre confessionnel et regional.

En rentrant de Libreville, BOZIZE a fait semblant de dissoudre le COCORA mais fait créer la CC dirigé par Stève YAMBETE, qui a poursuivi les mêmes objectifs de COCORA.

Il convient de rappeler que cet accord, obtenu sous la pression de la communauté internation n'a pas été appliqué par le régime de BOZIZE. C'est ainsi que la SELEKA s'est vue obliger de pre le pouvoir par la force le 24 Mars 2013, afin de rétablir l'équilibre socio-économique.

Cependant, la SELEKA a été infiltrée par les éléments du régime de BOZIZE qui se sont illustrés des exactions au nom de cette dernière. Des campagnes médiatiques mensongères en d'adhérer à la communauté internationale à leur causes ont fait croire à une guerre religieuse et engagé le pays dans une spirale de violence sans précédent.

Imbu de son statut d'homme d'Etat, épris de paix, le Président DJOTODIA avait devant homologues, les Chefs d'Etat de la CEEAC, accepté de démissionner, pour préserver la paix et l'u nationale, en date du 10 janvier 2014. Ainsi, la transition devait être gérée en vertu de l'accor NDJAMENA en tenant compte du double equilibre confessionnel et régional, pour conduire la na aux élections libres et transparentes. Malheureusement après cette démission, la situation s envenimée et l'on a assisté à une stratégie d'extermination et de destruction de biens meuble immeubles ainsi que les lieux de culte des musulmanes, sous un regard indifférent, complice d communauté internationale et des dignitaires religieux chrétiens.

Après son élection à la magistrature suprême de l'Etat, la Présidente de la transition, n'a respecté les accords de Ndjaména. C'est après le FORUM de Brazzaville que madame la Préside de la transition a unilatéralement nommé un chef de gouvernement musulman. Cet équilibre a que les engagements solennels de l'Organisation de la Coopération Islamique (OCI) pris au som de Ndjaména le 19 Décembre 2015 ont décrispé partiellement le climat délétère qui ont abou l'organisation du forum national de Bangui, les élections référendaires, présidentielles et législat afin de mettre fin à la transition chancelante. La population du nord-est croyait que les maux minent la société centrafricaine allaient trouver des réponses à leurs préoccupions dans le fo national de Bangui, dans la nouvelle constitution et les élections présidentielles et législative 2016. Malheureusement, force est de constater que la pratique des nouvelles autorités politiq est loin de donner une assurance. Car, le contexte actuel démontre à suffisance le mépris à l'é

du centrafricain de Nord-est , rendant impossible la cohabitation avec les autres communauté
communauté internationale s'enlise du jour en jour dans la crise centrafricaine

II- CONTEXTE ACTUEL

Les actes politiques posés au quotidien par le régime du Président TOUADERA s'inscrivant dan logique du régime de BOZIZE. La mauvaise gouvernance, la politique d'exclusion et la démago compromettent inéluctablement les efforts de cohabitation entre les différentes communau d'une part et d'autre part, entre les populations du nord-est et celles du reste du pays

II-1 La mauvaise gouvernance

II-1.1 La désignation des autorités politiques

Le Président TOUADERA a nommé son directeur de campagne Simplice Mathieu SARANDJI qui fu son directeur de cabinet au poste de premier ministre, alors que ce poste devait être attribué à un musulman du nord-est, selon le principe de l'équilibre régional et confessionnel, consacré par les recommandations du forum de Bangui et la nouvelle constitution.

Il a systématiquement réfuté l'idée d'un accord politique avec les forces d'opposition armées avant le processus du DDRR. C'est une stratégie qui consiste à pérenniser sans doute les conflits. Sous ce prétexte, il a procédé à la désignation des membres du gouvernement en excluant les ex-séléka, alors que les leaders de la milice anti balaka sont nommés à des postes ministériels. Les populations du nord-est ne sont pas toutes représentées, à l'exemple de la préfecture de la Haute-Kotto qui ne dispose pas de représentant au gouvernement.

Aucun musulman ne faisait partie du cabinet présidentiel. Suite aux critiques de la communauté internationale et même nationale, le Président TOUADERA a repêché deux musulmans à son Cabinet aux postes périphériques, pour tromper les partenaires afin d'obtenir des financements.

Le Cabinet de la Primature a été une fois de plus une illustration remarquable de la haine et de l'exclusion. Aucun musulman sur les trente quatre membres du cabinet. Est-ce là une attitude tendant à encourager la cohésion sociale et la cohabitation entre les différentes communautés ? Rien de surprenant car tout comme BOZIZE et son entourage, TOUADERA étant vice président du KNK, Premier Ministre sous BOZIZE pendant plus de cinq ans, ne saurait apporter du nouveau au peuple centrafricain, moins encore aux ressortissants du nord-est, qui l'avaient évincé du pouvoir. Selon un adage populaire, « *L'on ne peut transformer un cœur endurci par la haine* »

II-1.2 L'impunité comme mode de gestion : le favoritisme et le recyclage des anti-balaka

Le Président TOUADERA prône la tolérance zéro à l'égard des auteurs de crime de guerre et de crimes contre l'humanité. Cependant il faut comprendre que cette attitude de fermeté ne vise que les ressortissants du nord-est. La preuve en est que les grands criminels notoirement connu et faisant l'objet de poursuites judiciaires et de mandats d'arrêt, sont en liberté et participent à la gestion des affaires publiques. Pour les encourager dans leurs entreprises criminelles, certains sont élus député de la nation et jouissent de l'immunité (Bertin BEA et Alfred YEKATOM Alias RAMBO) ; d'autres font partie de la sécurité rapprochée du Président de la république (Eugène NGAIKOISSET Alias le boucher de Paoua et Olivier KOUDEMON alias BANGOUMA) ; et d'autres encore nommés à des postes de responsabilité à l'exemple de Jean-serge BOKASSA, pourtant auteur des actes de criminalité de septembre et octobre 2015, est nommé Ministre de l'Intérieur et de l'Administration du Territoire, interlocuteur de la MINUSCA. Les anti balaka et les anciens dignitaires du régime de BOZIZE bénéficient des traitements particuliers. Entre temps, les ressortissants du nord-est qui ont fui pour sauver leur vie et se retrouvent soit à l'étranger ou dans le nord-est sont systématiquement démis de leurs fonctions, radiés de la fonction publique, remplacés ou qualifiés de rebelles et recherchés par la justice.

II-1.3 Partialité de la justice

Il est également à noter que la justice centrafricaine n'est pas impartiale. Car, la population du nord-est se demande pourquoi la justice centrafricaine n'a pas empêché les candidatures de Serge BOKASSA, Alfred YEKATOM, Bertin BEA, Thierry LIBERE Alias 12 puissances et le député de Nola aux élections législatives et présidentielles.

Lors de la dernière session criminelle qui s'est tenue à Bangui, la plus part des criminels anti-balaka ont été purement et simplement acquittés, en dépit des actes ignobles qu'ils ont commis sur les musulmans et dont certains ont même reconnu les faits. Tous les anti balaka libérés ont ainsi repris les armes et certains sont aperçus dans la région de Damara, fief du Président TOUADERA. Par conséquent, la population du nord-est ne fait plus confiance à la justice centrafricaine.

II-1.4 La réorganisation et le réarmement de la milice anti balaka

Le retour aisé de Francis BOZIZE, fils de l'ancien Président François BOZIZE n'est pas un fait du hasard. Le Président TOUADERA a fait appel à celui qui avait organisé et planifié le massacre des ressortissants du nord-est en général et des musulmans en particulier, pour continuer son œuvre de persécution et d'extermination de cette communauté. C'est pourquoi, dès son arrivée, Francis BOZIZE s'est remis au travail en multipliant les contacts et en se rendant régulièrement dans certaines provinces pour tenir des réunions avec les responsables anti balaka. En dépit de son arrestation par la MINUSCA en vertu d'un mandat de justice, il a été remis en liberté et est désormais libre de ses mouvements. Depuis lors, les anti balaka montent en puissance car, à chaque fois que le Président TOUADERA se rend dans une localité, les milices anti balaka sont dotées en armes et tentent de reprendre du terrain aux ex-séléka. Les récentes violences de Kaga Bandoro en sont une illustration. Le nommé Maxime MOKOME, auteur de ces violences est parti de Damara, fief du Président TOUADERA. A l'heure actuelle, le gouvernement a recruté plus de 2000 anti-balaka qui sont formés et opérationnels sous la bannière des FACA.

II-1.5 L'irresponsabilité et la partialité de la société civile de Bangui

La société civile de Bangui qui, en principe a pour rôle de contrôler les actions du gouvernement et défendre le bien être de la population sans discrimination, s'illustre également par des prises de position politique contre les communautés du nord-est. Les leaders comme Gervais LAKOSSO, Joseph BENDOUNGA, Hyacinthe GBIEGBA, Joseph BENDOUMI et autres ont fait des appels publics d'incitation à la haine et à la violence contre les musulmans et les médias sont transformés en outils de propagation de la haine anti musulmane.

D'ailleurs, cette société civile a prouvé ses limites en acceptant la démission du Président DJOTODIA à l'étranger. Quelle humiliation pour un Etat indépendant depuis plus de deux générations ? L'on comprend aisément par ce qu'il s'agit d'un musulman.

II-2 Impossibilité de cohabitation

Depuis les évènements du 5 décembre 2013, la majorité des populations du nord-est en général et des musulmans en particulier ont soit quitté le pays, soit regagné le nord. Celles qui n'ont pu sortir ont été regroupées et vivent depuis lors dans l'enclave du KM5. Pendant que le gouvernement organise et planifie le retour des déplacés chrétiens dans leurs quartiers respectifs, il n'y a aucune initiative gouvernementale concernant les déplacés musulmans. Les tentatives de nettoyage ou de retours dans leurs quartiers d'origines se sont soldées par des violences. Leurs passages même dans d'autres quartiers de Bangui sont toujours sécurisés par la MINUSCA. Les musulmans sont toujours escortés pour se rendre vers le nord-est. Malgré tout, ils sont souvent victimes de multiples tractations de la part des forces de l'ordre. Ils sont considérés comme des étrangers et déclarés non grata. Pourtant au nord-est et dans les zones où vivent les musulmans, ceux-ci et les non musulmans cohabitent ensemble et vivent en parfaite harmonie.

Par ailleurs, les anti balaka et la population de Grimari ont érigé des barricades dans ladite ville empêchant la déportation des éléments détenues de l'UPC vers Kaga Bandoro aux fins de leur cantonnement. Le vivre ensemble est devenu impossible dans la vie courante, dans les établissements scolaires et Universitaire, dans les milieux socioprofessionnels. A titre d'exemple il suffit d'être dans les convois qui effectuent les tronçons Bangui-Bandoro et Bangui-Bambari pour se rendre compte des souffrances des musulmans. Il est interdit aux musulmans de faire la prière dans les villages situés sur ces tronçons sous peine de lynchage. Il faut noter que certains musulmans qui essaient de revenir dans certaines préfectures sont contraints à se reconvertir au christianisme. C'est pourquoi on trouve beaucoup de peulhs dans les églises des préfectures de Nana-Mambère, de Mambéré Kadeï et de la Lobaye, rendus en état d'esclavage par les anti-balaka sans la moindre protection.

Les maisons abandonnés par les musulmans ou ressortissants du nord-est sont soit vendues ou détruites et les terrains servent de dépôt d'ordures, de footballs et de fabrication de parpaing. Celles qui ne sont pas détruites sont occupées ou mises en location par les bourreaux.

Cette situation perdure depuis près de trois ans et rien ne prouve que les anti balaka et les populations du centre sont prêts à accepter les musulmans et les ressortissants du nord-est. Surtout

TOUADERA au pouvoir à tel point que les récents événements de Kaga Bandoro sont commandités par l'ex premier Ministre Nicolas Tiangaye et l'actuel ministre de la sécurité et de l'administration du territoire Jean serges BOKASSA. L'espoir de cohabitation et de reconstruction de notre pays est définitivement compromis du moment où, c'est le pouvoir même qui entretient les violences intercommunautaires. Il suffit d'interroger les citoyens Banguissois ou des régions environnantes pour se rendre compte que plus de 90% de centrafricains chrétiens du sud rejettent les populations du nord-est et ne sont pas prêts à faire la paix avec elles.

Ces différents faits ont été corroborés par un groupe d'enquêteurs des Nations-Unies qui ont mentionne dans leur rapport « *Les echecs à résoudre des causes profondes du conflit* » par le Président TOUADERA.

D'ailleurs, le Secrétaire Général des Nations-Unies avait déjà lors de sa visite à Bangui en date du 5 avril 2014, reconnu qu' « *Une épuration ethnico-religieuse est une réalité* » en Centrafrique.

En dépit de tous ces constats, les musulmans et ressortissants de la région du nord-est de la République Centrafricaine continuent d'être persécutés et discriminés sous un regard indifférent de la communauté internationale.

III- L'AMBIGUÏTE DANS LE ROLE DE LA COMMUNAUTE INTERNATIONALE EN RCA

Après la fuite du Président BOZIZE, tout allait de mieux en mieux, lorsque la société civile politisée s'est mise à dénaturer les faits pour faire croire que l'ex rébellion SELEKA qui était au pouvoir tuait systématiquement tout sujet chrétien. C'est ainsi que les mouvements COCORA et COAC ont été transformés en anti balaka et dirigés par François BOZIZE et ses scribes.

Après le cout d'Etat manqué du 5 décembre 2013, la société civile chrétiennes et l'Eglise catholique dirigée par monseigneur Dieudonne NZAPALAYINGA ce qui lui a valu le titre de cardinal faisaient croire à la communauté internationale dans une déclaration des évêques et la plate forme religieuse avec les ministres des affaires étrangères de la France que les assaillants armés n'étaient que des patriotes. D'où la mission SANGARIS dirigée contre la communauté musulmane. Nous nous réservons le droit de saisir la justice internationale le moment venu puisque, nous disposons de preuves irréfragables des actions concertées menées par la SANGARIS et les anti balaka contre la communauté musulmane.

La MINUSCA qui devait également jouer un rôle d'interposition, s'est parfois enlisée sur le terrain au coté des anti balaka constitués pour la plupart, des FACA et des ex gardes présidentielles de BOZIZE. Les ressortissants du nord-est n'ont aucune chance dans le processus de restructuration de l'armée centrafricaine soutenue par la MINUSCA. En dépit de l'embargo sur les armes, la levée partielle de l'embargo sur les diamants centrafricains du sud-ouest par le processus de Kimberley au detriment du nord-est ayant permis au gouvernement l'achat des armes de guerre ; la MINUSCA a laissé le champ libre au gouvernement qui a mobilisé les anti-balaka réarmés tout au long de la route Bangui-Kaga Bandoro, ainsi que dans d'autres provinces. Lesquelles perpétuent les exactions sur les paisibles citoyens du nords-est voulant se rendre à Bangui ou regagner la région sous prétexte de contrôle. Alors que, sur le corridor Bangui-Douala, les véhicules circulent librement. Ce qui revient à



dire que la MINUSCA favorise si non, contribue à la persécution des musulmans et des ressortissants du nord-est.

Cette paisible population marginalisée par les régimes successifs qui ont adopté une politique éducative restrictive dans la région du nord-est, n'aura pas la chance de s'épanouir dans la nouvelle armée. Pourtant lors du forum de Bangui, les Rwandais ont témoigné de la réussite du système de restructuration de leur armée, composée des rebelles, des génocidaires et des forces loyalistes. Aucun élément armé n'a été exclu. Le Tchad a réussi la cohésion sociale à travers l'incorporation dans l'armée de tous les ex rebelles. La population du nord-est pensait qu'au sortir de ce forum et des élections, la restructuration de l'armée allait tenir compte de ces modèles. Malheureusement, le processus de restructuration en cours présente un caractère exclusif et ne favorise pas le vivre ensemble. En conséquence, la population du nord-est ne peut faire confiance à une armée constituée sans ses ressortissants. Il en est de même pour les forces de sécurité intérieure.

Ce qu'il faut retenir est qu'il y a impossibilité de cohabitation et incompatibilité entre la population centrafricaine chrétienne du sud-ouest d'une part et les musulmans et ressortissants de la région du nord-est d'autre part. Personne ne veut plus sentir l'autre. Il suffit d'évoquer la réconciliation avec l'une des communautés pour susciter une colère inattendue de l'autre. La seule présence d'un musulman parmi des chrétiens du sud-ouest entraine automatiquement son lynchage et engendre des violences. Par contre les Chrétiens et les Musulmans vivent en symbiose dans le nord-est. Les tentatives de réconciliation entre les deux communautés étant impossibles, il faut alors les séparer pour calmer les ardeurs et vivre en paix, cela nous permettra de mieux réfléchir et peut être de nous réunifier plus tard, lorsque les germes de la violence et de la haine auront disparu. Lorsqu'il y aura une nouvelle élite après deux générations de part et d'autre, imbues d'un sens élevé de l'humanité, respectueuses des droits de l'homme et de la raison de faire la politique. Cette proposition est l'unique et meilleure solution dans notre cas précis. Ainsi, chaque peuple pourra se réorganiser et adopter son modèle de développement et l'avenir nous dira lequel des deux peuples était le meilleur. Cette solution qui permet d'éviter des guerres et des morts peut satisfaire tout le monde et ne sera pas la première. D'ailleurs, de nombreux pays se sont divisés par le passé à savoir : l'Allemagne, l'Inde et le Pakistan, l'Haïti et la République Dominicaine, la Yougoslavie, la Tchécoslovaquie, le saint Martin, le Chypre, le Soudan du Sud, l'Erythrée, la Crimée, la Serbie et le Kossovo en sont des exemples.

Avec la stratégie d'extermination, les discours extrémistes, les incompatibilités de plus en plus manifestes qui s'expriment, une partition ne serait-elle pas, une très bonne solution ?

D'ailleurs, de nombreux instruments internationaux tels que la charte des Nations-Unies, la Déclaration Universelle des Droits de l'Homme et la Charte Africaine des Droits de l'Homme et des Peuples interdisent et sanctionnent la discrimination, l'injustice et surtout la persécution et le génocide d'un peuple ou d'une communauté. Ces textes reconnaissent également le droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes et le droit à l'autodétermination.

La Cour Internationale de Justice, saisie par l'Assemblée générale des Nations-Unies, à l'initiative de la Serbie, d'une demande d'avis consultatif sur la légalité de la déclaration d'indépendance du Kossovo, a dans son avis en date du 22 juillet 2010 conclu que « *L'adoption de la déclaration d'indépendance… n'a violé aucune règle de droit international* ».

Qu'en est-il pour le cas Centrafricain ?

Fait à Bria, le 18 Octobre 2016

Annex 5.4: New FPRC structure. Document obtained by the Panel on 22 October 2016 from a confidential source.



FRONT POPULAIRE POUR
LA RENAISSANCE DE CENTRAFRIQUE

HAUT CONSEIL SUPREME

COMITE D'ORGANISATION DE
L'ASSEMBLEE GENERALE

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
Unité -Dignité -Travail

RAPPORT DE SYNTHESE DE L'ASSEMBLEE GENERALE

Du 18 au 19 Octobre Deux Mille Seize, s'est tenue à Bria une Assemblée Générale organisée par le FRONT POPULAIRE POUR LA RENNAISSANCE DE CENTRAFRIQUE (FPRC) au cours de laquelle ont pris par certaines entités politico-militaires actives dans le Nord-Est du pays.

L'objectif de cette Assemblée Générale vise essentiellement à la réorganisation de la chaine de commandement militaire, de la coordination politique et de ses structures techniques.

Pour cette circonstance précise un comité d'organisation a été mis en place et se compose de :

Président :G I DAMANE ZAKARIA ;

Vice-Président : AMIT IDRISS

1ER Rapporteur : GUISMALA HAMZA

2em Rapporteur : AHMED SENOUSSI ;

3em Rapporteur : IBRAHIM ASSIL ;

Membres :-BRAHIM ABDOULAYE Corneille

-AOUADALA Saint-Romain ;

-ACHIMENE SELEMANE ;

- DEYA-NGASSA Albert ;

-BABALA ABDRAHAMANE.

Un comité consultatif a été créé et est compose de :

-HAROUNE GUEYE

MOULOUD MOUSSA-TERAP

-ABDALLAH YOUSSOUF

-ZOUNDEIKO Joseph

-IBRAHIM SAFADINE.

La séance a été ouverte le Mardi 18 Octobre à 10h 26mn par les mots de bienvenues et de remerciements adressés aux invités et aux participants par le GI DAMANE ZAKARIA, suivi de l'allocution d'ouverture prononcée par Mr AMIT IDRISS au cours de laquelle il a mis un accent particulier sur :

- Les aléas de la vie sociopolitiques et sécuritaire dans le pays ;
- Les raisons des dysfonctionnements de la chaîne de commandement militaire et de la coordination générale ;
- L'importance de la tenue de cette Assemblée Générale pour définir un avenir politique promoteur.

A la fin de l'allocution d'ouverture, la séance a été suspendue pour permettre le retrait des officiels.

Les travaux se sont poursuivis par des consultations et ont pris fin a 15h 30mn.

A la reprise de la séance le Mercredi 19 Octobre 2016 a 8h 00mn, les travaux se sont poursuivis par les consultations jusqu'à 10h 00mn.

La plénière a démarré à 11h 18mn par :

1-La présentation et l'adoption du nouvel organigramme de fonctionnement interne.

2-La composition des membres du Haut Conseil Suprême (HCS) et du Conseil National de Défense et de Sécurité (CNDS) .

A-HAUT CONSEIL SUPREME(HCS)

-Président : GI NOURADINE ADAM

-Vice- Président : GI DAMANE ZAKARIA

B-CONSEIL NATIONAL DE DEFENSE ET DE SECURITE (CNDS)

-Président : ABDOULAYE HESSENE-RAMADANE

-Cependant. la désignation des autres membres du CNDS et des bureaux techniques se fera ultérieurement en fonction de l'organigramme.

Par ailleurs, la coordination générale qui est l'aile politique et ses structures techniques seront mises en place par le HAUT CONSEIL SUPREME.

3-La lecture des recommandations spéciales du CNDS.

4-la déclaration finale.

Enfin, les discours de clôture de l'Assemblée Générale ont été prononcés par le Gl DAMANE ZAKARIA Vice-Président du HAUT CONSEIL SUPREME et le Gl ABDOULAYE ISSENE-RAMADANE Président Du CONSEIL NATIONAL DE DEFENSE ET DE SECURITE pour marquer la fin des travaux à 13h33mn.

Fait à Bria le 19 Octobre 2016

Les Rapporteurs

1-GUISMALA HAMZA

2-AHMED SENOUSSI

3- IBRAHIM ASSIL.

Annex 5.5: LRA violence against civilians.[20]



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[20] Data from https://www.lracrisistracker.com/, accessed on 25 October 2016

Annex 5.6: Doctor Achaye's elements and structure. Pictures obtained by the Panel from a confidential source, October 2016.



Doctor Achaye



Lafoto – Commander



Habib – Trader ammunitions and goods

Structure of Doctor Achaye's group:

Team 1

1. **ACHAYE DOCTOR (Ugandan) – Top Commander**
2. **OKOT OGWIRI** (Ugandan) – Commander
3. **ROGER** (DRC) – Commander
4. **KOKILI** (Ugandan) – Commander

Team 2

1. **LAFOTO (Ugandan) – Team Commander**
2. **TONO** (Ugandan) – Commander
3. **LADO** (Soudan) – Commander

Team 3

1. **KIDEGA ALALA (Ugandan) – Team Commander**
2. **OLANYA** (Ugandan) – Commander
3. **DIEME** (Ugandan) –Commander
4. **TIPA** (DRC) – Commander

Children and Young People

Team 4

1. **ABALE: (DRC) – Team Commander**
2. **ADIE:** (DRC)
3. **JACQUES**: (DRC)
4. **MAKITOSHA** (CAR)
5. **ANDRE** (CAR)

Team 5

1. **FREDDY (DRC) - Adama-Village – Team Commander**
2. **GBOLU** (CAR)-
3. **JEAN** (DRC)
4. **ADJOKA** (CAR)
5. **ANSELME** (CAR)

Team 6

1. **BOBIRO (DRC) – Team Commander**
2. **SEMI** (DRC)
3. **OBO** (DRC)
4. **INDY** (DRC)
5. **ANGANYA** (CAR)
6. **KALAWA** (DRC)

Annex 5.7: Weapons confiscated from poachers by the Chinko Project, and a sample of a process verbal related to a weapons seizure and handover to the Chinko Project. Photograph and document obtained by the Panel on 12 October 2016 from the Chinko Project.





PROCES VERBAL N°001/016

L'an deux mil seize et le trois du mois de Février, nous Sous-lieutenant **MBENGA NZONGOMBLO Ponce-Pilate** Chef de section chargé de discipline et application des lois au projet Chinko, officier de police judiciaire assermenté avec résidence à Kocho, assisté des éco-gardes (Rangers) composant l'équipe de patrouille avons procédé à des saisies des matériels ci-après :

-Deux (2) armes kalachnikov **AK47**

1-N° 563916946;

2-N° 5635071499;

-Trois chargeurs AK47

-58 munitions

Les matériels saisis sont déposés à l'entrepôt du projet.

Cette opération a été effectuée à l'issue d'une patrouille légère d'observation dans la zone du projet précisément le long de la rivière Kocho à 11 heures 30 minutes. A notre arrivé, les peuls surpris à très courte distance ont pris la fuite sans avoir le temps de récupérer les armes retrouvées.

L'équipe de la dite patrouille se compose comme suit :

- S/lt **MBENGA Ponce-Pilate** : chef de mission
- Monsieur **ABROU Teddy** : Chef de groupe (Ranger)
- Monsieur **NIKABINOU Trésor** : Element (Ranger)
- Monsieur **BONDO Nadin** : Element (Ranger)
- Monsieur **BINGA Arsene Omer** : Element (Ranger)
- Monsieur **KETTE Philemon** : Element (Ranger)
- Monsieur **ZAKO Jolidon** : Element conducteur (Ranger)
- Monsieur **OUSMANE** : Interprète traducteur

En foi de quoi le présent procès verbal est établi pour servir et valoir ce que de droit.

Fait à Kocho le 03 Février 2016

Le Chef de section chargé de discipline et application des lois

Sous-lieutenant **MBENGA NZONGOMBLO Ponce-Pilate**

Annex 6.1: Communiqué dated 18 September 2016 by the Government of the Central African Republic on the deployment of national security forces to Kaga-Bandoro. Document obtained by the Panel on 21 September 2016 from a confidential source.



Communiqué gouvernemental

Centrafricains, Centrafricaines,
Chers Compatriotes,

Dans la journée du Samedi 17 Septembre 2016, des éléments du groupe Balaka sous la houlette d'un dénommé **GAZAMODO**, répondant à l'aile **Bertrand MOKOM,** ont installé en toute illégalité une barrière routière aux abords du village de NDOEMETTE a l'entrée de la ville de **KAGA–BANDORO.**

Les Ex SELEKA, informés de la situation ont vivement réagit, afin de déloger ces Balakas, parvenant ainsi à les mettre en déroute.

Dans leur lancée, les éléments des Ex Sélékas, s'en sont violemment pris aux biens de pauvres et paisibles populations avoisinantes.

Informé de ces troubles à l'ordre public, Son Excellence Professeur Faustin Achange TOUADERA, Président de la République Chef de l'Etat, depuis New York ou il prend part à **l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies, a immédiatement instruit Monsieur** le Premier Ministre, aux fins de dépêcher un détachement des forces de Sécurité Intérieure; à savoir **Police et**

Gendarmerie, avec l'appui de la **MINUSCA**, dans le but de mettre un terme à ces exactions.

C'est ainsi, qu'à l'heure où je m'adresse à vous chers compatriotes, ces opérations vigoureuses et musclées conjointement menées par nos forces de sécurités sont toujours en cours aux alentours de KAGA BANDORO.

Le Gouvernement lance un appel pressant à tous les compatriotes animés d'un esprit de violence à cesser immédiatement leurs exactions !

Le Gouvernement, tient également à rassurer les paisibles populations de ces localités, qu'il ne ménagera aucun effort afin de rétablir la Paix et la Sécurité sur l'ensemble du territoire national.

Fait à Bangui, le 18 septembre 2016

Le Ministre Porte Parole du Gouvernement
Théodore JOUSSO

Je vous remercie

Annex 6.2: MPC and RJ fighters being fully equipped, wearing military uniforms of various origin and armed with various types of assault rifles, such as Vector R4 assault rifles.

Photographs of MPC elements taken by the Panel on its mission at Beboye 3 on 19 August 2016.



Photographs taken by the Panel on its mission between Paoua and Bembere on 20 August 2016.

Annex 6.3: Arrest warrants against Colonel Luther (RJ), issued on 17 June 2016. Document obtained by the Panel on 30 August 2016 from a confidential source.



COUR D'APPEL DE BOUAR
****
TRIBUNAL DE GRANDE
INSTANCE DE PAOUA
****
PARQUET DU PROCUREUR

N°[illegible] *CA BG/TGI P/ PP 16*

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
Unité – Dignité – Travail

MANDAT D'ARRET

AU NOM DU PEUPLE CENTRAFRICAIN

Nous, Narcisse DANBOY OUEFIO, Procureur de la République près le Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paoua,

Vu les dispositions pertinentes des alinéas premiers des articles ***28***[1] et ***29***[2] du Code de Procédure Pénale ;

Vu l'accord d'Etablissement entre la République Centrafricaine et la MINUSCA ;

Vu les pièces de la procédure judiciaire suivie contre **NDOTAR Luther**

Mandons et ordonnons

A tous dépositaires ou Agents de la Force Publique et AUX FORCES DE LA MINUSCA basées à Paoua d'arrêter et de conduire devant NOUS en se conformant à la Loi ;

Le (la) nommé(e) : NDOTAR Luther
Domicilié(e) : à BEDAM
Inculpé de : Coups et Blessures Volontaires, Séquestration.

Requérons tous dépositaires et Agents de la Force Publique auquel le présent mandat sera exhibé, de prêter main forte pour son exécution.

Fait à Parquet, 17 juin 2016.

LE PROCUREUR DE LA REPUBLIQUE

Narcisse DANBOY OUEFIO
MAGISTRAT

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[1] - *« Le Procureur de la République reçoit les plaintes et les dénonciations et apprécie la suite à leur donner ».*

[2] - *« Le Procureur de la République procède ou fait procéder à tous les actes nécessaires à la recherche et à la poursuite des infractions à la loi pénale ».*

Annex 6.4: Dismissal of Armel Sayo as RJ's President by Colonel Raymond Belanga on 22 April 2016. Document obtained by the Panel on 25 August 2016 from a confidential source.



Révolution Justice
****
Etat-major de R J
****
Les Principaux Lieutenants de R J
****

République Centrafricaine
Unité-Dignité-Travail
****

26/04/16
4h15

DECISION

Portant destitution du Président de Révolution Justice (R J)

Vu les comportements égoistes et hypocrites de Monsieur SAYO-MINGATOLOUM Armel vis- à-vis des combattants sur le terrain ;

Vu l'érigration du mouvement R J en parti Politique dénommé OPRJ (Organisation Patriotique pour la Révolution et Justice) sans informer les principaux Lieutenants ;

Vu le constat des hommes non Combattant envoyés sans le consentement de principaux Lieutenants sur le terrain pour le recensement des groupements ;

Vu le refus d'aller à la base politique de BEMAIDE depuis sa nomination au Gouvernement de Transition.

Les principaux Lieutenants

Décident

Article 1er : Monsieur **SAYO MNGATOLOUM Armel** est destitué à la tête du Mouvement Révolution Justice (R J) de la zone Nord Ouest conformément au conseil d'Etat major R J

Article 2 : **Le Chef d'Etat-major le Colonel BELANGA Raymond** est désormais désigné comme **Président de RJ** jusqu'à nouvel ordre.

Article 3 : le pouvoir exécutif dirigé par le président de la République, le premier ministre ; le pouvoir législatif ; le pouvoir judiciaire ; les partenaires opérationnels (Ambassade de France, Ambassade d'Amérique ; Union Européenne, Minusca ; ONG...) sont chargés du respect scrupuleux de la présente décision

Article 4 : la décision qui ne doit souffrir d'aucune dérogation entre en vigueur à compter de la date de sa signature et sera communiquée et publiée partout où besoin sera.

Fait à Bémaïde, le 22 Avril 2016

Le Chef d'Etat-Major

Colonel Raymon BELANGA

REVOLUTION JUSTICE RCA
LE CHEF D'ETAT MAJOR

Ampliations :

- Présidence de la République ;
- Primature
- Assemblée Nationale ;
- Ministère de la Justice ;
- Ministère de l'Intérieur et de l'Administration
- Ministère de la Défense Nationale ;
- Ambassade de la France ;
- Ambassade d'Amérique ;
- Union Européenne ;
- Minusca ;
- CEEAC ;
- Radio Centrafrique
- Préfet de l'Ouham-Pendé
- Préfet de l'Ouham ;
- Sous-Préfet de Paoua ;
- Président du TGI de Paoua ;
- Comsite Minusca de Paoua ;
- Les autres, Groupes Armés ;
- Les presses écrites ;
- L'Intéressé ;
- Les Archives ;

Annex 6.5: RJ structure as decided by Armel Sayo on 19 September 2016. Document obtained by the Panel on 25 September 2016 from a confidential source.



REVOLUTION JUSTICE

DECiSON N°0021/20016/0009/0017
PORTANT REORGANISATION DE L'ETAT-MAJOR,
ET
NOMINATION DES NOUVEAUX MEMBRES.

Sur proposition des officiers supérieurs et le conseil dudit mouvement entendu ; monsieur MINGATOLOUM-SAYO Armel, président du mouvement politico-militaire Révolution Justice

DECIDE :

Article 1 : L'ancien Etat-Major militaire de Révolution Justice est suspendu et remplacé par une nouvelle équipe.

Article 2 : La nouvelle équipe est constituée d'un Etat-Major, puis d'une coordination ; Les deux affiliées à un organe politique animé par le président du mouvement monsieur **MINGATOLOUM-SAYO Armel** puis de quelques conseillers politiques.

Article 3 : Sont nommés membres d'Etat-Major puis de la coordination

- CHEF D'ETAT-MAJOR: **le Général de brigade BETOUGAM Luther**
- CHEF D'ETAT-MAJOR ADJOINT: **le ~~Général de brigade NDAMBE Joël~~** Colonel ADEMADJI NGOT

DES COORDONATEURS

- COORDONATEUR Général: **Colonel BESSAIN Urbain**
- COORDONATEUR Général adjoint : **Colonel DEROUMGOTO Paulin**
- COORDONATEUR zone BOCARANGA : **Colonel NEKOUDJOUMBAYE Séraphin**
- COORDONATEUR zone BOZOUM : **Colonel NGALLA Crizologue**

Article 4 : La présente décision qui prend effet a compté de la date de sa signature, abroge toutes dispositions antérieures et est notifiée aux intéressés pour valoir ce que de droit.

Fait à Bédam le.......................... [illegible]

Armel MINGATOLOUM-SAYO

PRESIDENT

REVOLUTION JUSTICE

DECISION N°0020/2016/0009 PORTANT NOMINATION DES COMMANDANTS DES OPERATIONS

Il S'agit de :

- Commandant Des Operations Zone 1 Paoua :

  ........BERE.........RODRIGUE..

- Commandant Des Operations Adjoint Zone 1 Paoua:

  ........ALLAHIMADJI........GASPARD..

- Commandant Des Opertions Zone 2 Markounda : Colonel NDOYAM Emmanuel

  ~~**Colonel ADOUMADJI Ngoï**~~ KOINDOROUM NESTOR

- Commandant Des Operations Adjoint Zone 2 Markounda :

  Colonel NDOYAM Emmanuel

- Commandant Des Operations Zonne 3 Ndjim, Ngaoundaye, Bocaranga :

  Colonel KERENDYANLEY Rufin Belzone

- Commandant Des Operation Des Operations Zonne 4 Bozoum :

  Capitaine BENOUNGA Franck

Fait à Bédam le 17 12 2016

Armel MINGATOLOUM SAYO

PRESIDENT

Annex 6.6: Letter dated 24 September 2016 from Colonel Belanga reasserting his leadership over RJ and committing to participate in the DDRR process. Document obtained by the Panel on 30 September 2016 from a confidential source.



Révolution Justice (RJ)   PAOUA, le 24-09-2016

Objet: Engagement

A
Son Excellence, Ministre
Conseiler au DDRR, Jean
WILIBIRO SACKO.

Excellence,

Nous, Principaux lieutenants de Révolution Justice (RJ) BELANGA, avons pris engagement pour le Pré-DDR car la paix n'a pas de prix.

Veuillez agréer, Excellence, l'assurance de nos considérations les plus distinguées.

Pour les PrinciPaux lieutenants

REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE

Colonel ReymondBELANGA

Annex 6.7: Groupe des patriotes (GP)

The Groupe des patriotes, a splinter group of Révolution et Justice (RJ) seems to have no clear political agenda. In early 2016, the RJ/MPC coalition chased GP members away from their original base in Pougol (20 km west of Paoua). GP has played a rather marginal role in the area since (see S/2015/936, paras 143-144). GP is a loose coalition of armed men involved in criminal activities in a few places around Paoua such as Bambara, Gouze and Pende.[21] On 9 March, colonel Fidel, the leader of the group in Pende, confirmed to MINUSCA that the group has 57 children between the age of nine and 16 amongst its elements, including girls who are used as combatants and concubines. The presence of child soldiers was verified and confirmed by MINUSCA and NGOs.[22] GP is involved in the MINUSCA Community Violence Reduction program.

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[21] Meeting with confidential sources, Paoua, 9 August 2016; Confidential report, 14 September 2016.

[22] Confidential source, 16 March 2016.

Annex 7.1: Retour Réclamation et Réhabilitation (3R)

1. In September-October 2016, a cycle of clashes opposed 3R and anti-balakas fighters under local leader Ndalé in the Koui area, west of Bocaranga. Fighting first took place on 17 September, reportedly causing three deaths.[23] On 27 September, in a failed attempt to dislodge 3R from Koui, anti-balaka combatants launched a major attack on the city. Combats reportedly left nine killed and five injured.[24]

2. On 1 October, upon MINUSCA's request, General Sidiki left the city, while leaving some of his elements in town. In spite of the holding of talks between representatives of the two groups in Bouar, additional fighting took place on 11 October, causing further displacement of populations.[25]

3. Both anti-balaka leaders Patrice-Edouard Ngaissona and Maxime Mokom told the Panel that the Ndale brothers, anti-balaka leaders involved in the fight against 3R, are members of their anti-balaka group.[26]

4. On 30 September 2016, the Koui Mayor, from the Peulh community, was suspended by the Minister of Interior. This decision was interpreted by 3R leaders as a demonstration of the Government's bias in favour of anti-balaka.[27]

5. The main humanitarian incidents are related to the constant clashes between the different armed groups and their persistent attacks against the civilian population; for example, by the zone commander Sidiki, leader of the group 3R. The Fulani affiliated with 3R control the axis between Yelewa, Sabewa and Safou; they are also present in the Bouar area, including Koui.[28]

6. 3R acts as de facto authority in many locations[29] extorting the population,[30] imposing "taxes",[31] curfews,[32] illegal detentions,[33] along with looting,[34] killing[35] and injuring civilians.[36]

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[23] Confidential reports, 17 September 2016.
[24] Confidential report, 28 September 2016.
[25] Confidential report, 12 October 2016.
[26] Meeting with Maxime Mokom, Bangui, 15 August 2016. Meeting with Patrice-Edouard Ngaissona, Bangui, 14 October 2016.
[27] Confidential report, 7 October 2016.
[28] Confidential report, 16 January 2016.
[29] During the month of September, 3R basically took control of Koui's area. "On 30 Sep 2016, CMRBATT reported that the DET CDR in Koui met with 3R elements, instructing them to withdraw from Koui by midday or will be forcefully ejected by MINUSCA forces. 3R initially refused to leave on the condition that they meet anti-balaka leaders for discussion, however, requested for time to consult with Gen Sidiki for instructions. Thus, Gen Sidiki ordered his 3R elements not to leave Koui. The Muslim community in Koui are in favor of this decision by the 3R as to not leave Koui for the fear of reprisal attacks by anti-balaka. Meanwhile, the Imam promised to speak to the population on the need for 3R to leave Koui and to assure them that CMRBATT will provide protection as CMRBATT continues to patrol the town." Confidential report, 1 October 2016.
[30] Extortions reported in Niem and Service Kollo. Confidential report, 2 March 2016.
[31] Imposition of Illegal taxation at Kele Movele village, near Koui. Confidential report, 15 September 2016.
[32] Confidential report, 16 January 2016.

7. 3R's actions in Bocaranga, Poua and Koui's area during the month of September and early October caused a large number of IDPs.[37] It also produced the cessation of humanitarian operations in the area.[38]

8. On 27 September in Koui and Bocaranga Ouham Prefecture, local NGOs suspend activities while INGOs evacuated their staff to Paoua and Bangui following threats from 3R and anti-balaka elements.[39] Humanitarians were systematically threatened, looted, and physically assaulted by 3R and anti-balaka elements.[40]

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[33] Abduction and killings of farmers in Kapowal village. Confidential report, 21 March 2016.

[34] Looting of farmers' goods in Niem. Confidential report, 3 February 2016. Attacks against Bosempte and Toumbanko villages near Koui. Confidential report, 28 June 2016.

[35] Confidential report, 16 January 2016.

[36] Confidential report, 16 January 2016.

[37] An attack of anti-balaka elements against 3R stationed in Koui, on 11 October 2016, produced an influx of more than 30 persons seeking refuge in the MINUSCA CAMBATT Camp at the south entrance of Koui, while another 130 sought refuge in the MINUSCA GABBATT Camp at the north entrance. Confidential report, 12 October 2016.

[38] Clashes between 3R and Ibrahim Ndale, a local anti-balaka leader, in the areas of Bocaranga, Poua and Koui, confidential reports, 15-29 September 2016.

[39] Confidential reports, 28-30 September.

[40] Confidential report, 29 September 2016.

Annex 7.2: Anti-balaka list of coordinators showing Nice Demowance in Amada Gaza sub-prefecture. Document obtained by the Panel on 15 July 2015 from a confidential source.



ANTI BALAKA

LISTE DE PRESENCE DES COORDONATEURS ET COM – ZONES PROVENCIAUX A L'ASSEMBLEE GENERALE ELECTIVE DU BUREAU NATIONAL DU MOUVEMENT GROUPE D'AUTO DEFENCE RESISTANT PATRIOTE ANTI BAL AKA

N	NOMS	PRENOMS	FONCTIONS	ZONES	TELEPHONES
001	MAHANI	CONSTANT	COORDONATEUR	DAMARA	72 59 50 14
002	KOLO	OLIVIER	COORDONATEUR	SANGA MB	75 12 75 37
003	NOUBAER	FERDINAND	COORDONATEUR	NOLA	
004	GODONAM	ACHILLE	COORDONATEUR	BOUCA	72 44 89 21
005	NAMKOESSE	FERDINAND	COORDONATEUR	DEKOA	72 08 99 54
006	ZALO	JACQUES	COORDONATEUR	BOSSANGOA	
007	BASSALA	SYLVAIN	COORDONATEUR	SIBUT	72 22 72 84
008	KOMBO	NARCISSE	COORDONATEUR	DAMARA	
009	ZAHORO	SAMUEL	COORDONATEUR	BOZOUM	75 08 22 02
010	MBAINA	FLORENTIN	COM - ZONE	BOZOUM	72 59 45 10
011	BAGAZA	RODRIGUE	COORDONATEUR	MALA	
012	DALIWANE	ALAIN	COM – ZONE	YALOKE	72 56 59 90
013	YABANDA	DIEUDONNE	ADJOINT COM – ZONE	YALOKE	
014	WABILO	GUY	COORDONATEUR	GADZI	72 42 60 01
015	SINAKOLO	SYLVESTRE	COORDONATEUR	CARNOT	
016	DEMOWANSSE	NICE	COORDONATEUR	AMADAGAZA	75 12 90 61
017	YERE	GUY	COORDONATEUR	BOGANGOLO	
018	[illegible]	JO BRICE	COM - ZONE	DAMARA	72 31 67 44
019	BELLA	LOZACK	COM - ZONE	GAGA	
020	YANGOUMALE	STANIE	CEMA	GRIMARI	72 87 55 16
021	FEIGANAZOUI	GUY	COM - ZONE	PK 42	72 35 49 83
022	OUAPOUTOU	BENJAMIN	COM - ZONE	BOSSEMBELE	
023	KPANOU	SEBASTIEN	COORDONATEUR	GRIMARI	72 14 03 42
024	SEREMANDJI	AIME SERGE	COORDONATEUR	NDJO	
025	YAPELE	CHRISOSTOME	COORDONATEUR	BERBERATI	75 45 01 38
026	NAMNENDOLA	SYLVAIN	COORDONATEUR	COROMPOKO	
027	DIKA	BASILE	COORDONATEUR	OUHAM PENDE	72 02 78 35
028	OCTINAM	THIERRY	COM - ZONE	MBOUROUBA	72 31 49 25
029	AZOUNOU	HIPPOLYTE	ADMINISTRATEUR	DAMARA	72 54 39 27
030	YANGUE	BAUDOUIN	S. G NATIONAL	BOGANGOLO	72 21 43 71
031	IYA	ARNAULD	COORDONATEUR	BOUAR	72 21 43 21
032	BARON	ADRAMANE	CONS**LER SPECIAL	DEKOA	72 04 11 86
033	ZOKOUE	MAHAMAT	MEDIATEUR INTERNE	NATIONAL	75 08 16 16

Annex 7.3: Nice Demowance's proof of payment for his artisanal mining license. Document obtained by the Panel on 18 August 2016 from prefectural mining authorities in Berbérati.



N°

TRESOR PUBLIC - QUITTANCE

NICE

Trente mille

NOM COMMERCIAL

PROFESSION OU ACTIVITE

Adresse

BP

LOCALISATION

CLASSE IGU

CLASSE LICENCE

CHIFFRE D'AFFAIRES

CHIFFRE D'AFFAIRES

VALEUR LOCATIVE ANNUELLE

MONTANT DES DROITS DUS

250 000

TAUX

TAUX

PHOTO

Annex 7.4: Incidents in 2016 targeting Muslims in the western diamond production zone in CAR. Incidents taken from the Panel of Experts database (April-October 2016).

Date	Summary
17 April	A Muslim returnee at Berbérati was attacked by an unknown assailant who was occupying his house.
18 April	Two Muslims returnees were about to be lynched by suspected Christian population in Poto Poto, Berbérati.
23 April	An increase in Muslims returning to check on their properties has led to some incidents in Nassole where a Muslim trader was robbed by an anti-balaka element.
1 May	A Muslim was stabbed in the back by an unidentified man in Berbérati.
3 May	A Muslim was attacked as he was asked for some money at Berbérati. The victim was taken to the local hospital.
11 May	Several Muslims returnees were harassed at Poto Poto, Berbérati by a group of 7 former anti-balaka led by someone called Mr. Eto.
20 May	The Muezzin from the Central Mosque in Berbérati, was attacked by a group of presumed anti-balaka elements inside the Mosque while he was getting ready to call Muslims to prayer. The attackers fled. He was later transported to the hospital.
1 June	Alleged anti-balaka elements threat against the Imam of Poto Poto, Berbérati
5 June	Three armed men assaulted a Muslim merchant at Poto Poto, Berbérati.
7 June	The local population demonstrated at Gamboula, Berbérati against Muslim IDP returnees.
20 June	Village youngsters armed with artisanal weapons threatened to attack Muslim traders returning from Cameroon if the traders attempted to claim their former positions at the local market, at Sasso-Nakombo (about 50 km south west of Berbérati).
20- 21 June	Five houses belonging to members of the Muslim community were looted by alleged anti-balaka members in Carnot, Mambéré-Kadeï prefecture. During the attack, a Muslim was reportedly hacked with a machete. An unconfirmed number of houses were torched and at least 20 persons were injured.
22 June	Nine men armed with knives and AK-47 rifles went to the market and attacked two Muslims at Poto Poto, Berbérati.
22 June	MINUSCA reported that while patrolling the area of the market at Poto Poto, Berbérati a group of persons, presumably anti-balaka members, looted two houses belonging to Muslims. MINUSCA intervened to rescue the victims. The aggressors fired at MINUSCA peacekeepers and the patrol returned fire. Three suspects were arrested and kept at the gendarmerie.
22 June	Two Muslims were attacked in Berbérati by a group of six armed men. One of the victims sustained serious injuries and was transferred to the hospital for surgery. Three of the six aggressors have been identified by the local police. The situation was reported very tense.
23 June	Ten Muslims were threatened by former anti-balaka elements in Sosso Nakombo. The Muslims were placed under the protection of the local gendarmerie.
24 June	Following up on the intercommunal tensions in Berbérati and Sosso Nakombo during the night from 22 to 23 June, an undetermined number of Muslims sought refuge at the local gendarmerie due to alleged threats by former anti-balaka members who subsequently surrounded the area. MINUSCA Force was deployed on site to ensure the safety of those threatened.
14 July	In Mambéré Kadeï, the stigmatization of Muslims continues to hinder the return of refugees, as evidenced by the beating of a Muslim in Berbérati.

18 July	On 18 July 2016, in Berbérati, Mambéré-Kadeï prefecture, a Muslim trader was assaulted in the market by a hostile crowd, allegedly led by an anti-balaka known criminal. MINUSCA police extracted the victim from the crowd for his security. The victim was taken to the gendarmerie and subsequently to the Berbérati Court to file a complaint.
20 July	In Haoussa neighbourhood in Bouar, Nana-Mambéré prefecture on 20 July 2016, an anti-balaka element had threatened to harm a Muslim man on 18 July in Haoussa neighbourhood in Bouar.
24 July	In the central market of Berbérati, Mambéré-Kadéi prefecture, a former anti-balaka man, who was recently released from prison, attacked and robbed two Muslims. The victims sustained light wounds, and the perpetrator fled the scene. The victims filed a complaint with the local gendarmerie.
28 September	Cruel and inhuman treatment of a 55-year-old Muslim by anti-balaka elements in Maigaro, Nana-Mambéré prefecture on 28 September 2016.
29 September	Cruel and inhuman treatment of a 30-year-old Muslim by anti-balaka elements in Ndalet, Nana-Mambéré prefecture on 29 September 2016.
9 October	Following the 4-7 October unrest in Bangui, anti-balaka in Nola threatened to retaliate against the Muslim population. The quick response from MINUSCA forces paid dividend and anti-balaka fled away. Local gendarmerie took action to arrest some of the local trouble makers as the situation in Nola is under control.
11 October	In Sokolingui village (60 km south of Nola), Sangha-Mbaéré prefecture, unidentified assailants reportedly killed a Muslim man who was accused of sympathizing with ex-Séléka.
16 October	27 armed ABLK elements with weapon arrived in Mambele, Sangha Mbaere prefecture. ABLK are threatening the Muslim population following the clash at Kaga-Bandoro.
23 October	In Nola, Sangha-Mbaéré prefecture, a group of presumed anti-balaka elements forcibly removed a detained 34-year-old Muslim man from prison, accusing him of being affiliated with ex-Séléka. The attackers beat the victim before throwing him in the Kadei River, believing that he was dead. He received medical assistance from MINUSCA. Following the attack, 19 detainees escaped from police station cells.

Annex 7.5: IDP at Carnot's Church. Photographs taken by the Panel on 31 August 2016.

Living conditions of IDP at Carnot's church.

IDP representatives at Carnot's Church.

Living conditions of IDP at Carnot's church.



Living conditions of IDP at Carnot's church.